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Abstract
Standing by my bedroom window, looking out at the ocean, a huge wave comes and swallows up
my building. Everything around me is gone, including me. I wake up. I am 13 years old and
living in the Coney Island Houses on Surf Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. With ongoing
anthropogenic changes to the natural environment such as sea level rise and intensifying storms,
coastal communities, especially ones segregated by class and culture, are particularly vulnerable
in this context that challenges a way of life, and in some instances, threatens that life’s survival.
This dissertation focuses specifically on what one massive storm—Hurricane Sandy (Superstorm
Sandy)—left behind. This research explored how these experiences impacted the design/
planning professionals’ (architects, planners, landscape architects, engineers) approaches to
future climate-related events, as well as the impacts upon them personally, professionally, and
societally. A single, embedded case study with narrative inquiry was used to gather first-person
accounts and insights into the work, thoughts, and feelings of professionals whom society relies
on increasingly as climate-induced crises proliferate. Data were classified into three pillars:
Personal (impacts on the self/individual, psycho-social challenges, empathy/stress), Professional
(impact to professional practice, reflection on strategies post-Sandy, impact on future events),
and Societal (local and global impacts, leadership). Prominent themes under the personal pillar
were impermanence, emotional resilience, and dignity. Professionally, Sandy left the study
participants looking toward a more reflective design practice. The societal pillar described the
broader social issues that emerged from the interviews. Two significant findings were lack of
equal attention to marginalized communities and lack of diversity and inclusion within the
design/planning profession. As more populations are being impacted by Hurricane Sandy-like
events, designers/planners will need to become leaders in changing to both a reflective and
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proactive stance to professional practice in the context of climate, economic and social justice.
This dissertation is available in open access at AURA: Antioch University Repository and
Archive, http://aura.antioch.edu/, and OhioLINK ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/.

Keywords: Climate Adaptation, Climate Change, Post-Disaster Recovery, Disasters,
Hurricane Sandy, Managed Retreat, Narrative Inquiry, Superstorm Sandy, Design/Planning
Professionals, Resilience, Leadership, Vulnerable/Marginalized Communities
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Chapter I: Introduction
This dissertation is about what a massive storm left behind. Hurricane Sandy hit the New
York region in fall of 2012. The storm’s damage and process of recovery, while certainly the
most obvious, was in the aftermath coupled with many more questions than answers. Did this
mark the beginning of a new normal in the Northeast? How would the storm and its recovery
impact the built and natural environments? How would design/planning professionals,
(custodians within the built environment) address these challenges? Will these challenges change
this profession? How will this impact both the individual practitioner and larger societal issues
that either pre-dated or were the result of a storm of this magnitude?
Since the massive storm occurred, part of its legacy has been to not only rebuild and
recover but to investigate, act, and reflect upon these much larger questions. Although each in its
own right deserves research and study, this dissertation focuses specifically on the impact of
Hurricane Sandy (Superstorm Sandy) on design/planning professionals. Within the context of
this study, the phrase designers/planners is used as a generic phrase that encompasses architects,
planners, landscape architects, and engineers. While each is independent in nature, there is an
interdependency between them all which is further underscored in the aftermath of a climateimpactful event.
There are almost innumerable scholarly and literary accounts of the impacts of great
storms through history: tales of the destruction of the works of humanity and of untimely deaths,
of natural environments—already weakened by human meddling—smashed into unrecognizable
shadows of the protective ecosystems they once had been. However, this story is about a
different array of effects that are not well discussed in academic or other literature: how
Hurricane Sandy changed the social context, the lives and the professional practice of people
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who are sorely needed to help humanity confront such storms and global climate impacts:
designers/planners.
The Genesis of the Research Question
Design/planning professionals respond to post-Sandy-like events in a myriad of different
ways that range from targeted short-term solutions for immediacy to long-term solutions. This
trajectory is the genesis for the following primary research question: In what ways did
post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the design/planning professionals’ approach to future
climate-related events personally (individually), professionally, and societally?
Design/Planning Professionals—Who They Are and Why It Matters
In New York State, a “Design Professional” is defined in the New York State Business
Corporation Law as someone who is licensed in New York as an architect, landscape architect,
professional engineer, land surveyor, or geologist. All of these services are related to the design
and construction of buildings and the spaces around them. (New York State Education
Department, Office of the Professions, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).
According to the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards the definition of
an architect is:
Licensed professionals trained in the art and science of the design and construction of
buildings and structures that primarily provide shelter. An architect will create the overall
aesthetic and look of buildings and structures, but the design of a building involves far
more than its appearance. Buildings also must be functional, safe, and economical and
must suit the specific needs of the people who use them. Most importantly, they must be
built with the public’s health, safety, and welfare in mind. (as cited in Hubbard, 2018,
para. 3)
Planners by definition provide services that are related to the work of these other
professionals. Planners’ work as explained by the American Planning Association (n.d.) is as
follows:
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The goal of planning is to maximize the health, safety, and economic well-being of all
people living in our communities. . . . Planning helps create communities of lasting value.
. . . planners take a broad view while architects often focus on a single building or the
structures themselves (paras. 1–2).
Landscape architects are defined by the American Society of Landscape Architects (n.d.)
as follows: “Landscape architects analyze, plan, design, manage, and nurture the built and
natural environments. Landscape architects have a significant impact on communities and quality
of life” (para 1).
Consulting engineers, as defined by the American Council of Engineering Companies of
New York (n.d.), are,
Licensed professionals . . . who provide design services . . . integral in shaping our
communities and our world—designing our highways, bridges, tunnels, and transit
systems . . . buildings . . . energy-efficient mechanical, electrical and fire safety systems;
and water and wastewater treatment plants. (para. 1)
The American Society of Civil Engineers (n.d.) explains geotechnical engineering as
follows: “Geotechnical engineering utilizes the disciplines of rock and soil mechanics to
investigate subsurface and geologic conditions. These investigations are used to design, and
build foundations, earth structures, and pavement sub-grades” (para. 1).
While there are other practices within the profession of engineering, such as structural for
example, the ones defined above are represented by the participants in this study.
Given the interdependent trajectories and the direct societal impact design/planning
professionals have on the built and natural environments, part of what this study shows is how
they are more than custodians but are in many instances the conscience in collaboration with the
community during the planning of or recovery from a storm like Hurricane Sandy.
A Personal Journey to Sandy and the Dissertation Topic
Standing by my bedroom window, looking out at the ocean, a huge wave comes and
swallows up my building. Everything around me is gone, including me. I wake up. I am
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13 years old and living in the Coney Island Houses on Surf Avenue, Brooklyn, New
York.
As a young girl, I dreamt of becoming a mapmaker—not because I lived in a world that
felt global or vast but because I lived in a world that felt small and constricted. I desperately
wanted to redraw the lines that defined my neighborhood, so I could make it bigger, wider,
longer. I was inspired to do this by the natural world I saw outside my window: the ocean. Its
vastness and movement knew no boundaries. Even when it met the limits of the shore, it could
just as easily move back out and join the bigger part of itself. This was the world I wanted to
become a part of, but short of becoming a mermaid, I took to the urban landscape and began,
with great obsession, drawing lines on the sidewalk with big chunky colorful chalk,
block-by-block up and down Surf and Mermaid Avenues. If I could only draw fast enough, far
enough, long enough, then maybe I could break this spell of isolation by redrawing a world that
separated people by street names, building numbers, racial diversity, and economic disparity. As
time progressed, so did I, and I moved from drawing lines on sidewalks to using words to create
place-based narratives at the crossroads of the individual and the societal. I learned that when
these were contextualized, they did, in fact, become the collective stories upon which cities and
communities are built.
Surf Avenue, Coney Island, and the Projects left a powerful imprint that not only
translated to the city as a very active protagonist in my life but became the foundation for a
dialectical relationship between the natural and built environments. Post-Sandy, the child who
once dreamt of disaster and the adult who wanted to do something about it met in a timeless
space along the shoreline, a foreshadowing of what was yet to come. Figure 1.1 shows me as an
adult standing in front of the apartment complex where I grew up.
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Figure 1.1. The author in front of her childhood home at Coney Island (Brooklyn). Photograph
by Gretchen Bank. Used with permission.
Coney Island was called a war zone during my childhood. Burned-out buildings, arson,
random drug-related and gang-related shootings were part of daily life as was a strong sense of
neighborhood identity and local activism within this multi-racial community. As a graduate
student, I wanted to understand what a war zone was like outside the urban inner city. I studied
the writings of urban planners, many of whom lived in Bosnia during the ethnic cleansing. They
wrote about how the destruction of architecture was used as a weapon of war. By systematically
destroying aspects of urban life that held the greatest cultural and historical memory of its
people, the built environment, once seemingly impenetrable, was reduced to an abstraction.
Writers and urbanists alike described being haunted by the ghosts not just of the people they lost
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but also of the buildings destroyed, communal and familial—a church, mosque, synagogue,
library, theater, school, park.
When I went to Bosnia after that semester, the brutality of the loss of urban geography on
the human psyche was something I saw first-hand. As I watched people in deeply wounded cities
try to adapt and recover, the urban environment took on an eerily human element of vulnerability
and fragility.
On September 11, 2001, while on my way to work, a low-flying plane traveling up
University Place in New York’s East Village looked as though it had gone off-course and was
going to crash into the building directly in front of where I was walking. Instead, it raised its
altitude and continued toward what was to become its ultimate destination, the Twin Towers of
the World Trade Center.
Months later, as a writer on one of the earlier proposals for the site master plan for
Ground Zero, and later as a liaison with the initial design team and the victims’ families, I
experienced how the recovery and rebuilding were far outpacing one’s ability to process the level
of trauma and grief. It was during this time that people in New York became increasingly
sensitized to a professional community—the planning and design community—that most did not
think much about—their impact on our shared, built environment. The terms “architecture,”
“planning,” “structural integrity,” and “progressive collapse,” moved into the collective zeitgeist
along with design charrettes and public hearings.
Not only did 9/11 provide the public with an understanding into the role of these
professionals in response to disasters, it also galvanized the voices of design/planning
professionals within their own community, along with civic and grassroots organizations. This
response was the result of design decisions being made by government officials that did not
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always take the public realm and those of the families and city dwellers into account. Designers/
planners found themselves in the role of helping the city and the country move forward through
the design and rebuilding, but it was also being done in the most traumatic and tragic of
circumstances.
Close to four years later, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast and devastated New
Orleans, Louisiana, and along the coast to Gulfport, Mississippi. Close to a year later, I was
engaged with a team in Iberville, New Orleans, to study an art deco low-income housing
complex as the researcher and custodial storyteller for the people who had lived there and had
been evacuated. It was a short-lived assignment.
While Hurricane Sandy was not an act of terrorism like 9/11, nor as catastrophic as
Hurricane Katrina, lives and homes were lost, and it did have massive economic and physical
impacts.2 Hurricane Sandy also brought into question a different kind of vulnerability from 9/11,
but not so much different from Katrina, in which the boundaries of the built environment and the
natural world blurred with devastating results.
A Dissertation Turning Point in Coming Home to Sandy
After distributing hot meals to displaced people from the parking lot of the Cyclone
Baseball Stadium in Coney Island, post-“Superstorm Sandy” as the media had dubbed it, I walk
along the fractured boardwalk to the building where I grew up. Right below the window that was
once my bedroom, there was a waterline from Sandy’s surge. Sands had shifted from the beach’s
flat grade to mountainous hills in the middle of the streets. Pieces of the boardwalk were
dismembered by the sheer force of the 14-foot storm surge; homes, schools, houses of worship,

2

Although the total reach of economic effects of both catastrophes are difficult to determine overall, September 11
terrorist attacks in New York City are estimated to have cost between $10 billion and $13 billion in property and
infrastructure damage (Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, n.d., para 7), while Superstorm Sandy’s were
approximately $19 billion (PlaNYC, 2013, p. 5).
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businesses penetrated by the ocean or the nearby creek. As I walked from Surf to Mermaid to
Neptune Avenues, the smell of mold permeated the air; possessions lay in wait for the taking on
the sand. Water seized memories and life with velocity and an incomprehensible roar. The force
was merciless.
Walking along the shoreline on that day, trying to help people clean up the debris, the
beach seemed so much smaller than I remembered it to be. The ocean was that odd green color,
more than blue, that it gets in the winter, and the smell of the salty sea air, usually intermingled
with Nathan’s Famous hot dogs and fries, was uncomfortably absent.
It was sobering.
Hurricane Sandy was sobering.
Sea level rise, with an increase of climate-impactful events is sobering.
Sandy was an act of nature. Nature creates a home for all life to exist. Standing on the
shore in the aftermath of Sandy’s wrath, I could not demonize the very thing that had given me
an understanding of hope, beauty, and the vastness of the world. However, I could not deny its
explosive power and how humanity fared in the face of it.
So, where does one go with this preservation of human community and, yet, the changes
in the natural world? The answer will, in part, be determined by the work of design/planning
professionals, in collaboration with communities, governments, and other actors. For this
reason, the research on how those professionals have been impacted by Sandy, needed to be
explored.
New York City had never experienced a storm of this size that had caused so much
damage and affected so many lives (PlaNYC, 2013; see especially Chapter I, “Sandy and Its
Impacts”). Central to this dissertation’s purpose, Sandy is also an instance where design/planning
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professionals, after the first responders, were the ones literally on the front lines of planning,
rebuilding, and reimagining along with the impacted communities, the narrative for their future.
Many of them were also personally impacted either directly or tangentially by the events of
Sandy themselves. How that affected them personally and professionally, and the implications
for coping with future climate change and the disasters it can bring societally, is this
dissertation’s subject and purpose.
Changing Realities Impacting Design/Planning Professionals
Today, New York is a city with 520 miles of coastline, home to more than eight million
people living within five boroughs: Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island,
all within one of the largest natural harbors.
Nearly half of the world’s population lives within 60 miles of the sea, and hundreds of
millions more reside in river valleys. In Hong Kong and Singapore, New York and
Shanghai, thousands of acres of new waterfront land have been created by landfill.
Seas are rising, land is sinking. The soil under Jakarta, Indonesia, for instance, drained
steadily of groundwater, is collapsing four inches a year. (Chu, 2013, para. 6)
Perhaps the place to start in trying to come to terms with what is increasingly becoming
our new reality is at the very core of the human psyche, that we as human beings tend to look at
life as something that goes on forever, until the moment when one realizes that it does not. That
realization is the gateway to enter the paradoxical juncture between the finite—one’s life
span—and the infinite, which includes being part of something bigger than oneself, such as God,
eternity, or the earth itself. It is an existential passage that brings one to a moment of reckoning
and reassessment. From my perspective, this is where we as a society are now standing.
With the increase of climate-related events impacting people across the global
community on a more regular basis, it is not just human beings facing into this paradox but the
natural world as well. It is a planetary message that has gone viral.
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A key question is: Are we listening? And if we are, what are we going to do about it?
And, instrumental to that question is another: Who are the leaders on the front line of this
movement to bridge the natural world with the human-built environment as changes continue to
unfold? And what can they achieve?
How post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impacted the design/planning professionals’
approaches to future climate-related events, as well as the impacts upon them individually
(personally), professionally, and societally, was the basis of this research. The hope is that this
exploration will contribute to the design/planning field and how designers/planners can help lead
communities through disaster to recovery, fully mindful that they, too, are humans who not only
strive to shape events but who also are shaped by them.
About Hurricane Sandy and Climate Change Related Disasters
With ongoing anthropogenic changes to the natural environment, such as sea level rise,
there is a pattern of growing interdependency between the natural world and the human-scale
built environment. Coastal communities are particularly vulnerable in this context that challenges
a way of life, and in some instances, threatens that life’s survival, with relocation strategies
becoming sometimes mandatory options for residents from Newtok Village, Alaska, to
Vunidogoloa Village, Fiji, to Oakwood Beach, Staten Island (post-Hurricane Sandy).
Hurricane Sandy3 made landfall in the New Jersey–New York City area on the evening of
October 29, 2012. From satellite photos, its power and enormity were unmistakable (Figure 1.2).

3

Hurricane Sandy, as it struck New York, was frequently called Superstorm Sandy, in reference to the fact that
while the system was designated a hurricane during its early formation east of the Caribbean Sea, it had been
downgraded, technically to a tropical storm, then upgraded back to a hurricane and back down to a storm, all within
a matter of days (see Blake, Kimberlain, Berg, Cangialosi, & Beven, 2013, especially p. 1). For consistency, I refer
to it as Hurricane Sandy in this dissertation, except when quoting sources using the term “Superstorm.”
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Figure. 1.2. Satellite photo of Hurricane Sandy as eye moves towards New Jersey–New York
shore. Adapted from “Hurricane Sandy,” United States Geological Survey,
(https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/hurricane-sandy). In the public domain.
When Sandy was downgraded from a hurricane to a post-tropical cyclone, people of the
region thought they had dodged a bullet, particularly when there did not seem to be a lot of
rainfall. Nevertheless, there was a powerful wind field that extended for 1,000 miles with winds
topping 90 miles per hour. It was the strength of the wind, in combination with the angle of the
storm, which gave rise to a fast-rising storm surge. These factors were in addition to a full moon
that brought on one of the highest tides of the year in combination with the New York bight and
bathymetry and a disturbance in the jet stream that resulted in the storm’s unanticipated turn west
into New Jersey.
In the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) post-storm report
(Sullivan & Uccellini, 2013), Sandy caused significant damage in both the Caribbean and the
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continental United States. While the highest storm surge and greatest inundation was in New
Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, the water levels rose along the entire East Coast of the
United States from Florida up to Maine. In many of these locations, especially along the coasts
of central and northern New Jersey, Staten Island, and southward-facing shores of Long Island,
the surge was accompanied by powerful waves with storm surge in some areas exceeding eight
feet above ground level. Some coastal communities in New Jersey were without power for
months. The late October timing of the storm also resulted in heavy snows across portions of the
central Appalachians, most particularly in West Virginia and the mountains of western North
Carolina. Snowfall totals were up to 36 inches in these areas. Closer to the coast, more than 12
inches of rainfall resulted in river, stream, and creek flooding over portions of the Mid-Atlantic.
Sandy’s immediate impacts. During Sandy’s surge, the East River was more than nine
feet high. The seawall was overcome by water, and low-lying parts of Lower Manhattan were hit
with a storm surge that rose to 14 feet (Kluger, 2012). Areas became inundated with water
including New York’s Financial District, Battery Park City, eastern parts of Chinatown and the
Lower East Side, and farther north in Chelsea and Greenwich Village. In Chelsea, a four-story
building's facade crumbled and collapsed, leaving the interior on full display during the height of
the storm.
The New York Stock Exchange was closed for two weather-related days, something that
had not happened since the blizzard of 1888. Brooklyn’s Red Hook, Navy Yard, Coney Island,
and Brighton Beach were under several feet of water. Red Hook, with 70% of its community
living in public housing, and surrounded by water on three sides, was devastated by the storm.
In Queens, Long Island City and Jamaica Bay were severely flooded. Breezy Point, a
private community on the far west end, had fires break out and destroy parts of the community
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due to salt-water inundating electrical equipment in homes prior to the Long Island Power
Authority and National Grid turning the power off (Sobel, 2014). While the Bronx was impacted
in areas across Long Island Sound, if the storm had hit at a slightly different angle, it could have
heavily damaged Hunts Point in the South Bronx, New York’s primary food distribution center.
Staten Island, especially along its southern shore in communities such as Oakwood Beach,
Midland Beach, Ocean Breeze, and South Beach, that are built on swamp land with only low
dunes to protect them, had the highest rates of fatality.
There were 6,500 patients who had to be evacuated from hospitals and nursing homes;
1.1 million children were unable to attend school for a week; nearly 90,000 buildings flooded
with water (K. H. Jacob, 2015; PlaNYC, 2013). There were 650,000 homes damaged or
destroyed; 200,000 small business closures due to damage or power outages (Ovink &
Boeijenga, 2018). Insurers said that New York suffered $19 billion in damages (PlaNYC, 2013),
and insurers say the total loss was $65 billion, of which $30 billion were insured losses (Munich
Re, 2013).
With the entrances of tunnels being close to sea level, there was an attempt to keep the
water out. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) shut down the entire subway
system—all 660 miles of track and 468 stations—impacting more than 5.3 million commuters at
the time (Kluger, 2012). Specifically, air vents and station entrances were covered; for example,
“The impromptu plywood dam they threw up to protect the 148th Street tunnel in East Harlem,
saved the No. 3 line from flooding” (Sobel, 2014, pp. 147–148). PATH trains were also shut
down. Seven other subway tunnels were flooded along with the Brooklyn–Battery Tunnel,
Midtown Tunnel to Queens, and Holland Tunnel to New Jersey. The Lincoln Tunnel was the
only one not flooded. Runways at both LaGuardia and JFK airports were also submerged, with
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flights cancelled at LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark International airports, and the airports were
closed during and immediately after the storm.
Subways were shut down for an unprecedented amount of time, coming back on-line
within a week. The power station at the East River and 13th Street was shorted out by the
salt-water inundation and caused a huge transformer explosion. In addition, two other lower
Manhattan substation outages resulted in blackouts that lasted for days from downtown
Manhattan with a dividing line in midtown above 30th Street where residents had power. There
were no traffic lights, no working cash machines, and nowhere to get a hot cup of coffee or a
meal. Places that had their own generators set up recharging stations so that people could charge
their phones. There were impromptu ice cream parties and makeshift barbeques in backyards and
on building stoops as people salvaged what they could from a defrosting refrigerator to share
with neighbors and passing strangers. Power was out to 1.1 million people in New York City and
within the New York–New Jersey region, more than 8.5 million people were without electricity.
Countless trees, and subsequently power lines, were brought down by the rain and heavy winds.
Over one hundred million gallons of raw sewage was released into Hewlett Bay on Long Island,
two days after Sandy (Ovink & Boeijenga, 2018).
In New Jersey, Sandy’s core hit near Atlantic City, and the damage was extensive along a
coastline that is composed of mostly flat barrier islands (Figure 1.3) When the peak surge hit, the
sea split Island Beach, located in Mantoloking, in two. Seaside Heights, known for its
amusement park, had ruptured gas lines, and the small community of Camp Osborne went up in
flames.
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Figure 1.3. Damage from Hurricane Sandy at Mantoloking, NJ. From “Aerial photograph of
Hurricane Sandy storm damage at Mantoloking, New Jersey coastline,” United States Geological
Survey (2012). Photo by Greg Thompson, USFWS (https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/aerialphotograph-hurricane-sandy-storm-damage-mantoloking-new-jersey-coastline). In the public
domain.
Hoboken, an island until the 20th century, lies predominantly below sea level. More than
half of the city flooded, either from the surge or sewers backing up. (Sobel, 2014, p. 154). Gas
shortages also developed, and New Jersey Governor Christie, later followed by New York City
Mayor Bloomberg, began an odd–even day rationing. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 capture but a minute
sense of the vast destruction wrought by the storm in residential areas.
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Figure 1.4. Debris scattered about a Brooklyn shorefront. Photo by MCC J. Ryan, U.S. Marine
Corps. (https://www.marines.mil/Photos/?igphoto=2000001214). In the public domain.

Figure 1.5. House on Brooklyn shorefront after Sandy. Photo by “Proud Novice,” 2012.
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Damage_from_Hurricane_Sandy_to_house_in_Brook
lyn,_NY.jpeg). Creative Commons License BY-SA 3.0.
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Sandy did not discriminate between areas of privilege and those areas that were less
privileged and therefore more vulnerable. However, in the aftermath of Sandy the impacts were
experienced differently. Household income had a huge impact on how quickly people could
build back their lives. Thirty percent of homeowners and 65% of renters who registered with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had household incomes that were at or well
below the federal poverty level for a family of three. Sandy destroyed over 300,000 housing
units in New York City, many of which were home to economically disadvantaged households.
There were 402 New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) buildings that lost electricity and
access to elevators, and many lost heat and water. In total, over 77,000 residents were heavily
impacted due to storm. The Housing Authority was unprepared to deal with the extent of
destruction and the consequential needs of its residents, especially those most vulnerable,
including the elderly and disabled (New York Women’s Foundation Strategic Learning
Department, 2015).
The direct death toll from Hurricane Sandy—including as it changed into what came to
be called Superstorm Sandy—was estimated to be a total of 147 people (Blake, Kimberlain,
Berg, Cangialosi, & Beven, 2013) including 43 in New York; 12 in New Jersey; nine in
Maryland; six in Pennsylvania; five in West Virginia; four in Connecticut; two in Virginia; and
one in North Carolina. One person died in Canada, and at least 67 people were killed in the
Caribbean, including 54 in Haiti. Blake et al. (2013) pointed out that at the time this was the
deadliest hurricane to hit the United States, outside the South, since Hurricane Agnes in 1972.
Residents and government officials did not anticipate that the storm would breach the
vulnerable areas marked by FEMA on their flood zone map with such veracity. Certainly, no one
expected that its extent would invalidate FEMA’s mapping by moving beyond what was
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considered a vulnerable location. It should be noted that in this reference, the term vulnerable is
defined as the actual physical location of a site. It is not meant to infer the use of vulnerable areas
in the sole context of economic vulnerability. Yes, people believed that an event like Sandy
would happen someday, just not in their lifetime. In fact, according to a report done about Sandy
by the Natural Resources Defense Council, it was noted that “the record-breaking flood height
and storm surge that accompanied Sandy was on par with the New York City Panel on Climate
Change projections for the 2050s” (Knowlton & Rotkin-Ellman, 2014, para. 4). In 2015, updated
FEMA flood maps were produced that expanded the areas of risk based upon the flooding from
Sandy which New York City’s current Mayor de Blasio appealed. New FEMA flood maps are
not expected until 2024. Without a common set of flood maps, more people are left exposed,
especially those in vulnerable communities.
Implications of Sandy for designers/planners. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the
long-term objective that ran through many of the planning initiatives is to develop communities
that are more sustainable in the face of climate impacts. The phrase sustainable communities has
a variety of different meanings. In their sustainability framework, The American Planning
Association (2016) relied on a common definition of sustainability, developed by several NGOs
and UN agencies in 1991.
Given the rise of sustainability as a concept over the last decade, there are many different
versions of definitions of sustainability. Most definitions reference the need to respect
environmental, economic, and social conditions. Another common element is managing
resources for both current and future generations. For the purposes of the Policy
Framework, the following definition of sustainability is used: Sustainability means
improving the quality of people’s lives while living within the capacities of supporting
natural and human systems. (p. 5)
Tackling these issues in a comprehensive way requires systemic solutions of frameworks
and leadership that shift the current thinking, perceptions, and values. An outgrowth of this
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expansion in thinking is a fundamental change in our collective moral compass where inclusion,
respect, and dignity are interconnected as part of a complex system of people, place, profit, and
planet. While each of us may be called upon to embody these ideas in our own unique way, the
professional planners, architects, engineers, landscape architects, and builders are on the front
line. Not only are they the front lines for reimagining solutions in response to these events, but
they are the ones by the very nature of their responsibilities who will be impacted in terms of
evolved elements of their professions and mapping their own personal and professional
experiences. According to one summary report prepared by a climate change network of
megacities from around the world: (it should be noted that the definition of a megacity from the
Cambridge Dictionary is “a very large city, especially one with more than 10 million people
living it” (Megacity, n.d.).
By 2050, over 570 low-lying coastal cities will face projected sea level rise by at least 0.5
meters.
•

Over 800 million people will be at risk from the impacts of rising seas and storm
surges.

•

The global economic costs to cities, from rising seas and flooding, could amount to
$1 trillion by mid-century.

•

Local factors mean that cities will experience sea level rise at different paces. Cities
on the east coast of the United States, along with major cities in Asia, are particularly
vulnerable.

•

Sea level rise and flooding can impact essential services such as energy, transport,
and health. When Hurricane Sandy struck New York in 2012, coastal floods impacted
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an estimated 90,000 buildings; 2 million people lost power, which caused extensive
damage and disrupted commercial activity to a cost of over $19 billion.
•

Resilience strategies, strengthened coastal protection, upgrades to existing buildings
and infrastructure, relocation from the most at-risk areas as well as community
engagement and preparedness can help cities adapt to sea level rise and coastal
flooding. (C40 Cities, n.d., paras. 1–6)

The final bullet in this overview cues a central role and a need for designers/planners
whose work centers on decisions and approaches to building for resilience and engaging with
leaders and options such as rebuilding and relocation. The readiness of these professions and
their ability to guide these decisions, will depend on how previous experiences with climate
crises have affected these groups of people.
The Study’s Purpose
When disasters strike, people are strongly affected, often harmed, but always changed.
Understandably, impacts on affected communities and their citizens have been the primary focus
of aftermath studies along with the broad-scale effects on natural ecosystems (Erikson, 1976;
Friesma, Caporaso, Goldstein, Linberry, & McCleary, 1979; Lindell & Prater, 2003). Literature
on the social, psychological, economic, and cultural impacts of disasters related to climate
change are reviewed in Chapter II. However, when it comes to professionals whose work is vital
dealing with the short- and long-term effects of such disasters, especially after the immediate
emergency subsides, studies tend to be about their work as a mitigating factor, not about how
they themselves have been impacted and changed by the disaster and by what they have had to
do as a result of disasters. Those impacts are the subject of this dissertation. By gathering and
analyzing the narratives of designers/planners in relation to Hurricane Sandy, I have garnered
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first-person accounts and insights into the work, the thoughts, and the feelings of professionals
who society will rely on more and more as climate impactful events proceed.
Clearly, the ability of the New York/New Jersey coastal region, and other urbanized
coastlines worldwide, to deal with the complex and uncertain future against a backdrop of
heightened effects of global warming, will require a wide array of professional work under
conditions that are far from normal. Medical professionals are an obvious example who are
bound to be in unusually high demand when catastrophes strike, whether these are
climate-related or not. Other professions who become engaged to their capacity when hurricanes,
floods, and forest fires strike include fire fighters, law enforcement, as well as a wide variety of
rescue workers, some professionally trained, but many not. These practitioners are collectively
referred to as first responders and researchers have undertaken an increasing amount of study
over the last several decades on how first responders and their effectiveness is impacted.
While these and other professions take leading roles in dealing with the acute phase of
disaster recovery, societies need to plan mid- and longer-term responses—and the ones who are
central to such initiatives as recovery, rebuilding, relocation, adaptation, mitigation, and
prevention, like first responders—do their work amidst highly traumatic situations and distraught
fellow citizens and neighborhoods.
For designers/planners, professional responsibility especially relates to the mid- to
long-term. Like other professionals, they are likely to be placed in situations of tragic choices
that have the characteristics of what in medicine is called triage: “the selection and categorization
of the victims of a disaster with the view to appropriate treatment according to the degree of
severity of illness or injury, and the availability of medical and transport facilities” (Domres,
Koch, Manger, & Becker, 2001, p. 53).
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Making these kinds of choices, whether in a makeshift medical tent or in considering who
will be helped and listened to, for example, the relocation of physically vulnerable communities,
will be stressful; if the disaster is huge, it may be stressful enough to incapacitate helping
professionals temporarily or long-term. In preliminary discussions about this doctoral research,
several design/planning professionals referred even to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as
something to consider among those who have been most deeply involved in dealing with such
events as Hurricane Sandy (2012); Hurricane Katrina (2005); and more recent disasters including
Hurricane Matthew (2016), and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria (all of which struck in the late
summer of 2017); Hurricanes Florence, Michael (2018); and Hurricanes Barry, Dorian and
Humberto (2019).
These practitioners must do this amidst stresses also unforeseen and perhaps
unforeseeable. Thus, we need to understand how professionals will cope, adapt, and successfully
face the unknown, if possible. There are few professions that will not be affected. Having gone
through Hurricanes Katrina, Ike, Sandy, and a growing steady number of other climate-related
catastrophes, such as wildfires in California, has been a reminder of the diversity of professions
whose ability—and equanimity—will be needed and yet jeopardized by the uncertainty and the
scale of events. This new zeitgeist of natural disasters will include medical professionals whose
facilities will be severely strained at the very time that a spike of physically and mentally
traumatized patients need them; it will include police, fire, and other emergency workers; it will
include engineers who are called upon to restore infrastructure. My focus is on a group that has a
special role to play in facing climate change and catastrophic events: designers/planners,
including architects, landscape architects, planners, and engineers. There is some scholarly and
related documentation about the role that planners face in disastrous events generally (e.g.,
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Litman, 2006; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, & Smith, 1998) and climate change in particular
(e.g., Dubois, Cloutier, Rosenkilde-Rynning, Adolphe, & Bonhomme, 2016). But, to repeat,
there appears to be very little research on how these professionals are impacted by experiencing
disasters on which they will be later working.
One of the leading authorities of cities in the 20th century, Lewis Mumford (1960), wrote
in The Culture of Cities: “Cities are a product of the earth, whereby people transform a
nature-based reality into a place of physical form that supports human growth and sustenance”
(p. 3). Though not an architect or planner, Mumford became a spokesperson for the Regional
Planning Association of America—a leading professional organization of practicing planners and
designers. Environmental degradation and its impact on our cities and their social fabric became
a main focus of his professional and personal discourse.
Today, designers/planners are facing their own kind of critical examination of their role
in the context of the transformation of the built and natural environments.
In 2016, an estimated 54.5 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban settlements.
By 2030, urban areas are projected to house 60 per cent of people globally, and one in
every three people will live in cities with at least half a million inhabitants (United
Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs, 2016, p. ii)
A later report from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, predicted
68%—2.5 billion more people—could live in urban areas by 2050 (Lardieri, 2018).
In this highly vulnerable stage after a climate impactful event, the design or planning
professional is, in fact, addressing a situation where not only the physical but the psychosocial
has changed (Mooney et al., 2011). The psychosocial was defined by an advisory group
following the 2011 New Zealand Canterbury Earthquakes during the disaster recovery phase, as
“encompassing cultural, psychological, social, economic and physical (including housing,
infrastructure and physical health) dimensions that are part of the regeneration of a community
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that has experienced adversity” (Mooney et al., 2011, p. 3). That begins to give a sense of just
how complex and wide an array of issues and considerations designers/planners need to be
taking account of in aftermaths of climate change related disasters.
The Research Context, Questions, and Focus
The problem context in brief. Philosopher Takashi Uchiyama, in talking about recovery
in the context of Japan, a country that has had more than its share of natural and human-made
disasters, states:
The main subject for the recovery is neither “people,” nor “nature.” It is not granting
from the government, or experts who instigate the process as “recovery from zero.”
What shapes the recovery processes are relations: relations between human beings and
nature, relations between people, relations between us and those we lost, including our
ancestors, relations between our lives and local cultures and histories. (Uchiyama as
cited in Murakami & Murakami-Wood, 2014, p. 238)
What became increasingly clear through the body of the research and the narratives of the
professionals that were interviewed for this study, is that recovery and planning in advance of
any future events is not in isolation, nor is it pre-prescribed. It is a shared approach done for an
agreed upon common purpose. It follows that designers/planners—whether architects, planners,
landscape architects, or engineers—are in relationship-based professions in which they create or
enhance place and space within the built environment. The work is technical, but it is also
inescapably about relationships. That inclusive approach is especially critical when designing or
planning for climate-vulnerable communities or in response and rebuilding in communities,
post-disaster. This was underscored post-Sandy, when many of the efforts, later described within
this chapter, focused on moving beyond negotiating solutions and toward building even better
results. To accomplish this type of approach requires transparency and trust developed from a
relationship-based perspective that Uchiyama so eloquently described. More often than not,
designers/planners may be working within a community where they have no previous
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on-the-ground history. While this presents its own set of challenges, the narratives in Chapter IV
describes how these challenges have been approached from a variety of perspectives.
Designers/planners are not regularly exposed to disaster-related events, so there is no
direct correlation as part of the professional expectation of working with the psychosocial
dynamics of people within communities when they are planning for or implementing plans for
recovery and rebuilding.
Consider this dynamic following the experience with Hurricane Sandy. Immediately after
such a disaster, there is a period of shock followed by the global awareness that what had just
happened was even worse than anyone had initially anticipated. This juxtaposition creates an
understandable amount of disorientation and emotions that include fear, confusion, and loss. This
disorienting dilemma is often where designers/planners are entering when they begin to work
with communities in the recovery and adaption stages. A disorienting dilemma (Mezirow, 2000)
is part of a transformative learning theory in which an individual confronts situations that
challenge professional and personal paradigms of assumptions, beliefs, and values. Experiencing
such a dilemma can result in a discourse that is more relational and inclusive. In light of this, the
study focused on the ways in which design/planning practitioners have coped, were personally
impacted, and how they would approach the next climate-related event based upon their
experiences.
Main and interrelated research questions. Recognizing these challenges through the
primary research question, in what ways did post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the
design/planning professionals’ approach to future climate-related events personally,
professionally, and societally, a number of other potential foreshadowed questions have been
explored as relevant to the participants’ stories, including the following:
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•

As a result of Hurricane Sandy and other climate impactful events, how have
designers/planners developed solutions that reshape thinking and behavior around
two of the most challenging issues that we will have to face in the coming decades:
sea level rise and drought?

•

How are designers/planners addressing controversial adaptive measures such as
managed retreat?

•

How do or will they cope with the impacts and use the learning inherent in working in
a crisis situation in charting the new course for New York and, by implication, other
human communities in the face of the changing global climate?

•

As a result of what they experienced during and after Sandy, have they or their
practices changed?

•

How did Sandy’s impact on marginalized or economically challenged communities
impact their perspective and approach personally, professionally, and societally?

•

Have designers/planners evolved a more nuanced appreciation for their role amidst
the greater complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts of this
extraordinary context?

•

Does this new and often shocking context for their work and their lives, test their
limits personally, professionally, and societally? Has there been an emergence of
professional paradigms that recognize certain limitations and the resultant need for
designing and planning for contingency and surprises?

In effect, designers/planners are walking into situations that are atypical—which is, in
essence, at the core of the research for this study. Some would say that atypical contexts are,
paradoxically, the rule and not the exception for the professions of design/planning. Schön
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(1983) in The Reflective Practitioner, wrote, “The institutional context of planning is notoriously
unstable” (p. 204). Many others before and since have stressed that the designer/planner, perhaps
more than most other professionals, is always working with issues in contexts that are wrought
with—again in Schön’s (1983) words—“complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and
value conflicts” (p. 14). In a post-Sandy scenario, designers/planners enter a space of
disequilibrium with individuals whose very community and personal wellbeing has been
threatened. Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky (2009), in the context of leadership, state of such
situations:
You have to help people navigate . . . as they sift through what is essential and what is
expendable, and as they experiment with solutions to the adaptive challenge at hand. This
disequilibrium can catalyze everything from conflict, frustration, and panic to confusion,
disorientation, and fear of losing something dear. This is not what you are paid to do and
will certainly not be as well received as when you are mobilizing people to address a
technical issue that is within their competence or requires expertise that can be readily
obtained. Consequently, when you are practicing adaptive leadership, distinctive skills
and insights are necessary to deal with this swirling mass of energies. You need to be
able to do two things: (1) manage yourself in that environment and (2) help people
tolerate the discomfort they are experiencing. You need to live into the disequilibrium.
(pp. 28–29)
This perspective on leadership was particularly insightful when evaluating participants’
approaches to design and planning challenges post-Sandy and what changes need to be made in
the future, based upon both their professional and personal experiences.
Framework for interpreting planning and design practice after Sandy: The three
pillars. To organize the approach to this intricate and daunting knot of questions, the normative
work of Lederach (1997, 2003) was most inspiring. He focused on peacekeepers rather than
designers/planners, but the settings within which these practitioners work bear strong
similarities. Both are caught up in “repair and prevention” work in contexts where traumatic
human suffering and physical destruction surrounds them. Both peacekeepers, on one hand, and
designer/planners, on the other, are expected to both solve critical immediate issues, yet lay the
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ground for better societal futures where the sorry conditions do not recur and, hopefully, better
worlds exist for deeply impacted human beings.
Lederach (2003) proposed four categories of adaptive response for peacekeepers to grasp
and strengthen their crucial work and working lives:
Personal: Changes affected in and desired for the individual;
Relational: Changes in face-to-face relationships;
Structural: [Coming to understand] the underlying causes of conflict;
Cultural: Changes produced by conflict in the broadest patterns of group life. (pp.
23–26)
From Lederach’s (1997) perspective, effecting such changes is the key intended outcome
for peacekeepers in these contexts: reconciliation.
Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns
about both the past and the future can meet. Reconciliation-as-encounter suggests that
space for the acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future is the necessary
ingredient for reframing the present. (p. 27)
In looking at the work and mission of designers/planners post-Sandy, I believe that
reconciliation also describes the ideal towards which they work. There are more than enough
interpersonal and social divides for them to reckon with as traumatized people struggle to resume
and be protected in good lives in the wake of disasters. Social conflict abounds and is
accentuated after disasters, as was seen nowhere more dramatically than in New Orleans,
post-Katrina. But in the aftermath of climate-driven catastrophes, there is renewed urgency as
well, for a broader reconciliation between humans and the natural environment (cf. Ashby,
1978).
The research has drawn from Lederach’s (1997, 2003) agenda for peacekeepers in his
work on reconciliation, broadly speaking, as a means of looking at the core issues being faced by
designers/planners in terms of three pillars—related to, though not quite commensurate with his
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four categories of adaptive response to conflict. The pillars for breaking down and understanding
the strategy and impacts are:
•

Personal—Impacts on the self/individual; psycho-social challenges, such as
empathy/stress

•

Professional—Impact to professional practice, reflections on strategies
post-Hurricane Sandy, and impact on future events.

•

Societal—Local and global impacts, leadership.

Figure 1.6 figuratively summarizes this framework. These categories of impact have been
the way to “step in” to the undoubtedly bewildering complexity of the experiences of
designers/planners as they were impacted by and continued to respond on society’s behalf to
Hurricane Sandy and other climate impactful events. The pillars differ from what one expects of
literal pillars, which include a solidity and something that will persist as they are when first
created. Instead this structure is my way of organizing questions and the data that this
dissertation yields. The questions from what I had initially planned did change in the course of
my research. These changes were informed by the “talk back”4 to my initial formulations of this
work.

4

The notions of “stepping in” to problematic situations and then listening to the “talk back” of what
results from studying them, are drawn from Schön’s (1983) view of research as a “reflective
conversation” (p. 268) with the research problem.
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Figure 1.6. Three pillars used as the framework for understanding the impacts on and strategies
developed for post-Sandy challenges by designers/planners.
In addition to Lederach’s (2003) work with and for peacekeepers, there are a number of
other professions by which designers/planners can be informed. By the nature of a longer history
of this type of disaster-related work, these professions bring much insight into
multi-disciplinary challenges the design community may need to address with an increase in
“Sandy-like” impactful events. This cross-professional pollination is essential because the entire
way that professional activity has been understood, both post-disaster as well as planning for
vulnerable communities, has had to undergo significant change in the recent past. At a seminar
convened by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2011, Leonard Doyle of
the International Organization for Migration in Haiti observed:
Quite honestly, I think a little over three decades ago we did fairly well in bringing
communities back into recovery and then moving into rehabilitation. But things have
obviously changed . . . I must admit I really thought that we could handle pretty much
anything . . . But we’ve come to the conclusion recently that we don’t have all the
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answers. Two things have happened. One, very healthily, we have recognized that
disaster management is just not a health discipline, it is the first multidisciplinary
discipline including social sciences, anthropology, religions, etc. Increasingly we are
looking to those elements of society to come up with the answers that we can no
longer supply. Things are a lot more complex. We have to move outside of our
traditional disaster management assets, look much more, not only with [other
disciplines] but certainly the community. (Doyle as quoted in Scribner & Herzer,
2011, pp. 33–34)
This quote underscores the importance of having aligned professional disciplines outside
the immediate study area as part of the research. The following four professionals who had
worked on the ground beside design/planning professionals were interviewed as part of this
study:
•

a communication specialist, who underscored how the impact of the narrative
post-Hurricane Sandy impacted design/planning professionals;

•

a social activist from Occupy Sandy who worked in conjunction with design/planning
professionals during the recovery;

•

an activist/storyteller who provided insights into some of the challenges being faced
by designers/planners; and

•

an urban strategist who refers to herself as a “community activator,” and was
instrumental as a consensus builder with designers/planners in the aftermath of
Sandy.

Designers/planners can learn much about the changes they will be affected by from other
practitioners who work in the aftermath of climate-intensified storms. There is a further body of
literature that is examined in Chapter II on such changes, both for designers/planners, and from
other areas of intervention from which much can be learned.

32
The Methodological Approach Previewed
Given that the methods and research plan are outlined in Chapter III, an initial overview
of the research approach is offered here. An embedded case study research design was chosen,
due to the complex and contextualized nature of the object of study (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin,
2014). This approach allowed for the exploration of the impact of Sandy on design/planning
professionals from different perspectives and integrated multiple data sources (Scholz & Tietje,
2002). Within this structure, the study utilized biographical narrative inquiry (Chamberlayne,
Bornat, & Wengraf, 2000) and focused on the stories of designers/planners engaged in those
initiatives. One of the key reasons for using a narrative inquiry methodology is because it
provides a structure for parsing out the struggle between the aspirational aspects of the
profession and the practicality of the actual ground action over a period of days, weeks, months,
years, and even decades. This requires a structure where complex, seemingly conflicted realities
can co-exist in the mind of the interviewee; their narrative must prevail, however odd it may
seem to the researcher, and can only do so if it has space, rather than the researcher-imposed
categories. Narrative stories are the best way to hold and convey the depth of this experience and
information. The stories these professionals shared are critical to understanding not only what the
best approaches are for going forward to meet those challenges, but also, in parallel, the impact
of those narratives within themselves and each other.
For this portion of the study, professionals who were engaged post-Sandy, and who may
have also participated in similar type of events prior to or since, were interviewed, focusing on
their first-hand accounts within the larger societal context, alongside the personal and
professional impact of the three pillars: Personal, Professional, and Societal.
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The findings of the study are organized into two components using a research procedure
of two-tiered sampling. Details are further described in Chapter III, but in summary, the first part
centered on interviews approached and aimed at drawing forth 28 robust stories. This consisted
of architects, planners, landscape architects, engineers, and several associated professionals that
worked closely with designers/planners. Therefore, four of these narratives included an urban
strategist, communication specialist, activist/storyteller, and social activist. A focus group, which
tested the study’s findings, included one architect, one architect/planner, and one landscape
architect/architect.
The general method of data gathering was biographical narrative interviewing in which
fairly minimal questioning or prompts from the researcher were used, leaving the participant
wide latitude to structure his or her “stories of Sandy” in his or her own way. Some questions
about each participant’s professional background were asked so that there was a foundational
base of information prior to delving into more personal experiences. This yielded a range of
insights based directly on the design/planner’s lived experience. While the focus was on the
post-Sandy experience and the effect on the design/planning professionals, the participants did
bring up other places they worked before or after Sandy as a further means of expanding upon
their response to Sandy. The second part of this two-tiered research approach was in the form of
a focus group, which consisted of three professionals, who were given a series of questions with
the intent of triangulating the research and testing the viability of specific responses from the
study with them. Details on the plan for this focus group discussion and on the subsequent
analysis of the recorded discussion are described in Chapters III and IV.
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An Overview of Post-Sandy Strategies Engaging Design/Planning Professionals
In the aftermath of a major disaster striking one of the world’s largest and most
prominent urban regions, an array of different initiatives with the broad intent of reconstruction
and prevention of recurrence were put into place.
This section provides an overview of the main post-Sandy initiatives on which
designers/planners worked. Participants in this study have participated significantly in one or
more of these initiatives:
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency,
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Rebuild by Design,
New York Rising/Buy It Back (a New York State initiative),
Build It Back (a New York City initiative), and
Occupy Sandy (a grassroots initiative that overlapped with a number of these
programs).
Political and agency leaders strove to plan and act in ways that could support residents
and communities with short-and long-term responses to the effects of the storm. They vary in
several important ways based upon the extent to which affected communities’ perspectives were
central or not, and in the larger view of the storm as a rare catastrophe versus a symptom on
longer-term “permanent white water” (Vaill, 1996, book subtitle). Vaill defines a fast-changing
reality that pervades an existing paradigm as a permanent white water. He goes on to stress the
importance of life-long learning within this context: “The presence of permanent white water
demands that we look anew at the challenge of continued lifelong learning—what it involves,
what the barriers are, and whether we even understand it well enough to practice it (Vaill, 1996,
p. 20).
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This concept of permanent white water and life-long learning not only pertains to the
challenges political and agency leaders may have been facing post-Sandy, but it also pertains to
the narrative interviews during the research phase of the dissertation. Many of the
design/planning professionals post-Sandy were faced with certain technical challenges that made
them feel as if they were engaging in a level of learning for which even decades in the profession
had not prepared them.
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency.
“I think we’re deluding ourselves,” says Ron Shiffman, a veteran city planner. “There’s
only so far you can kick the can down the road. We know sea-level rise will be six feet by
the end of the century. That’s an enormous amount; we need to be able to plan for it.”
(Murphy, 2015, para. 8)
In December 2012, Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced the development of the NYC
Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) to address creating a more resilient New
York City, post-Hurricane Sandy. The focus was on developing plans to prepare and protect
more than a dozen communities throughout New York. Organized by public officials and
stakeholders and design/planning professionals, meetings were set up within the heavily
impacted communities, to share ideas and to listen to community concerns about the rebuilding
and resiliency process. As a result, relationships were built and people who had a “big stake in
the challenge, whatever their perspectives, were listened to and their interests and voices were
taken into account” (p. 135), as Heifetz et al. (2009), in discussions of adaptive leadership
described. This gave those in positions of authority, alongside the stakeholders, the opportunity
to look at some of the technical aspects that were being suggested (sea walls, for example) and
discuss these within the context of the adaptive challenge.
The final SIRR report, A Stronger More Resilient New York, was released in June 2013
(PlaNYC, 2013), resulting in an array of recommended pilot projects for rebuilding the
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communities impacted by Sandy and increasing the resilience of infrastructure and buildings
citywide. This new effort preceded a number of other programs and frameworks that advanced
the work with which NYC SIRR initially began. As a result, for example, New York City with
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers replenished beaches in vulnerable areas like Coney Island and
Rockaway as well as rebuilt dunes on Staten Island.
Rebuild by Design.
“We didn’t want to just build barriers; we wanted to build an ecosystem,” said Henk
Ovink, a Dutch water-management expert who also served as a senior adviser to the
Presidential Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, a group within the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, which earmarked billions for the program. “For that to
happen, we have to live with the water, to understand it, while still understanding our
vulnerabilities.” (Feuer, 2014, para. 4)
Rebuild by Design (RBD) began as part of former President Barack Obama’s Hurricane
Sandy Rebuilding Strategy led by a task force. The President signed an executive order in
December 2012 that created the task force, with work that began in February 2013, culminating
in a detailed, multi-faceted report by August of the same year.
RBD began in June 2013, “to promote resilience in the Sandy-affected region by
attracting world-class talent to develop innovative projects” (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task
Force, 2013, p. 4). This resulted in an international design competition led by HUD with a
high-ranking planning official from the Netherlands, Henk Ovink, on loan to the United States
from the Dutch government. The intended outcome was that this would become the model of
working with communities in post-disaster recovery, one that was more holistic in nature so that
the model of recovery was not dictated, but done in concert with each specific community, and
with sources of funding and leadership that involve design/planning professionals as well as
non-profit organizations with a history of community-based change locally and world-wide. The
organizations in partnership with HUD for the competition included The Municipal Art Society
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of New York, Regional Plan Association, Institute for Public Knowledge–NYU, Van Alen
Institute, and support from The Rockefeller Foundation and other philanthropic partners.
New York Rising/Buy It Back. The NY Rising Community Reconstruction (NYRCR)
Program described itself as a “participatory recovery and resiliency initiative that supports the
planning and implementation of community-developed projects to 124 communities severely
damaged by Superstorm Sandy, Hurricane Irene, and Tropical Storm Lee” (Governor's Office of
Storm Recovery, n.d.-b, para. 1). Unlike Rebuild by Design, NYRCR was not an international
design but administered at the state level by the New York State Governor’s Office of Storm
Recovery (GOSR). NYRCR was overseen by a planning committee that assessed storm
damages, risks, community needs and opportunities, and developed strategies that encompassed
both recovery and resiliency. As part of the post-Sandy initiative, the GOSR also managed the
State’s voluntary Buyout and Acquisition Programs (Buy It Back) in which homeowners could
ask the state to buy back properties that were substantially damaged or destroyed. A similar
buyout program was developed by Governor Christie of New Jersey.
This state program was a departure from the NYC SIRR plan in that it refused to
entertain withdrawal or a strategy that has been attracting considerable attention—managed
retreat—which means acceding to there being some impacted areas that are never to be rebuilt
(cf. Agyeman, Devine-Wright, & Prange, 2009).
The NY Rising Acquisition Program was created by GOSR to offer individual
homeowners whose property was in the floodplain and have suffered substantial damage, the
opportunity to sell their homes to GOSR to be auctioned for redevelopment and elevation. The
NY Rising initiative focused on developing reconstruction plans in 124 New York State
communities well beyond the immediate New York metropolitan area.
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A press release from the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (2017) about the
Acquisition Program, stated that the goal of this program was to give storm-impacted owners in
affected neighborhoods a chance to sell their uninhabitable homes, allowing the properties to be
redeveloped in accordance with local codes as new, resilient housing to replace vacant
storm-damaged properties. Over the course of three auctions, beginning in May 2015, GOSR
auctioned 470 properties for a total of $73 million; 466 of these are now in private hands, and 44
properties have completed reconstruction. Projects included in the planning ranged from
community-wide infrastructure improvements, retrofits of critical community facilities with
emergency backup, and training programs.
Build It Back. The Build It Back Program of the NYC Mayor’s Office of Housing
Recovery Operations has been by far the most controversial of all the post-Sandy programs. It
was announced seven months after Sandy to help New Yorkers in the five
boroughs—Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island—to rebuild their homes and
also to improve the resiliency of their homes in communities impacted by Sandy. It was
described to potential beneficiaries as follows:
If your home was demolished or destroyed as a result of damage caused by Hurricane
Sandy, Build It Back may provide you with the construction funds necessary to help you
rebuild what you had before Sandy. You may choose to rebuild using the City-selected
Developer who has pre-approved plans to start rebuilding your home. Or you may choose
your own contractor to build one a home for you, following program guidelines and
within cost restrictions. In both rebuild options, NYC Build It Back will make payments
directly to the contractor. (New York City Housing Recovery, n.d.-b, para. 1)5
In the days following the storm, New York City helped families return to their homes
through the Rapid Repairs program, which was described in self-congratulatory language as:

5

Note that some of the websites that the City and its agencies established to assist with recovery after
Sandy have been revised after programs came to an end. The wording here is no longer on the website
cited in the references.
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A first-of-its-kind pilot program to provide free, government assistance to thousands of
homeowners left without heat, power and hot water after Hurricane Sandy. No other city
has ever responded to a natural disaster by offering emergency repairs to allow
homeowners to shelter in their own homes. Rapid Repairs restored essential, emergency
services and served as a critical first step in helping residents rebuild their homes more
quickly. (New York City Housing Recovery, n.d.-a, para. 1)
This program was different from the approach with Build It Back, which focused more
on long-term rebuilding.
As noted, the Build It Back program has become widely criticized with suggestions that,
to some New Yorkers whose homes were destroyed by Hurricane Sandy, the phrase
Build It Back has come to sound like a perverse taunt. Across the flood zones of
Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island, hundreds of homeowners are still doing battle with
the troubled city program that was created to put them back on their feet quickly and
efficiently. (Blau & Durkin, 2017)
Reflecting on Build It Back, as well as post-Hurricane Katrina rebuilding initiatives, Brad
Gair (2016) the Director of Housing Recovery Operations in the New York Mayor’s Office at the
time of Hurricane Sandy, referred to both as “categorical failures” (as cited in Wachs, 2016,
para. 2).
Occupy Sandy. Unlike the aforementioned four initiatives, Occupy Sandy was entirely a
volunteer grassroots disaster relief organization. It grew out of the well-known Occupy Wall
Street collective, shifting, as Sandy struck, from protest to relief work. Eventually the Occupy
Sandy initiative worked in partnerships with local communities, FEMA, the Red Cross, and
design/planning professionals in short-term needs and long-term rebuilding efforts. However,
like Occupy Wall Street, it maintained an anti-establishment credo, based on the idea that
everyday people had to be the leaders in public action and the sometimes implicit, often explicit,
presumption that large, formal, top-down-run organizations, such as government agencies or
more established non-profits, cannot be relied on. Instead the philosophy is one of “mutual aid”
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(Occupy Sandy, n.d.-b, para 1), a phrase that recurs in Occupy movements seemingly inspired by
anarchist thinkers such as Kropotkin (1902).
Occupy Sandy raised well over $1 million and played a leading though collaborative role
in supporting a wide array of rebuilding actions in the first several months after Sandy. The
movement worked on the following initiatives in their post-Sandy funded program of activities:
Worker Owned Rockaway Cooperatives: . . . an initiative to rebuild after Sandy in a way
that addresses both the storm’s impact and the long-term systemic issues in the
neighborhood. The program’s goal is to equip Far Rockaway residents with the skills and
financing to launch small, worker-owned businesses that fill a need in their community . . .
Rockaway Wildfire: . . . geared toward community empowerment and activism through
learning in action, in light of Superstorm Sandy. We aim to strengthen the community,
create alternatives, engage in political education, and be involved in the redevelopment
and planning in the Rockaways.
FLO Solutions: FLO Solutions for Disaster Relief is a project that brings the best
free/libre/open-source tools and techniques to New York City-based disaster relief groups
and helps them document their best practices and share them with people around the
world.
Occupy Sandy New Jersey: From the Delaware Bay to the Hudson River, OSNJ strives to
help communities drive their own recovery.
SI Unity Hub: Occupy Sandy Staten Island is a volunteer-based group helping to rebuild
and support the Staten Island community in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. We are
actively interested in building relationships with other grassroots community
organizations and sharing our network of legal aids, medics, translators, skilled
tradespeople and volunteers with donation drop off/pick up spots, volunteer hubs, and
community groups in need.
YANA . . . which stands for “You Are Never Alone,” is a community resource center
devastated by Sandy which re-emerged as a relief hub before a gut renovation was
completed with an eye towards green technology and sustainability.
[Sandy] Storyline: StoryLine is a collaborative documentary for us to share experiences
of Hurricane Sandy and relief efforts.
Respond & Rebuild: [an] on-the-ground effort coordinating relief workers, residents,
resources, and volunteer power to communities most affected by Hurricane Sandy.
(Occupy Sandy, n.d.-a, paras. 1–8)

41
Each of the major post-Sandy initiatives undertaken by governments and
non-government organizations are multi-faceted with diverse components in terms of physical
and social actions. My research demonstrated that each required the significant involvement of a
wide range of design/planning professionals—the focus of the present study. In the course of my
work, I identified the array of professionals associated with each initiative and then explored,
through interviews, their involvement and how this impacted them personally and professionally.
Significance of the Proposed Research
There is little research on how designers/planners (as individuals and as professionals)
are affected at the personal, professional, and societal level by their engagement in post-disaster
and pre-planning/design. The scant efforts to discover such published assessments are presented
in Chapter II. By way of contrast, many studies have looked at how working amidst catastrophes
and their aftermaths, the impacts of disasters on first responders and front-line workers, such as
police (Alexander & Wells, 1991), fire fighters and rescuers (Berger et al., 2012), paramedics
(Durham, McCammon, & Allison, 1985), and medical and mental health workers (Dyregrov &
Solomon, 1991). There has been especially broad attention to PTSD for emergency workers
(e.g., Figley, 2013; Regehr & Bober, 2005). However, this framework has not been applied to
design/planning professionals. Neither have other broader impacts—positive as well as
negative—been examined for those whose work extends long beyond emergency response, to
assisting in preparedness and adaptation for future climate events.
The research is intended to provide a significant contribution to understanding
professionals that are not, by the very nature of their work, trained to deal with disaster and
trauma as part of their discourse. With the greater frequency of these climate impactful events,
design/planning professionals will need to address these challenges in the long-term. This
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challenge is not dissimilar from professionals who work in areas of conflict where issues around
rebuilding in traumatized communities take their toll not just on the people who have
experienced the loss but those who are helping to facilitate the rebuilding and reclamation
process.
This equally complex set of voices and approaches interviewed for this study required a
methodology that allows for a structured yet nuanced approach which is evidenced in the use of
the case study. As defined by Yin (2014), “a case study investigates a contemporary
phenomenon (the ‘case’) in its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (p. 2). More specifically, the use of an
embedded single case study, meaning that within the single case there are several embedded
units of analysis, addresses the six related but conceptually distinct initiatives the
design/planning professionals would have encountered during Sandy that were previously
mentioned.
A key variable among these initiatives is the extent to which and the means by which the
design/planning professionals engaged with non-professionals, which is an important feature
because climate change adaptation and mitigation arguably should be based on a constituency of
involvement from those most affected by the storm. Otherwise the individual and collective
change and learning that climate-impactful events necessitates will not take hold. Further, as
stressed in Chapter II, there are difficult ethical issues of inequality that become inescapable in
urban areas impacted by disasters—a theme that the Katrina experience indelibly underlined.
Thus, one of the principal impacts of Sandy on design/planning professionals that may be
uncovered is an altered disposition toward the public and its role in what has long been seen as
exclusively professional work. Therefore, the use of the embedded single case study relied on
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biographical interviewing for data about how design/planning professionals were impacted and,
possibly, changed by the Sandy experience. It also entailed looking at documents, broadly
speaking, that recount the events and responses to them (especially by design/planning
professionals) during and after Sandy.
My Positionality
Revelation of a researcher’s positionality is about much more than bias but rather about
telling readers as much as possible about the lens through which she/he sees the story that is told.
A large part of how I looked at Hurricane Sandy was revealed at the beginning of this chapter, as
I showed more than told about what it is to grow up, work, and live in a great world city that is
imperiled by a storm and, more broadly, by massive changes in the world’s climate.
The qualitative researcher’s perspective can be a paradoxical one: It is to be acutely
tuned-in to the experiences and meaning systems of others and at the same time to be aware of
how one’s own biases and preconceptions may be influencing what one is trying to understand.
(Dwyer & Buckle, 2009; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994).
Therefore, while I am neither a designer nor a planner, I have worked within the
profession of the built environment as a writer, researcher, in communications, and as marketing
specialist with designers/planners (architecture and engineering) for more than two decades. I
was a researcher, writer, and editor for the American Institute of Architects (AIA) Post-Sandy
Initiative report; a communications liaison on one of the Rebuild by Design teams during the
initial competition; participated in public meetings for New York Rising; worked as part of
Occupy Sandy; participated in and organized and facilitated post-Sandy symposia; a member of
the AIA New York’s Design for Risk and Reconstruction working group, and a member of The
Municipal Art Society’s post-Sandy roundtables, as well as one of the co-editors for The Future
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of Cities: An Integrated Approach to Urban Challenges (Çelik, Leighton, & Yurtseven, 2016),
based on the February 2015 conference at UN Headquarters in New York City.
In Coney Island, I was one of the volunteer facilitators as part of the New York City
SIRR report as well as a visiting professional in one of the design studios focusing on Coney
Island post-Sandy for Pratt Institute’s RAMP (Recovery, Adaptation, Mitigation and Planning).
Additionally, I worked on a preliminary study for Iberville, New Orleans, post-Katrina, a
WPA6 affordable housing complex.
As noted in the introduction, with my deep roots in New York and having grown up in
NYCHA affordable housing does give me a depth of understanding that could contribute to a
level of bias particularly in relation to marginalized communities because of my own experience.
This means that while I listened to designers/planners’ experiences, I needed to be able to view
my work from a place of discovery rather than on inferences from previous personal experiences,
and to not direct the participants’ attention to a particular area that I would want to study
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Josselson, 2007).
Given these significant and diverse involvements, it was important to acknowledge this to
the participants to maintain transparency and be cognizant of any potential bias that may have
arisen.
Ethical Considerations
Any research that heavily relies on people to share their experiences, especially when
those experiences have stressful, possibly even traumatic undertones, requires the utmost care to
protect participants. For this topic, many of the key participants either still are working in

6

WPA stands for Works Progress Administration, an initiative from the 1930s by the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Administration as a measure to alleviate the Great Depression. Numerous public works in New
Orleans and other U.S. cities are still identified as “WPA."
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contexts that they can be asked to discuss or have moved to other sensitive positions. Their
reputations and the confidentiality requirements of their positions, past and present, needed to be
respected. Further discussion of the ethical issues and how they were addressed are at the
conclusion of Chapter III.
The Study’s Limitations
Any qualitative study must face a number of challenges to both validity and to its
applicability to other settings with broadly similar issues. In regard to the latter, generalizability
is not a primary intent in a qualitative study. Such research cares about relating information and
knowledge that can be useful to others, but that is not the same as aiming to infer general
theories that can be transferred to other cities and their design/planning professionals who cope
with climate change. Using cases (examples) is an ancient, time-honored way humans use to
transfer understandings between settings. Embedding lessons from experience is as old as
hunter/gatherer elders relating stories of past tribal events, not to tell their listeners what will
happen in the future, but to familiarize them with adaptation to always-changing, ever-uncertain
events. It is in that spirit, that this research studied the experiences of design/planning
professionals as they coped with an event that will not be the same, not only in some other urban
settings, but the next time in the New York region. Stake and Easley (1978) suggests that
qualitative case studies should aim for “naturalistic generalization” (p. 6) whereby the researcher
maximizes the richness and thoroughness of detail about a context and events, thereby giving
others in roughly parallel situations, the responsibility to take what they will from the case. They
state that naturalistic generalization is,
arrived at by recognizing the similarities of issues in and out of context . . . naturalistic
generalizations develop . . . as a product of experience. They derive from the tacit
knowledge of how things are, why they are, how people feel about them and how these
things are likely to be later or in other places . . . They seldom take the form of
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predictions but lead regularly to expectation. They guide action, in fact they are
inseparable from action. (Stake & Easley, 1978, p. 6)
To repeat the objective for this study’s usefulness is not in being able to predict what
might be the case with design/planning professionals facing disasters later or elsewhere. Rather it
is in providing some guide for action here and for other regions facing similar and potentially
inevitable negative consequences.
A second possible limitation of this work was more particular to the interactions with
some of the participants. There was a challenge, and thus a potential limitation in this study, with
participants too readily reverting to “plannerese” (Stephens, 2005)—such as “we need to change
our paradigms”—and other truisms common to the profession. The narrative could have ended
up with a lot of flowery forward-looking idealism rather than creating a bridge between the
aspirational and the practical. Therefore, questions were created that discouraged platitudes and
got deeper into real, perhaps sometimes politically incorrect perspectives. Another limitation to
the study was that there were a few participants who were either unable or unwilling to decouple
the personal pillar from the professional pillar. When questions designed to open up that
conversation failed to produce any results, rather than pushing the issue, I looked to see if that
would be a pattern throughout the study. It was not.
It was very difficult to find a significant number of engineers for this study. Many of the
individuals I queried declined participation in this study when they learned I worked for an
engineering firm that they viewed as a competitor.
It was very important to leave room for a breadth of responses since both personally and
professionally there is the need for a different idea of what designers/planners have historically
experienced. Climate-related events may in fact be the great disruptor that will have lasting
impact upon the profession. It was also important to avoid imposing my own experience or to
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access that experience when asking the same question in different ways did not bear any results.
It was important to allow participants to tell their stories and to act in the role of facilitator but to
listen from the space of the observer.
Design/planning professionals who did not want to be openly identified because of the
current political climate and the country had the option to participate in these interviews
anonymously with their stories included under pseudonyms. However, after completing the
interviews, and reviewing the transcripts, and noting the volume of deeply personal
comments, I elected to use pseudonyms for all the participants.
Additionally, there were limitations as to the degree to which the experiences of
professionals post-Sandy were or were not applicable or transferrable to other design/planning
professionals in small urban environments or in communities where there was greater discussion
about managed retreat.
Outline of Succeeding Dissertation Chapters
Chapter II, the literature review, presents a critical look at relevant theory, research, and
practice. It addresses historically climate-impactful events, the increasing frequency of these
events, most specifically focusing on rising sea levels and coastal cities and what the research is
showing in terms of future impacts. This next area of reviewed research focused on the actual
Sandy event, its damage and how at the time it was the second costliest hurricane in U.S. history,
after Hurricane Katrina. To further this study, literature from other areas of the world were
explored, examining how global communities and professionals elsewhere have addressed
issues, whether arising from a specific climate-impactful coastal event or as seen in the proactive
steps taken in areas known to be vulnerable to sea level rise where there is evidence of change
without a specific precipitating threatening event. The chapter is also comprised of highlights
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from the literature about stress and other responses by responders to major disasters, whether
human-caused or natural. The literature review chapter also explores ideas about mitigation, risk,
adaptation, recovery, resolution, resiliency, and transformation, as applied to the physical impact
of the aftermath of disasters or advancing ideas in vulnerable areas ahead of any impactful
events.
Chapter III, on methodology and research procedures, provides insight into how I
gathered and analyzed the data for this dissertation. The research points to a methodology of
inquiry that can provide empirical knowledge of situations not hitherto well explored. To achieve
this end, the method of this study utilized an embedded singular case study with narrative
inquiry. Chapter III defines the case being studied, the methods employed (embedded singular
case study and narrative inquiry) along with their foundational history. The connection was also
made that the case study approach is commonly used in the profession of design/planning for the
study of places, processes, and events impacting the built environment—but more rarely to look
at the professionals themselves.
Chapter IV presents the findings and results of the study. It draws upon major themes
from the interviews in terms of how interviewees described the impact through the structure of
the three pillars on the personal, the professional, and the societal context. These interviews are
enriched with documentary and archival research that was uncovered. Findings from the
narrative research were presented in a series of questions to a focus group of three, with the
intention of testing the validity of some of the major themes that came from the interviews with
them.
Chapter V, the conclusions, places the findings into the context of the literature about the
professional facing disaster-related events. Findings are interpreted as well as the impact on the
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design/planning professionals and the implications for climate-impactful events in the context of
leadership and change in the profession. Additionally, there are recommendations for actions and
further study. This chapter also includes my reflections on the experience with the process: what
was learned in doing the research, and its personal impact as a scholar–practitioner and leader
committed to cities and sustainable change.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
The literature that examines the impacts of Hurricane Sandy and climate change-induced
storms, on the changing nature of the work of design/planning professionals in those
communities, is vast and complex. The extensive array of works that were reviewed, assimilated,
and analyzed in this dissertation set the stage for this study. Moreover, by the very nature of the
topic, the literature highlighted the harsh realities that lie within the context of
designers/planners' complex roles in preparing for future climate-induced events.
The bottom line is that we as a civilization are facing an array of threats and problems
well beyond what have been variously dubbed over the years “meta-problems” (Chevalier,
1969), “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973), “messes” (Ackoff, 1974), and
“climacterics” (Ashby, 1978). Global climate events reach into every realm of human life and
concern, including cities, complex organisms that exist with a framework of interdependency
between both the ecological and human communities (Hallegatte, Henriet, & Corfee-Morlot,
2011).
Disasters have a disproportionate effect on urban places. Dense by definition, cities
and their environs face major disruptions in their complex, interdependent
environmental, economic, and social systems. Weaknesses not readily apparent in
pre-disaster times surface as longstanding structural and substantive problems become
prominent; environmental abuses are exposed; the local economy falters; municipal
services collapse; social and political rifts widen. (Birch & Wachter, 2006, p. 1)
This litany of breakdowns, seen from a long-term perspective, calls on no professional
group as much as it does designers/planners. It is almost as if many of the inequities and
behaviors that we as a society could not self-correct must now be faced or dealt with by a force
greater than our own. This is not meant as a punishment, in the biblical sense, by some angry
patriarchal God or some cruel matriarchal force of nature but as an awakening, as an opportunity
to rethink how we live with nature and with each other in a more equitable manner. The impact
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and the road to travel there is a challenging one; how we meet it will depend on how deep we can
enter into the conversation and the solutions.
I remember as a little girl, my Polish immigrant grandmother sitting me in front of a
globe and telling me that the world is round, not flat, so nothing falls off or goes away. With a
twig in her hand from a tree outside her kitchen window, she showed me where she had grown
up and how the land she farmed there was related to the earth in which she planted seeds for
flowers in America. My grandmother wanted me to consider that there was a great underground
system that connected all the roots in nature in the world together, and that even if we could not
see it, we should imagine and feel it. That is the conversation I am engaged in with all of the
voices from within this literature review, connecting all these systems into one coherent storyline
from the underworld to the outer world of design/planning professionals. My grandmother’s
statement is accentuated in the words of an architect interviewed in Chapter IV. There, Roberta
describes the interconnectedness of all living things, as putting your finger on the map—a
manner in which to gain insight into people and places within and outside your own experience.
Flow of the Review
The topics needed as background to this dissertation are as diverse as the challenges are
broad. The fundamental driving force behind the increasing storms with which we all—but of
central interest here, designers/planners—will need to cope with and confront climate change.
The main focus here amidst this enormous subject and literature is the connection between the
phenomenon of climate change and the increasing intensity and threat of major storms. The
second section is about those storms and their impacts, beginning with and focusing on
Hurricane Sandy. I briefly noted the technical reports that have delineated the nature of the storm
and then move to the topic of impacts, both the obvious and immediate physical impacts. These
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include, but are not limited to, coastal change, flooding, infrastructure and housing damage, and
then the economic, psychological, and social effects. Information from other experiences,
notably Hurricane Katrina, but also internationally, are noted.
Following the review of literature about climate change-induced storms, I focused on the
writings that examined the implications of such catastrophes for professionals in general and
then specifically for designers/planners. It was found that there is an especially limited literature
base about these professionals. It is a gap that this dissertation intends to begin to fill,
recognizing that their work is pivotal in human societies’ and especially cities’ attempts to deal
with climate change. In this section I looked at some of the ways that researchers have examined
the work of designers/planners and related practitioners.
In the third section, I highlighted some previous areas of research on how those in critical
and influential positions face extraordinary contexts, ones that take them out of zones of
familiarity and comfort into settings of high uncertainty and lack of precedent, yet for which
society needs them most. The fourth and final section explored literature about catastrophes more
generally, focusing on what is known from the field of disaster studies regarding the impacts on
communities and individuals. That section closes with a specific review of literature about how
professionals and responders are affected by the traumatic nature of disasters. Figure 2.1 charts
the flow of the chapter as just described.
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Section 2
About climate change and
its relation to disasters

Section 1

Storms and their impacts
• Sandy
• Katrina and other
hurricanes
• Storms and flooding
internationally

Section 4
Impacts on
design/planning
professionals
•Responders generally
•Designers/Planners

Professionals in
challenging times
• Designers/Planners
• Peacekeepers

Section 3

Figure 2.1. Flow of sections in literature review.
About Climate Change and Its Relation to Disasters
It is important to situate Sandy within the wider, global array of extreme weather and
other impacts of climate change. In this section, literature was reviewed on an issue which, sadly,
continues to be debated both in the course of legitimate debate among scientific experts, but also
as a result of willful denial. I have not allotted much space here to the latter. Instead, I began by
referencing the legitimate scientific question of how connected climate change is to increasingly
powerful storms that are being experienced around the world. First, because the terms climate
change and climate impactful events are used throughout the research, a brief and authoritative
current definition from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, n.d.) is presented
here:
Climate change . . . refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified .
. . by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for
an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over
time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. (p. 30)
The uniqueness of the predicament is underscored, according to the IPCC report, by the
fact that “eleven of the last twelve years (1995–2006) rank among the twelve warmest years in
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the instrumental record of global surface temperature (since 1850)” (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, n.d., p. 30).
Most significantly to this study is that climate change induces weather phenomena that
can spell catastrophe over vast regions. In addition to the storms and associated flooding that I
focused on, note should also made of the several other kinds of disasters which are associated
with climate change: increasing numbers and scale of wildfires (Marlon et al., 2009; Westerling,
Hidalgo, Cayan, & Swetnam, 2006) and heat waves that afflict more and more people, often
fatally (Meehl & Tebaldi, 2004). Relatedly, droughts may increasingly afflict areas vital to
feeding and supplying urban areas with water, another cumulating impact on cities suffering
from other climate change impacts. Severe dryness and heat will also increase the likelihood and
severity of forest and range fires and of infestations of pests in woodlands (Clark et al., 2016;
Dale et al., 2001; Hanson & Weltzin, 2000). All of these can and probably will impact human
populations and natural ecosystems in a cumulative manner, thereby adding to the burden and
complexity of design/planning professionals’ responsibilities. Urban areas may not experience
forest fires or directly suffer because of drought, but it must be remembered that the needs of
cities for food, water, and other essentials are enormous, and that climate-induced catastrophes in
non-urban areas that reduce such resources will drastically impinge upon urban populations
(Misra, 2014). It is important to note that from time to time, two or more of the most worrying
climate change-induced crises may coincide, greatly exacerbating the strain on societies.

The reality and overall scope of climate change is a topic so profuse in scholarly and
other publications that this dissertation focused only on the critical issue of how intensified
storms are related to global warming. For more general reviews of the global climate context, a
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prime source is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988 by
the World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
The IPCC is presently into its sixth cycle of assessment. Its website is the main way to be current
with its frequent assemblies and previous reports (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
n.d.). Of note are several special reports released by the IPCC during the Sixth Assessment Cycle
in 2018 and 2019, including Global Warming of 1.5°C (October) and in 2019, The Refinement to
the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (May), Climate Change and
Land (August) and The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (September).

Another overview that is of special pertinence to this study is Bulkeley’s (2012) synoptic
collection, Cities and Climate Change—although it must be noted that the sheer volume of major
overviews being steadily published, not to mention the massive worldwide scientific
investigation of climate change, means that any hard copy publication is rapidly superseded and
outdated.
As in most complex scientific questions, perspectives vary. At its most moderate, some
scientists caution that there is still not enough known to definitely make the link. An example is
the publication by Pielke, Landsea, Mayfield, Layer, and Pasch (2005), who stated:
Claims of linkages between global warming and hurricane impacts are premature for
three reasons. First, no connection has been established between greenhouse gas
emissions and the observed behavior of hurricanes . . . Second, the peer-reviewed
literature reflects that a scientific consensus exists that any future changes in hurricane
intensities will likely be small in the context of observed variability . . . And third,
under the assumptions of the IPCC, expected future damages to society of its projected
changes in the behavior of hurricanes are dwarfed by the influence of its own
projections of growing wealth and population . . . While future research or experience
may yet overturn these conclusions, the state of the peer-reviewed knowledge today is
such that there are good reasons to expect that any conclusive connection between
global warming and hurricanes or their impacts will not be made in the near term. Yet,
claims of such connections persist. (p. 1574)
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Pielke et al. (2005) went on to worry that
invoking the modulation of future hurricanes to justify energy policies to mitigate
climate change may prove counterproductive. Not only does this provide a great
opening for criticism of the underlying scientific reasoning, it leads to advocacy of
policies that simply will not be effective with respect to addressing future hurricane
impacts. (p. 1574)
This was written almost 15 years ago, and while healthy skepticism continues to motivate
the work of climate scientists, more and more inferences in the literature can be found that there
is a strong, if complex, connection (Knutson et al., 2010). The argument, put simply, is that two
of the major consequences of climate change—sea level rise and increased sea surface
temperatures—combine to make storms larger, more frequent and, when they hit, more likely to
do damage. This phenomenon, now based on sophisticated predictive modelling (e.g., Lin,
Emanuel, Oppenheimer, & Vanmarcke, 2012), is widely acknowledged. Therefore, climate
change-based energy or recovery policies are no longer vulnerable to equivocation. A. J. Garner
et al. (2017) have developed a model for coastal flood hazard impacts of climate change
stretching from early colonial times to 2300, concluding that large slow-moving systems like
Sandy are almost certain to expose the city to a future of recurrent catastrophe.
In addition to climate change bringing on more severe storms and hurricanes, it must be
emphasized that a second and equally major factor in the ever-increasing risk of Sandy-like
events is sea level rise. In January 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and NOAA reported that 2019 was the second warmest year on record, only exceeded
by 2016 (NASA, 2020). This comes shortly after a December 2019 report from an international
consortium of polar scientists (the IMBIE Team) stated that because of the warming
climate leading to Greenland ice sheets melting, an approximate 2 to 5 inches (50 to 130
millimeters) of global sea level rise could result by 2100, are in alignment with previous
worst-case projections if the ice loss continues (IMBIE Team, 2019). Similarly, alarming
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conclusions have been drawn by the same scientists based on study of melting in Antarctica
(Shepherd et al., 2018).
Again, climate skeptics and deniers may point to the indisputable fact that long before
our excessive reliance on fossil fuels, the height on shorelines of the world’s oceans has gone
through cyclic and non-cyclic long-term oscillations (Douglas, Kearney, & Leatherman,
2000). As with increasing intensity of storms and with even less scientific controversy, it is
accepted that an acceleration of the rise of sea level has occurred in the last century. In fact, seas
do not rise evenly around the world and the east coast of the United Stated happens to be
somewhat of a “hot spot” for these changes (Sallenger, Doran, & Howd, 2012). The consequence
is that when storms of any strength attack, the higher the sea level the greater the area affected
and the impacts of storms like Sandy (Shepard et al., 2012).
Other dimensions of climate change contribute further to the risk of catastrophic events
especially in coastal areas. Though variable in its effects over the globe, in many regions, climate
change will bring about a significant change in rainfall. Trenberth (1998) explains the complex
interactions which may tragically imply that where there is too little rainfall, less will come,
while in areas that are already subject to seasonal deluges, those may get worse:
Increases in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere produce global warming through an
increase in downwelling infrared radiation, and thus not only increase surface
temperatures but also enhance the hydrological cycle, as much of the heating at the
surface goes into evaporating surface moisture. Global temperature increases signify
that the water-holding capacity of the atmosphere increases and, together with
enhanced evaporation, this means that the actual atmospheric moisture should
increase. It follows that naturally-occurring droughts are likely to be exacerbated by
enhanced potential evapotranspiration. Further, globally there must be an increase in
precipitation to balance the enhanced evaporation. (p. 667)
The implications of such shifts are already being felt in one of the world’s most advanced
and largest metropolitan areas, Tokyo, Japan:
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Across Japan, rainfall measuring more than two inches an hour has increased by 30
percent over the past three decades, the Japan Meteorological Agency estimates.
Rising oceans also make the Tokyo metropolitan region, home to 38 million people,
vulnerable to storm surges, even as major redevelopment projects open up the
previously industrial waterfront to new residences and businesses. And years of
pumping groundwater has led some parts of the city to sink by almost 15 feet over the
past century. (Tabuchi, 2017)
“In July 2018, two million people had to evacuate their homes due to devasting
downpours that flooded thousands of homes and took more than 200 lives” (The Climate Reality
Project, 2019).
Storms and Their Impacts
About Hurricane Sandy. Edging into eight years after Hurricane Sandy, the effects of
the storm still linger. Yes, much work was done but challenges remain. The growing body of
literature surrounding Sandy reflects the ongoing impact not only of the storm but how prepared
this region is for the future. The literature describes and analyzes three major topics on this:
•

In what ways and why the impacts may have surpassed any previous expectations;

•

what the actions have been in response to these events; and

•

how individuals within impacted communities have fared as the water recaptures
shoreline, sidewalks and neighborhoods that were once wetlands and thriving
ecosystems—and may be so again whether by natural force or community choice.

This section highlights observable physical aspects of the storm itself, its meteorological
characteristics, including path, velocity, and timeline, so that the study has a clear picture of just
what happened. This is the reality that the people at the eye of this story experienced and with
which they strove to cope.
The overarching impact of Hurricane Sandy in physically vulnerable and economically
marginalized communities was often underserved in the course of rebuilding and future
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planning. This was underscored in a number of the interviews conducted during this study and is
further expanded upon in Chapter IV.
The storm. To a significant degree, Sandy, like Hurricane Katrina, is as much about
water “out of place” as it is about the horrific winds that one thinks about when the word
“hurricane” is used. Mathur and da Cunha’s (2006) expression, used in the context of Hurricane
Katrina, aptly frames what was faced in New York and what will become the new normal—that
we must negotiate a fluid terrain, places, of “ambiguity and relative flows . . . undecided between
land and sea, part of both, belonging to none” (p. 34). Sandy was a clarion call from the 71% of
the earth we call water. Its message was that the changing atmospheric conditions are influencing
the water’s behavior on the surface of the earth, with shattering results on human communities
and the natural world. An understanding of the storm, therefore, begins in and of the water. Thus,
when futuristic (but not that far in the future) scenarios of disaster are envisioned, inundation of
critically important urban and rural areas is high amidst our fears. A brief video imagining New
York 60 to 80 years from the present, dramatically if controversially envisioned the submergence
in part or whole of iconic New York spaces (Maxim// Menilmonde, n.d.). Similar dramatic
images abound just for New York in documentary and in fictional films and artwork, and others,
for example Goodell (2017), have written full and well-documented treatises—tellingly a book
about Miami’s future is titled, The Water Will Come. While some of the visuals from movies
such as The Day After Tomorrow and Artificial Intelligence seem so imaginary, when one looks
through an online gallery such as that mounted by the Gizmodo Media Group’s (Diaz, 2012;
Grace, 2012) of Sandy flooding, futuristic fears of inundation seem not so farfetched.
As already outlined, the water has come to the New York/New Jersey region already.
Catastrophic storms were not strangers to the region for years prior to Sandy, which struck in

60
October 2012. Weather 2000 (n.d.) tabulated notable storms impacting the New York coastal
area, going back to “the Great Storm of 1693” (which, coincidentally struck on the same date as
Sandy, 319 years later). Sedimentary evidence of intense hurricane strikes slamming New Jersey
have been traced back 700 years (Donnelly et al., 2001). However, as is briefly reviewed below,
it is now becoming quite clear that like coastal cities worldwide, the New York region can expect
severity and frequency of massive storms increasingly as global warming continues. Given that
the region is also far more urbanized than ever before when historic storms struck a less settled
New York, it is not surprising that the casualties and costs of Sandy are unprecedented in this
history.
Awareness of the threats associated with climate change arose well before Sandy. The
City of New York had undertaken a major conceptual planning initiative that began shortly after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and issued A Greener Greater New York (PlaNYC,
2007) six years later. A chapter was devoted to climate change—what it could do to the region
and broadly, how design/planning could be used to prepare. This chapter was expanded in an
update released four years later (PlaNYC, 2011) in which it was said:
Cities are at the forefront of both the causes and effects of climate change. Urban areas
are estimated to be the source of approximately 80% of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. At the same time, urban areas located on a coast like New York City face
increased climate risks. Accordingly, cities have a responsibility to deal with both the
causes and effects of climate change. New York City has always faced climate risks,
including heat waves, snowstorms, high winds, tropical storms, storm surges,
lightning, and torrential downpours. These events affect every New Yorker, and as our
climate changes, they will become more frequent and severe. (p. 150)
The report went on to say that there is no one single action that will change this but that
many coordinated strategies must be followed. Part of what designers/planners are doing on the
ground, whether planning for or responding to climate impactful events, is to develop these
strategies whether these are ones of mitigation, adaptation, or resiliency.
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Several months later, and still a year before Sandy struck, the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority issued a climate outlook for New York. Orchestrated by
researchers at Columbia University’s Earth Institute, Cornell University, and the City University
of New York, they drew upon input from more than 50 scientists. The resulting 600-page report,
Responding to Climate Change in New York State (Rosenzweig et al., 2011), predicted 8 to 23
inches of relative sea-level rise by the 2080s forewarned that a drastic 55 inches—four and onehalf feet—could occur if melting of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets accelerates. The
report pointed out that New York City is at risk because of its extensive shoreline, but so too are
towns and cities along the Hudson River as far north as the Federal Dam at Troy, 150 miles north
of Manhattan. The report summarized that as early as 2020,
nearly 96,000 people on the barrier island of Long Beach area alone may be at risk from
sea level rise under the rapid ice melt scenario; by 2080, that number may rise to more
than 114,500 people. The value of property at risk in the Long Beach area under this
scenario ranges from about $6.4 billion in 2020 to about $7.2 billion in 2080.
(Rosenzweig et al., 2011, p. 23)
This study was also updated several years later (Stevens et al., 2014), by which time, the
realities of climate-induced catastrophe had become all too clear for the city and the surrounding
area.
In Chapter I, both personal/subjective impressions and more factual information about the
dimensions of the storm were presented. Now, more than seven years later, there is an abundance
of literature on Sandy’s chronology, its physical /meteorological characteristics, and the resultant
economic and social impacts. Among the most thorough overviews of the storm is the National
Hurricane Center’s Tropical Cyclone Report, issued several months after the events (Blake et al.,
2013). It is worth quoting the full opening paragraph of this report as a way of reiterating what
New York City and the design/planning professionals, who are the focus here, must confront as a

62
memory, a source of continuing consequences, and a foreshadowing of
climate-change-induced challenges to come:
Sandy was a classic late-season hurricane in the southwestern Caribbean Sea. The
cyclone made landfall as a category 1 hurricane (on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane
Wind Scale) in Jamaica, and as a 100-kt category 3 hurricane in eastern Cuba before
quickly weakening to a category 1 hurricane while moving through the central and
northwestern Bahamas. Sandy underwent a complex evolution and grew considerably
in size while over the Bahamas and continued to grow despite weakening into a
tropical storm north of those islands.
The system re-strengthened into a hurricane while it moved northeastward,
parallel to the coast of the southeastern United States, and reached a secondary peak
intensity of 85 kt [knots]while it turned northwestward toward the mid-Atlantic states.
Sandy weakened somewhat and then made landfall as a post-tropical cyclone near
Brigantine, New Jersey with 70-kt maximum sustained winds. Because of its
tremendous size, however, Sandy drove a catastrophic storm surge into the New Jersey
and New York coastlines. Preliminary U.S. damage estimates are near $50 billion,
making Sandy the second-costliest cyclone to hit the United States since 1901. There
were at least 147 direct deaths recorded across the Atlantic basin due to Sandy, with 72
of these fatalities occurring in the mid-Atlantic and northeastern United States. (Blake
et al., 2013, p. 1)
In addition to federal assessments of the storm’s history and damage, both New York
State, the State of New Jersey, and the City of New York prepared their own detailed overviews.
The State of New Jersey fully reviewed the natural resource impacts of Sandy (Office of Science,
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 2015); the Mayor’s Office in New York
prepared what was referred to as an “after action report” outlining both what Sandy did and the
city’s overall response (Gibbs & Holloway, 2013), and of course the lead federal agency dealing
with disasters, FEMA (2013), likewise released an “after action” assessment. A more concise but
quite helpful plain-language overview of the storm was issued by the international reinsurance
firm AON Benfield (2013). Similarly, Halverson and Rabenhorst (2013) wrote a straightforward
summary which, like the AON Benfield document, provides a clear jargon-free overview of how
the storm built up and then its effects on American locales. Both documents present clear,
understandable graphics portraying the development and physical impact areas of Sandy.
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Since then, many multi-author collaborative studies have appeared that provide
overviews of Sandy and its impacts. Additionally, a massive amount of literature continues to
build on particular scientific questions about the course of the storm and its direct ecological and
technical effects. For example, a consortium of German researchers prepared a detailed
chronology and impact assessment including economic effects (Kunz et al., 2013). Many other
papers from the natural sciences and engineering focus on one or several closely related
scientific/technical dimensions of describing Sandy. Examples are Hapke, Brenner, Henderson,
and Reynolds, who examined impacts on Fire Island dune and beach systems; Smallegan, Irish,
Van Dongeren, and Den Bieman’s (2016) study of barrier island effects; and Trembanis et al.’s
(2013) assessment of changes in the seabed off of New Jersey and Long Island. The U.S.
Geological Survey prepared a detailed overall summary of the wide range of biophysical
research that was needed to take full stock of a system like Sandy and what it can do to nature
itself (Hapke et al., 2013).
Human and psychosocial impacts of Sandy. The term psychosocial, introduced in
Chapter I, was characterized in 2001 by an advisory group following earthquakes in New
Zealand. They defined it as “encompassing cultural, psychological, social, economic and
physical (including housing, infrastructure and physical health) dimensions that are part of the
regeneration of a community that has experienced adversity” (Mooney et al., 2011, p. 3).
There have already been many specific explorations of the social and human impacts of
Sandy. Some of these have been quite specific. For example, Kelman et al. (2015), and Lempert
and Kopp (2013), have looked at impacts on as specific a medical condition as kidney failure and
the drop in the quality of chronic care of sufferers. There have also been studies to appear about
diabetes care as affected by the storm (D. C. Lee et al., 2016). In turn, the many different ways in
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which Sandy impeded access to medical care for chronic conditions led to an increase in mental
health difficulties among people already suffering from serious chronic conditions, as reported
by Ruskin et al. (2018).
Without delving further into such specific literature, it is fair to presume that these are but
a foreshadowing of the wide and diverse array of stressful potential impacts. While medical
professionals are especially affected in terms of their practice, these are but a few of the impacts
that design/planning professionals will have to account for as they create future strategies to cope
with disasters like Sandy. Facility and transportation plans will have to plan for this
diminishment of normal essential services. Moreover, designers/planners, like first responders,
may also be personally touched by exposure to the trauma of others, what N. Garner, Baker, and
Hagelgans (2016) called “private trauma” (p. 168). They may suffer from the ripple effects of
such impacts within their own families and neighborhoods, a topic that was addressed in my
interviews with the study participants.
Sandy also had larger and broader impacts on key services, and in turn, left many
individuals within the region impaired in their everyday lives and work. Shortly after the storm,
Kaufman, Qing, Levenson, and Hanson (2012) reviewed the impacts on transportation
infrastructure in New York City and the surrounding region, pointing to vulnerabilities that had
been demonstrated but also commenting:
During and after the storm, New Yorkers displayed impressive inventiveness to
maintain their mobility. Individuals created new routes and combinations of modes to
get to work, using a variety of systems: bus shuttles, bikes, shared vehicles with
strangers, ferries, alternate work sites, and telecommuting. (p. i)
Housing was among the most powerfully affected human needs during and after the
storm. Sandy was a reminder of that, and while many can forget once the waters receded and life
returned to what many consider normal, that was not the case for everyone. Particularly those
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who face into the reality of vulnerability on a more consistent basis, in areas such as Red Hook
and Coney Island, Brooklyn, and The Rockaways, Queens, were all heavily impacted by Sandy,
with large percentages of New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) public housing.
It is easy to forget how vulnerable life is, particularly in places like New York, where one
is more connected to the concrete than to nature, where tall heroic buildings are powerful
manmade forces, that can appear like an impenetrable force field. Events like 9/11 or Hurricane
Sandy show us how vulnerable we are. We are reminded “just how fragile the busy world we
humans build around us really is” (Mead, 2012, para. 1). Perhaps it is human nature to run from
that reality, even though we all know that at some juncture, into every life a storm does make
landfall, and we are taken aback when it does happen.
A strong source of additional information on the broad sweep of Sandy’s impacts has
been prepared jointly by Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness, the
NYU College of Global Public Health, and Rutgers School of Social Work (Abramson et al.,
2015). Their work is divided into four reports including the Place Report, which scrutinizes the
evacuation procedures, the levels of displacement, housing damage and loss and insurance
dimensions, and the Person Report, which bears down on changes in physical and mental health,
alcohol and drug abuse impacts, child academic and behavioral issues, and storm related stress
and uncertainty. The Person Report is of particular interest in defining the panoply of planning
issues which professionals must confront both in their work and in their own lives.
A “fact brief” prepared jointly by the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy
and the Moelis Institute for Affordable Housing Policy (2013)—both institutes at New York
University—summarized,
Overall, almost 20% of NYCHA’s 178,000 total units were in buildings that were
damaged by Sandy. Many of the nearly 80,000 residents of these buildings were left
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without heat or electricity because the basements of the buildings, where the heating and
electrical systems are located, flooded. (pp. 3–4)
Similarly, dire effects were experienced in other affordable housing and privately-owned
rent-stabilized units. McArdle (2013) suggested that the winds and waters of Sandy showed that
any quest for future resilience (a concept that is fully addressed below):
must take account of the vulnerable populations at its periphery. Superstorm Sandy put
a face to their vulnerability, including 6,800 evacuees assigned to shelters, 1,800 of
whom were residents of chronic care facilities located in flood zones. The vulnerable
English speakers, who were stranded in New York City Housing Authority-owned
buildings without electricity, heat, and hot water for weeks as a consequence of storm
surges. (pp. 19–20)
In Public Housing on the Periphery: Vulnerable Residents and Depleted Resilience
Reserves Post-Hurricane Sandy, Hernández et al. (2018) further substantiated how New Yorkers
with the least resources to get them through crises were left stranded:
Many tenants in NYCHA’s densely populated high-rise housing, many of them elderly
and disabled, despite being adaptively resourceful were as a result of Sandy adversely
impacted by exacerbated social, physical, geographic, medical, and economic factors
within homes that became unlivable with some residents, trapped for days and weeks.
(pp. 2–3)
Impacts of other climate change-induced storms. The effects of Sandy on metropolitan
New York can be helpfully placed in the context of the wider national and global experience of
cities and regions hit by climate change-induced storms. It is almost impossible to discuss the
impacts on an American city without delving into the ever-amassing literature about the impacts
of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans. Such studies help to flesh out implications that may not
yet be fully examined in the case of Sandy.
Katrina and other hurricanes impacting the United States, the Caribbean and Puerto
Rico. The storm and breaching of levees in New Orleans in August 2005, remains probably the
most researched and, in many ways, one of the most lamentable events, showing the power of
such storms, and the limitations of preparedness and defects in mitigation. The story of the
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storm, the breaching of levees, flooding, and the aftermath, have been looked at in physical
descriptions of the destruction and especially in regard to the inequities suffered by
already-marginalized populations. Greater detail about the impact of designers/planners in the
context of Katrina, is expanded upon in Chapter IV.
The litany of hurricanes that directly destroy coastal property and bring on devastating
floods and a loss of life, has not abated. Research is ongoing into the nature and impacts
particularly of the following events:
•

Hurricane Harvey (August 2017) tied with Katrina as the costliest hurricane in terms
of damage to housing and infrastructure, this storm’s impacts were most publicized in
relation to the city of Houston, though like other hurricanes impacting the southern
and eastern United States, it had already left a path of catastrophe across the
Caribbean and affected a broad swath of other smaller cities, towns and rural areas in
Texas and Louisiana. The federal and other government responses to Harvey are
generally seen as far more just and adequate than what befell Hurricane Maria, a
comparison that underscored the issues of inequity associated with climate change
events. Another dimension that is being brought out in the experience with Harvey is
the extent to which Houston’s urban development—including massive historic and
contemporary destruction of wetlands that can protect against storms and flooding
(Costanza et al., 2008)—illustrates how preventative measures based on ecological
knowledge were ignored. This too is an issue which the design/planning professionals
interviewed in this study face in the stress of their post-disaster practice: confronting
the political, economic, and psychological forces that militate against design.
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•

Hurricane Irma (August–September 2017) was the second of three massive
hurricanes to strike the Caribbean and the southern United States in the late summer
of 2017. After heavy impacts on Cuba, it swept along the Gulf Coast of Florida
imposing probably the highest economic costs ever experienced in that state. There
was cataclysmic damage in Barbuda where 95% of the structures were destroyed.
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti each experienced flooding and heavy
damage, but there was much less destruction than anticipated. While some tragic
missteps in planning for such an event came to light—notably multiple deaths from
excess heat in a senior’s home where air conditioning and evacuation failed
(Nedelman, 2017), there have not yet, to my knowledge, been critical studies of
issues, especially for design/planning.

•

Hurricane Maria (September 2017) is considered to be the third costliest storm
affecting American territory, and it infamously once again exposed the inequities of
post-disaster measures, especially in the American Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. A
study by Harvard medical researchers demonstrated that death tolls were
underestimated by a factor of 70 (Kishore et al., 2018), evidence of the blatant
disregard and disrespect of the current U.S. Administration for Puerto Ricans. This
has been widely seen as evidence of racism as manifest by what happened in New
Orleans after Katrina (Schulze, 2018), a finding echoed in a publication that
characterizes Maria as a “public health disaster” according to (Rudner, 2018, p. 257).
A number of participants in this study discussed in-depth the severity and inequities
associated with Maria. The hurricane also devastated parts of the Caribbean,
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including the U.S. Virgin Islands and Dominica, which was still recovering from the
August 2015 Tropical Storm, Erika.
•

Hurricane Florence (August–September 2018) hit the Carolinas, with widespread
flooding and damage, particularly in North Carolina. It was one of the top ten
costliest hurricanes to hit the United States.

•

Hurricane Michael (October 2018) was the “first Category 4 storm in history to make
landfall in the Florida Panhandle . . . the first Category 3 Hurricane to hit Georgia
since 1898 . . . and the strongest storm to make landfall in the continental US since
Hurricane Andrew in 1992” (Miller & Griggs, 2018, bullets 1, 3, & 6).

• Hurricane Barry (July 2019) made landfall on the central Louisiana coast. While
Louisiana did have its share of flash flooding, New Orleans was spared from
devastation.
•

Hurricane Dorian (September 2019) impacted both North and South Carolina. The
Grand Bahamas and Abaco Islands had catastrophic damage.

•

Hurricane Humberto (September 2019) was the first named storm to hit Houston since
Hurricane Harvey and the first Hurricane to make landfall in Bermuda since 2016.
Major damage was averted.

As for the 2020 hurricane season, which runs from June 1 through November 30, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is predicting an above normal
Atlantic Hurricane season. The first named storm, Arthur, was identified in early May before any
outlooks were even posted (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2020).
More and more we must accept that these closely spaced storms, severely taxing the
resources need to provide relief let alone plan for longer term adaptation, are the “new normal.”
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This comes across with force in a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists with the telling
title, When Rising Seas Hit Home: Hard Choices Ahead for Hundreds of US Coastal
Communities (Spanger-Siegfried et al., 2017). Calling attention to the dismal political situation
in which climate change itself if being denied by the president and other leading political figures
including cabinet members, this report warns,
We are at a turning point where we can still avoid some of the most serious human
consequences and losses that our coasts—and indeed coastal communities around the
world—face this century. We have time to respond. We must use it wisely.
(Spanger-Siegfried et al., 2017, p. 42).
To underscore, it will fall significantly to designers/planners, the focus of this research, to
deal with the many stressful situations arising from climate change-induced disasters in order to
help society cope more effectively with those same events.
Storms and Flooding Internationally. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global
Risk Report 2020, there was $165 billion U.S. in worldwide economic stress and damage from
natural disasters in 2018 (World Economic Forum, 2020). It is therefore important when
considering the broader significance of this study to be aware of the global nature of the
challenges of climate change-induced disasters. It is also essential to look elsewhere to
understand how issues that post-Sandy designers/planners face are being confronted elsewhere.
We look to what has happened internationally and been documented in other coastal areas, urban
and regional, for a grasp of the dimensions of the challenge.
In terms of impact, it is clear that coastal areas, whether cities or not, struggle with
similar impacts, especially on marginalized and already poor and powerless communities around
the world. Bulkeley (2012) has surveyed a wide array of cities that face major climate-related
change and which, as she emphasizes, are in fact places that contribute massively to the
emissions that contribute to the climate problem. She pointed out that “by 2030, over 80% of the
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increase in global annual energy demand above 2006 levels will come from cities in non-OECD
countries” (Bulkeley, 2012, p. 8). Benson (2018) summarizes information on the world’s cities
that are most vulnerable to conflicts resulting from climate change impacts, singling out Manila,
which has already had to cope with major storms such as Typhoon Haiiyan in 2013. The
resulting scarcities, he argued, overload not only local capacity and infrastructure, but the
political system itself:
Terrorist groups including Abu Sayyaf and ISIS are active in the Philippines, and
radicalization could thrive in the uncertainty and hardship following a major
disaster. . . . Because climate change and conflict are so inextricably tied, efforts to
make a city more sustainable often double as increasing stability and security. Cities
that prepare may be able to avoid a breakdown of order. But cities that fail to act could
come apart at the seams. (Benson, 2018, paras. 20–21)
Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, and Corfee-Morlot (2013) have tabulated anticipated costs of
flooding and flood prevention in major coastal cities around the world largely resulting from
storms and sea level rise associated with climate change. They concluded,
With climate change and subsidence, present protection will need to be upgraded to
avoid unacceptable losses of US$1 trillion or more per year. Even if adaptation
investments maintain constant flood probability, subsidence and sea-level rise will
increase global flood losses to US$60–63 billion per year in 2050. (Hallegatte et al.,
2013, p. 802)
Because of the very high property values and labor costs in developed countries, the list
Hallegatte et al. (2013) compiled is dominated by their cities. But the data shows that developing
world coastal cities face equally bad or worse scenarios; and, of course, they have much less
capacity to afford rebuilding or other adaptive measures. Some of the major coastal cities in
developing countries for which there has been research into vulnerability to climate change
include Lagos, Nigeria (Adelekan, 2010) and Mombasa, Kenya (Awuor, Orindi, & Adwera,
2008).
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Beyond cities, some of the most vulnerable areas of the world are best described in terms
of specific geographic features, notably small island states and highly populated deltaic regions
such as where the Ganges and Mekong reach the sea in Bangladesh and Vietnam, respectively.
Small island developing states—of which there are 58 (Sustainable Development Goals
Knowledge Platform, n.d.)—are among the countries in the world that are most vulnerable to
climate change and required to adapt to its impacts, yet there is comparatively little research that
addresses their adaptation to climate change (Robinson, 2017). Places like the Maldives, for
example, are important lenses for the impact of climate change, adaptation, and resiliency in
place or managed retreat and how communities with limited levels of social capital are
responding in the context of design-delivery systems (see World Bank, 2010).
Geography has made the Maldives especially vulnerable to the consequences of
climate change. Being land scarce and low-lying, the country is exposed to the risks of
intensifying weather events such as damage caused by inundation, extreme winds, and
flooding from storms. With the melting of polar ice caps, the Maldives is also exposed
to the risks of sea-level rise. Future sea level is projected to rise within the range of 10
to 100 centimeters by the year 2100, which means the entire country could be
submerged. (World Bank, 2010, paras. 8–9)
It is a bitter but not uncommon irony that these disproportionately affected areas have had
so little role or benefit from the global fossil fuel economy.
With small island countries contributing less than 1% of global greenhouse emissions,
nonetheless in the Maldives, rising sea levels are causing salt-water to intrude into
underground fresh water supplies. In order to adapt, the country is trying to build
rainwater cisterns and new pipe systems to ensure that its people have safe drinking
water supplies. (Plumer & Friedman, 2017)
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Figure 2.2. Coastal city vulnerability and anticipated costs associated with future flooding. From
“Future flood losses in major coastal cities,” Nature Climate Change by Hallegatte et al., 2013,
p. 803. Copyright 2013 by Springer Nature. Used with permission.
As noted, highly populated deltas, especially those in developing countries, are also
especially prone to impacts of climate change-induced effects, both because of their low-lying
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altitudes rendering sea level rise a major factor and, typically their exposure to seasonal heavy
storms, worsened by global warming. Further, by definition, major deltas mean major rivers, and
in time when seasonal precipitation is increasing due to climate change, flood events are also
exacerbated. Two important examples of such vulnerable regions are the Mekong Delta and the
Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta (Khadka, 2015; Toan, 2014).
The Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta is one of the most densely populated areas in the world
prone to flooding disasters. Well before the impact of climate change on sea level and storm
intensities bore down on the area, it had experienced what has been described as the deadliest
tropical cyclone of the 20th century: The Bhola cyclone is thought to have killed a half million
people (Reilly, 2009). Although storm warning systems and other physical measures have
reduced the effects that such a storm would now have, Bangladesh remains one of the most
disaster-prone regions of earth. Huq (2001) wrote,
Bangladesh is one of the countries most likely to suffer adverse impacts from
anthropogenic climate change. Threats include sea level rise (approximately a fifth of
the country consists of low-lying coastal zones within 1 meter of the high-water mark),
droughts, floods, and cyclones (approximately 130,000 people were killed in the
cyclone of April 1990). With a population of 130 million, most of whom earn less than
U.S.$1 a day, it has some of the poorest people in the world. The impacts of climate
change will only exacerbate the problems already facing the population. (p. 1617)
The statistics for this region are further expanded upon in a January 2020 study which states that
“Depending on the region of the delta, water-level rise could reach 85 to 140 cm by 2100”
(CNRS, 2020, para.1)
These almost unthinkable vulnerabilities bring us back to the issue of who suffers most,
not only during catastrophic storms but in their aftermath, despite having taken measures to
recover and adapt. Mearns and Norton (2010b), on behalf of the World Bank, have edited a wide
range of papers that prioritize the issues of (in)equity in relation to climate change. These were
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contributions at a World Bank workshop in 2008. In their introduction, Mearns and Norton
(2010a) phrased the issues succinctly:
Viewing climate change through a social development lens leads us, at the outset, to
couch the agenda in terms of social justice, at all levels from the global to the local.
The causes and consequences of climate change are intertwined deeply with global
patterns of inequality. Climate change acts as a multiplier of existing vulnerabilities in
a warming and transforming world. It threatens to roll back the hard-earned gains in
poverty reduction and progress toward maintaining the Millennium Development
Goals that already have been achieved . . . The global injustice of a world in which
responsibility for the causes of climate change is inversely proportional to the degree
of vulnerability to its consequences calls for equity and social justice to be placed at
the heart of a responsive agenda on climate policy and action [emphasis added]. (p. 2)
In this volume and of special interest to my inquiries is the idea of developing “a
framework of pro-poor adaptation to climate change” (Moser & Satterthwaite, 2010, p. 232).
Meaning, policies that promote social, economic, and environmental justice among all people. I
have explored such ideas with design/planning professionals in this study.
Impacts on Professionals
Design/planning responses to climate change and disasters. How working within these
types of highly charged post-disaster or pre-disaster vulnerable coastal communities is impacting
design/planning professionals individually and collectively was the focus of my primary research
question: In what ways did post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the design/planning
professionals’ approach to future climate-related events personally (individually), professionally,
and societally? This is an area of literature that has only begun to surface; this dissertation
addressed that dearth.
In this section, I looked at the literature facing up to the disasters in the New York area
and elsewhere. I began with initiatives in the New York region that were central in the study
regarding design/planning professionals. Then, the discussion was broadened to look at strategies
and approaches used elsewhere, beginning by considering the several alternative principles or
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goals used in guiding post-disaster efforts: rebuilding, adaptation, and the emergence of
resiliency as an especially popular concept on what needs to be achieved. This discussion,
especially of the major ascendance of the idea of resilience in post-disaster design/planning
work, brings the discussion back to questions of equity and inequity—dilemmas that
practitioners will confront as they attempt to both “do good and be right”7 (cf. Hoch, 1984). First,
however, main post-Sandy initiatives in the New York area are reviewed here.
Major design/planning responses to Sandy. This section highlights lay documents
related to the major regional planning initiatives responding specifically to Sandy. Critical
commentaries, from newspapers, magazine, and online sources, rather than in scholarly works,
are also included. As noted in Chapter I, there are five principle responses8 of main interest:


NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR);



HUD’s Rebuild by Design;



New York Rising/Buy It Back (a New York State initiative);



Build It Back (a New York City initiative);



Occupy Sandy (a grassroots initiative).

NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency. The plan developed by the City at
the direction of Mayor Michael Bloomberg comprised a 438-page report titled, A Stronger, More
Resilient New York (PlaNYC, 2013). Interestingly, its authors chose to have a definition of the

7

The challenge of doing one’s technical urban planning and design work soundly (being right) yet
achieving social equity especially in relation to the disadvantaged (doing good) was considered below as
a core issue to explore in this research.
8
Referring to these as the principal post-Sandy initiatives should not downgrade the large number of
other studies that have been prepared by scholars, research collaborations, interest groups, and others,
about the storm and its effects. Such other works are the American Institute of Architects New York
(2013) Post-Sandy Initiative: Building Better, Building Smarter—Opportunities for Design and
Development, and the New York State 2100 Commission’s (2013), Recommendations to Improve the
Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure.
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definition of the word resilient directly after the cover page, indicating how substantially this
term is pervading post-disaster and climate-change writings. Emphasizing the path to a more
resilient response to climate change, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg asserted in his cover letter for
this report, “We are a coastal city—and we cannot, and will not, abandon our waterfront. Instead,
we must build a stronger, more resilient city—and this plan puts us on a path to do just that”
(PlaNYC, 2013, from “Foreword from the Mayor”). This perspective, as we shall see, is not
necessarily aligned with progressive thinking about disaster planning associated with resilience.
There follows a detailed chapter on repair and resilience for citywide infrastructure and
built environment, and, then, community rebuilding plans for each of the five boroughs’ most
storm-impacted areas. There are more than 250 specific projects comprising this plan with an
estimated total cost of $20 billion.
Rebuild by Design. The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force in partnership with
HUD launched an innovative, international design competition, Rebuild by Design (RBD). The
competition enlisted the support of civic, philanthropic, and academic institutions that included
the Municipal Art Society, the Regional Plan Association, NYU’s Institute for Public
Knowledge, The Van Alen Institute, and The Rockefeller Foundation, that supported this
multi-stage competition that was:
a cross-sector, cross-professional collaboration, and iterative design. Participants
collaborated with community and local government stakeholders to ensure each stage
of the competition was based on the best knowledge and talent and final proposals
would be realistic and replicable. (Rebuild by Design, n.d., para. 1)
Of all the initiatives this design competition was, from my perspective, one that changed
the way many design/planning professionals approached disaster and resiliency planning. The
RBD program has been involved in several collaborative publications describing the program
and its lessons (Grannis, 2016) and assembling the perspectives of designers who were involved
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in the program (Basalaev-Binder & Wachsmuth, 2018). Another monograph, Too Big: Rebuild
by Design’s Transformative Response to Climate Change, edited by Ovink and Boeijenga
(2018), further describes the experience of involvement with the program. The intention was:
to reflect on it, assess it in all its aspects and embed it in a broader context to offer a
guide for politicians, designers, change managers, community leaders, researchers,
activists, and others, offering future approaches wherever climate-change induced,
water-related urban challenges arise. (NAi Boekverkopers, n.d.)
Australian architectural professor, Helen Lochhead (2017), looking at the broader
applicability for approaches akin to RBD, saw the competition as underscoring the critical role of
urban designers in responding to extreme weather events. “Designers are collaborators,
visualizers, and synthesizers. RBD provided them the opportunity to unpack issues and put
together scenarios in new and different ways” (Lochhead, 2017, p. 3). She notes that Hurricane
Sandy did not limit its impact to political boundaries so neither should the design approach.
Designers and planners are needed to think from the perspective of regional interdependencies so
there could be a coordinated approach that did not simply stay at the local level. For example, a
designer/planner developing a barrier to keep the water out in New Jersey could potentially
negatively impact a part of New York during a storm, if it was not regionally vetted and
coordinated. Lochhead (2017) concluded, “The design-led process in RBD has crystallized the
role of designers as agents of change. The pivotal positioning of the designer in the RBD process
facilitated imaginative solutions to the complex problems in question” (p. 12). However, she also
called attention to the “crunch” within which the work of RBD took place, noting,
because of the compressed timeframe and constrained resources—activities that
typically take two years, took ten months—this inevitably resulted in a focus on
projects that address the immediate impacts of the disaster rather than systemic
vulnerabilities, such as chronic social housing and critical infrastructure in low-lying
flood prone land, that were exacerbated by the disaster. (Lochhead, 2017, p. 13)
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This hints at a question which will recur in this chapter and, became a key theme
explored in the research: Does the urgent work of designers/planners allow or preclude thorough
attention to public housing and other pre-existing inequities and vulnerabilities faced by
marginalized groups?
Another Australian article on RBD is Lentini’s (2016) work. Shapiro-Kline (2014)
focused on the extent to which RBD’s very open public process succeeded in setting the stage for
innovative approaches: “The urgency of the design competition timeframe, following from the
urgency of addressing Sandy’s impacts, brought together a wide range of citizens, organizations,
businesses, and government agencies, through the design teams as intermediaries and
facilitators” (p. 49).
This addresses a dilemma that this study explored: namely, that in the midst of a very
hurried and urgent response to the threat posed by future climate change and resulting storms, it
will be challenging for designers/planners to respond expeditiously, to be accountable to public
perspectives and be innovative. The research documents how design/planning professionals have
approached these challenges.
New York Rising/Buy It Back. Both these initiatives are parts of the GOSR program. The
NY Rising Community Reconstruction (NYRCR) Program was an initiative established to assist
124 New York State communities damaged by Hurricane Sandy, as well as Hurricane Irene, and
Tropical Storm Lee. GOSR allotted more than $700 million in federal funds for planning and
implementation of recovery and resiliency projects. Other than the website for the initiative
(Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, n.d.-b) which provides an overview of the entire
program, the direct documentation of New York Rising consists of the various planning
documents prepared by each affected community. Summaries of three rounds of planning have
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been prepared (New York Rising Community Reconstruction Planning Committee, 2014.).
While innovative in many aspects of its approach, New York Rising did integrate some of the
more traditional tenets of planning and recovery, informing yet another type of integrated
approach for planners and designers within communities.
While the NYC SIRR plan did not favor managed retreat or buyout scenarios, both the
New York State and New Jersey governors did set up specific programs for buying back homes.
The program in New York, Buy It Back, focused on specific areas where there has been a history
of severe flooding and where the vulnerability was such that there was high risk to dangerous
repeat flooding and that in order to improve the resiliency of the larger community, these
buyouts returned the land back to nature in the form of wetlands, open space, or storm
management systems. Part of this buyout also included what was called an Acquisition Program,
where the property was rebuilt in a manner that was resilient but which the existing tenants were
either unable or unwilling to do.
Build It Back. The NYC Mayor's Office of Housing Recovery Operations and the Build
It Back program was developed to help New Yorkers rebuild, repair, and elevate homes in
Sandy-impacted communities. Funded by HUD’s Community Development Block Grant
Disaster Recovery Program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, n.d.) Build
It Back provided support for homeowners after all other forms of disaster assistance was
exhausted.
As of June 2018, the program reported,
The City is nearing completion of its Hurricane Sandy housing recovery efforts.
Through June 2018, the Build It Back program has served 99 percent of approximately
8,300 homeowners (totaling 12,500 households) through either a reimbursement
check, construction start, or acquisition. The vast majority of these homeowners—95
percent—have received their full benefit, including construction, reimbursement, or
acquisition of their home. Over 4,500 projects have been completed across
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Sandy-impacted areas in Brooklyn, The Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island, including
98 percent of City-managed construction projects, and 92 percent of all construction
projects, which also includes homeowner-managed construction. (New York City
Housing Recovery, n.d.-b, para 4)
Notwithstanding, this initiative has been the most controversial and contestable of all the
programs noted here (Blau & Durkin, 2017; Nonko, 2017; Rizzi, 2016). As a result, not only has
Build It Back had impact on people within the communities—both welcomed and
resented—but also on the design/planning professionals working on the ground in the rebuilding
phase. The way that the program impacted or reshaped professionals’ working and thinking was
explored closely in the dissertation research itself. Again, the involvement of designers/planners
in this work gives rise to the interview discussion about the trade-off that may arise between
implementing a program on an urgent basis and yet being sensitive to social and personal
consequences for groups who are supposed to be helped.
Occupy Sandy. This initiative was an offshoot of Occupy Wall Street but later became a
separate grassroots disaster-relief organization to aid communities impacted by Sandy, most
particularly areas with large concentrations of subsidized or otherwise affordable housing and
more inter-generationally marginalized communities.
Occupy Sandy not only impacted the disaster relief community but also the
design/planning community in the post-disaster planning and rebuilding. The movement
effectively utilized its social media prowess to respond quickly and sensitively to social needs
especially among the most marginalized and vulnerable groups and neighborhoods (Jones,
2013). Not only was Occupy Sandy impressive in its tangible results, but it was able to ensure
that its accomplishments were well-publicized as both mainstream and alternative media gave its
aid work high profile. Thus, storylines ranged from positive to heroic as seen in this sampling of
storylines such as, “Where FEMA fell short, Occupy Sandy was there” (Feuer, 2014), and

82
“Occupy Sandy: True Heroes in a Time of Crisis” (Farr, 2013). Quickly, the movement
demonstrated its flexibility and agility in comparison to conventional charitable organizations, as
described in The New Yorker (MacFarquhar, 2012).
In a wider review of Occupy in the context of more traditional relief institutions, Ogman
(2014) argued,
Not only did Occupy Sandy outpace traditional relief institutions, they also absorbed a
much larger number of volunteers, putting them to work in distribution of donated
supplies, cleaning away storm rubbish, removing mold from people’s homes, knocking
on doors in public housing projects and delivering food and assessing medical
requirements of those trapped in their homes because of elevator power outages, and
much more. The group had established direct contact with affected populations, and
immediately ascertained their needs. (par. 104)
Ogman (2014) further argued that Occupy Sandy used the opportunities created by its
philanthropic work to reconnect to its original mission of opposition, in word and deed, to
neoliberal forces. Their work, he suggested, “strengthened their ties to affected communities and
drove them beyond relief work, back towards protest to get the city, state, and federal
governments to step up their efforts in the relief and reconstruction” (Ogman, 2014, para. 107).
Occupy Sandy brings into focus a central theme in the research: the social equity
dimensions of the storm and of other climate-induced disasters. To what extent, do the responses
of professionals to urban disasters focus on the well-being of the most marginalized and
vulnerable populations—or in contrast, is it “them that has gets” in post-disaster strategies?
Occupy Sandy, clearly was aimed at achieving the former and so, to repeat, brings to the fore the
inescapable dilemma that designers/planners faced as they engaged in recovering from
Sandy—and preparing for its successors.
Different ways of framing the mission in post-disaster initiatives. Each of these
post-Sandy initiatives incorporates one or more of the principal ways in which
designers/planners in New York and elsewhere are called upon to respond when large physical
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disasters occur. Key words for such initiatives are rebuilding, mitigation, vulnerability,
adaptation, and resilience. All of these reflect different, though not always mutually exclusive,
future work of design/planning in the face of ever-changing weather and water conditions.
Rebuilding “what used to be” seems the most instinctive response to a major disaster that
has destroyed housing and infrastructure. Klaus H. Jacob, who was integrally involved in
post-Sandy recovery, uses New York City as a case study:
Looking closely at the major competing approaches: defending against flood and rising
waters with massive earthworks and expensive engineered structures; accommodating
to and living with the rising waters so that the city can recover quickly after flooding;
strategically relocating to higher ground; and spreading the risk via insurance. It also
examines two other options: doing nothing and stopping the flooding problem at its
source. (K. H. Jacob, 2015, p. 1)
Klaus H. Jacob (2015) discusses changing precepts of design/planning work that, he
suggests, few are yet thinking about: “Science-based forward-looking, quantitative risk
assessment as a sound foundation on which not just to rebuild but to proactively rebuild” (p. 42).
K. H. Jacob terms this as “probuild” (p. 42). He evaluates adaptation options in terms of costs
and risks that bring added value to a resilient future: “Present affordability needs to be balanced
against intergenerational equity, which comes down to the element of risk.” (Jacob, 2015, p. 43).
I asked the participants in this study, “How are design/planning professionals to inject such
measured considerations while they are themselves affected by urgency and recollections of
traumatized populations living in stress and denial?”
Johnson and Olshansky’s (2016) After Great Disasters lays out the agenda reviewing
cases from disasters in China, New Zealand, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States.
Consistent through this work is that cities are complex systems and communities are
self-organizing systems. “Communities with a high level of collective efficacy [emphasis added]
are most likely to recover” (Johnson & Olshansky, 2016, p. 6). Yet within both the system of the
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city and community there is a different experience of time that evolves with what one
experiences as normal conditions and those that evolve post-disaster. Olshansky, Hopkins and
Johnson (2012) refer to this as “time compression” and the impact of that on both speed and
deliberation. “A tension that is exhibited between rebuilding quickly and slowing down to
develop plans that are for the betterment of the community, with the key being to deliberate more
efficiently within compressed time” (Olshansky et al., 2012, p. 11).
While this concept of “slowing it down” was critical to the philosophy of Rebuild by
Design in New York (see above), it was not as effective when compressed deadlines and slowing
down impacted areas that were already under severe economic and social stress and thereby
exacerbated by Sandy, particularly in areas of public housing. This is where designers/planners
play critical roles with potentially huge impacts by helping the city and the community focus on
early actions and separating that out from longer-range plans. They also can play critical roles in
communities that while vulnerable, have not been impacted by extreme events, providing time
for pre-disaster planning. This can improve post-disaster planning. Johnson and Olshansky
(2016) also concluded from their comparative case studies that communities lacking previous
post-disaster planning—often because of already being economically disadvantaged areas—were
not a priority in recovery efforts. This pattern places a heavy moral burden on designers/planners
as they are sure to be faced with more demands than they can meet: so, do they follow or break
with patterns of neglect when taking on the immediate work of recovery planning? Who decides
and how? Johnson and Olshansky (2016) bluntly asked, “To what extent can they facilitate
significant change from the pre-disaster state?” (p. 323, emphasis added). This analysis was a
part of the discussions with the post-Sandy designers/planners.
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Seattle-area planner Karen Wolf (2009) helpfully distinguished between dealing with
consequences of climate change versus being prepared in ways that reduce the harm inflicted by
such consequences.
Mitigation refers to the actions and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Using less and cleaner energy, driving less, and planting trees to sequester carbon are
all mitigation strategies. . . . But mitigation alone is not enough. Even if greenhouse
gas emissions ceased today, atmospheric carbon concentrations have already reached
such levels that global and regional temperatures will still increase to some degree.
Because some change is inevitable, adaptation strategies must be an equally important
component of communities' response to climate change. (pp. 1–2)
Wolf (2009) suggests that planners are the ones who will be at the centre of adaptation.
Planners are especially well-suited to lead communities in adaptation because of our
experience in working with a variety of stakeholders—citizens, the business
community, environmentalists, health professionals—to improve the quality of life for
all residents. (p. 2)
Two further concepts to be noted among the guiding ideas and principles to which
planners and designers are engaged in relation to disasters are vulnerability and adaption.
Vulnerability. Perhaps beyond the concept of a society’s vulnerability lies that of a
culture’s adaptability. Broadening the discursive framework beyond vulnerability may not only
improve the provision and degree of disaster preparedness and relief, but may also help break
free from the conceptual constraints that have rendered the world “unsafe” for so many millions
for so long. Bankoff (2001) brings to mind how the poor and marginalized of New York and
New Orleans have been talked about after hurricane disasters, in warning how narrow discussion
of vulnerability stigmatizes Third World areas impacted by climate change, “essentialising and
generalising cultural discourse that denigrates large regions of world as disease‐ridden,
poverty‐stricken and disaster‐prone” (p. 19).
While vulnerability is an outcome of climate change, it is exacerbated by conditions that
long preceded the gravity of the shifting environment. Tanner, Mitchell, Polack, and Guenther
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(2009) defined five characteristics that formed the basis of climate vulnerable and resilient urban
governance frameworks: decentralization and autonomy, accountability and transparency,
responsiveness and flexibility, participation and inclusion, and experience and support. Urban
governance is inclusive of elected or appointed officials as well as at a local level with
community stakeholders. Planned and autonomous adaptation and the willingness to tackle
existing vulnerabilities, is critical to achieving viable solutions across the globe.
Whether countries are successful in realigning their priorities to impede or ultimately
reverse the destruction to the planet’s environmental integrity and adopt more of the tenets of a
sustainable society, cities in both developed and developing countries will depend significantly
on designers/planners. They need to have more specific frameworks in place to deal with
climate-related events that have either already happened or may have been set into motion
without a time stamp of arrival. To accomplish this will take new ways of thinking about
frameworks that integrate adaptation, vulnerability and resiliency with leadership that can
embody the dignity of place, people, and planet at its core. This research explored the extent to
which Hurricane Sandy is changing mind sets of professional practice in this direction.
Adaptability. With a global movement toward increasingly more sustainable cities comes
an increase in the need for adaptability. This is especially pronounced in the context of extreme
climate-related events such as flooding, droughts, and earthquakes. Discussions surrounding
adaptability (adaptive capacity) in cities has led to a more extensive lexicon, inclusive of terms
that have a variety of meaning in the social sciences: vulnerability and resiliency. In a report for
the United Nations Development Program, Schipper, Cigaran, and Hedger (2008) argued that
“adaptation is not a ‘stand-alone’ issue” (p. 32). Adaptation plans need to be part of a larger plan
with short, medium, and long-term goals such as disaster management, poverty reduction,
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economic development, and land use planning—which brings this discussion to the guiding
concept which, in the last several decades, has moved to the center stage of discussions about
adapting to climate change.
The turn to resilience. The general turn to emphasizing resilience as one of the main
guiding principles in coping with climate-induced disasters is seen both in post-Sandy responses
and in other urban areas facing climate impactful events. Emergency response management
remains an inevitable priority directly after a catastrophic event but there is heightened
awareness—especially as the world faces the certainty of more frequent and intense
climate-change-induced calamities—that building disaster resilience must not be sacrificed as
short-term fixes are pursued. This is a fundamental change in philosophy changing the focus
from purely emergency response management teams to disaster resilience, which engages
communities to be better prepared and capable of responding to and bouncing back from
significant climate-impacting events. Additionally, identifying appropriate baseline indicators for
establishing pre-existing vulnerable conditions in relation to disaster resilience takes place before
improvements to the resilience of a community can be identified (Cutter, Burton, & Emrich,
2010).
While the term resilience is ever-more entrenched in the recovery, design/planning
nomenclature, the word has many definitions. It is derived from the Latin word, resilio, meaning
“to jump back” (Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003, p. 35). Probably one of the earliest uses in
literature was the study of resilience in psychology, and psychologists ascertained that there was
a lack of clarity and unification in the use of this term (De Bruijne, Boin, & Van Eeten, 2010,
p. 15). In the early 1970s, the term resilience was closely examined by Holling (1973) and his
associates whose primary interest was not in disaster situations but in how disturbed natural
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populations’ ecosystems return to prior functioning, if not identical equilibrium points, after
major perturbations. Holling (1973) defined resilience as, “the persistence of systems and of their
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between
populations or state variables” (p. 14). It is important to emphasize that in this initial formulation,
Holling was not saying that returning to a previous set of relationships was good. As a scientist,
he was puzzling over how some natural systems have a better ability to bounce back after
disturbance than others do. However, in later writings, value judgements about the desirability of
resilience were clear for having human-designed entities like engineering structures and, then
having whole social systems persist—meaning survive—seemed intuitively good (Holling,
2001). This perspective on resilience has become central in the widespread advocacy by social
scientists, planners, and others, of adopting strategies that maximize it. In disaster studies and
planning, resilience is seen as a means for dealing with “ever-changing patterns and surprises in
ecological systems, such as storms, droughts, and over- or under-population—or even the
extinction of entire species” (De Bruijne et al., 2010, p. 16).
Since then, resilience has more generally come to be “applied to describe the behavioral
responses of communities, institutions and economies” (De Bruijne et al., 2010, p. 21), with the
assumption that to persist is better than to change into something entirely different. The concept
of resilience has also been used as a concept in organizational and management literature in the
context of how to address a challenging and ever-changing business climate and is widely
applied to social systems and institutions in general (Maclean, Cuthill, & Ross, 2014).
Most pertinent to this study, the idea—and ideal—of resilience has also powerfully
entered the language and goals of design/planning, especially in the wake of disasters. The edited
volume, The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster (Vale & Campanella,
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2005b), provides a wide array of case studies ranging from the aftermaths of terror in both New
York and Oklahoma City (Linenthal, 2005); Berlin (Ladd, 2005), and Beirut (Sarkis, 2005) after
the ravages of war; Tangshan in China, after a major earthquake in 1976 (Chen, 2005); and Los
Angeles after the 1992 riots following the acquittal of police officers who assaulted Rodney King
(Fulton, 2005). Summarizing the “axioms of resilience” as they call the lessons of this wide
range of post-disaster experiences, Vale and Campanella (2005a) posit that architecture and
urban design are pivotal:
Rebuilding cities reassures us of a future . . . Architecture and urban design are . . .
central to the reconstruction and reimaging of traumatized places. In the effort to shore
up the scattered and shattered lives of survivors, post-disaster urbanism operates
through a series of symbolic acts. . . . They link the ongoing psychological recovery
process to tangible, visible signs of progress and momentum. (p. 344)
Vale and Campanella (2005a) go on to say that even in devastated urban areas, the
rebuild has not always led to visionary new plans that correct deficiencies. Johnson and
Olshansky (2016) as well as Henk Ovink9 (principal design consultant to the Rebuild by Design
initiative), both have stressed the importance in the rebuilding process to slow the process down.
While this is counterintuitive when dealing within a disaster, the space for creating change that is
substantive can only happen with a level of active listening and reflection. Rather than rushing in
with heroics to save the day, one needs to take pause and understand the problems well enough
to be able to create solutions that may mean changes long wished for or never thought of. As
expressed by Vale and Campanella (2005a), time and reflection are needed for “the construction
of a suitable interpretative framework that enables psychological, emotional, and symbolic
recoveries” (p. 340).

9

Ovink is also the co-editor of a collection of reflections by the main collaborators in Rebuild by Design
(Ovink & Boeijenga, 2018), telling the inside story of politics, human relations, and creativity in Too Big
(and its challenges), in that major post-Sandy Initiative.
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Over time, some voices have arisen that see problems with the hastened ascent of
resilience as the main guiding principle for recovery. Increasingly resilience is taken to be the
obvious and perhaps literally unquestionable10 responses to disaster. Mykhnenko (2016) ponders
whether or not resilience is “a ‘right-winger’ ploy” (p. 176), documenting the many sources on
both sides of the left-right spectrum who have jumped on this bandwagon. In the end, he
concludes (though one could interpret his evidence to support the opposite conclusion) that
“analysis does not seem to support the fear expressed by many scholars and commentators of
resilience as some sort of a Trojan horse of neoliberals used to advance their causes”
(Mykhnenko, 2016, p. 186).
Others are less concerned about possible abuse of the term to reinforce returning the
system to its status quo. Simin Davoudi (Davoudi et al., 2012)—a British architect and
professor—has worried that the idea of resilience is “in danger of becoming just another buzz
word” (p. 299). She asked, “Does its malleability mean that many divergent measures, including
those that might otherwise appear indefensible, can be justified in the name of resilience?”
(Davoudi et al., 2012, p. 299). In a related paper Davoudi co-authored with urban studies scholar,
Libby Porter (Davoudi et al, 2012), resilience’s similarity to other “elastic concepts” (p. 329),
such as sustainability, is noted with the concern that these are “employed to justify diverse and
even conflicting ends . . . empty signifier[s] which can be filled to justify almost any ends” (p.
329). This foreshadows other more critically expressed fears that resilience can go hand in hand
with trying to restore the status quo rather than seize upon disasters as opportunities to effect
more radical changes in favor of the disadvantaged. Vardy and Smith (2017) suggest that,
“Resilience risks becoming code word for ‘business as usual’ as industrial, military, and political
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elites rearrange their operations to acknowledge the reality of climate change while maintaining
relations of power” (p. 175). Taking a constructive and positive tack at the possible risks of
resilience-seeking as shoring up pre-existing “them that has gets” relations, Cote and Nightingale
(2012) call for “resilience approaches . . . needing to engage with the insights and critiques from
the social sciences about agency” (p. 484).
This goes to the heart of discussions with design/planning professionals closely addressed
in the research. The term resilience while sounding so right on the surface, could bypass or beg
the critical question that arises for those most concerned with social equity and the status quo
before and after disaster: Are designers/planners unwittingly supporting socially inequitable
arrangements, where the “powers that be” continue to dominate, through this concept of
resiliency? This was a controversial question during the research, and designers/planners were
polarized in their responses.
When disaster strikes, confusion, panic, disorientation, and often finger-pointing follow.
Amidst the emergency, people and agencies make forgivable and understandable errors. But it is
also well-known that after the casualties are cared for, the dead are grieved, and basic
infrastructure is sufficiently restored to allow some semblance of normal daily life and work,
authorities still often act without a reasoned approach based on sound design/planning.
Politically expedient projects may be launched that turn out to have been more harmful than
helpful. Some of the public and private works may even smack of opportunism and greed as
when funding is channeled to rebuilding for those who have the greatest means to take care of
themselves. This pattern has been described and documented in many settings, most notably in
the United States in the aftermath of Katrina which struck New Orleans and breached the levees
in late August 2005. Shughart (2006), writing soon after the event, coined a new and derogatory
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term—Katrinanomics—while nicely highlighting a number of conspicuous failures that made the
infamous disaster even more disastrous:
Who was to blame for the authorities’ evident failure, illustrated most vividly by the
chaos at Louisiana’s Superdome, to mount a timely, well organized effort to succor the
victims of Katrina’s wrath? Where was the Red Cross? Where was the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)? Why were no police or National Guard
units in place to prevent the looting and gang violence that erupted in “Baghdad under
water,” as former Louisiana Senator John Breaux described New Orleans (Gibbs et al.,
2005, p. 44), a city which, by 1 September, “was on the verge of anarchy” (Thomas et
al., 2005a, p. 47)? Why was the official response to Katrina so “pathetic”? (p. 31)
In the years after Katrina, billions were expended and yet the predicament of victims and
survivors—especially those of color—was repeatedly documented as adding up to a colossally
mismanaged “recovery.” Leeson and Sobel (2008), having looked at disaster relief along the
Gulf, concluded that: “Natural disasters create resource windfalls in the states they strike by
triggering federally provided natural-disaster relief. By increasing the benefit of fraudulent
appropriation and creating new opportunities for such theft, disaster-relief windfalls may also
increase corruption” (p. 667). Squires and Hartman (2013b) aptly titled their collection of critical
essays on post-Katrina recovery, There is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and
Hurricane Katrina. In their editors’ introduction, they list the panoply of post-disaster corruption
that Katrina exposed:
Credible accusations of dereliction, even financial improprieties, on the part of
national sacred cows such as the Red Cross. . . Foreign aid coming to us not from
us—and then mishandled . . . A mandating of moratoriums (albeit ephemeral) on
mortgage foreclosures and evictions—an intervention in the housing market unheard
of since Depression days . . . Absentee voting problems (only partially resolved) on an
unprecedented scale . . . Police officers simply walking away from their jobs
. . . Incidents of racism/exclusion/NIMBYism . . . [most notably that] police in the
Westbank city of Gretna blocked a bridge, preventing large numbers of African
American evacuees from escaping the deluged city. (Squires & Hartman, 2013a,
pp. 1–2)
The chaos, corruption, and heightened marginalization of already marginalized groups
continue to serve as a warning for those who plan and act in the aftermath of Sandy. And yet,
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Cohen and Liboiron (2014) conclude that there were actually two Sandys experienced in the
New York region: “The first was a one-time indiscriminate exceptional catastrophe. The second
was an extraordinary acceleration of inequalities affecting the poorest New Yorkers” (p. 34).
Ways of recovering need to be created that not only rectify the destruction wrought by the
disaster but attend to the special neediness of segments of the population, including going deeper
into the roots of social inequity—this, I repeat, is central to the mission and varied experience of
designers/planners in New York and worldwide, as climate change-induced catastrophes
proliferate. Cohen and Liboiron (2014) sum up well what these professionals and our society
generally must face up to:
Disasters don’t just leave infrastructure in rubble. They also illuminate the moments
when our usual forms of intervention fail to address a devastating problem. New
systems, communities, and policies must emerge as the old systems are overwhelmed
by social and physical change. Within this paradigm, the systemic inequities that
Sandy laid bare occurred long before the hurricane hit. (p. 4)
Similar concerns have steadily emerged from analyses of responses to both Sandy and
Katrina. For example, Liberty (2013), a New Jersey public defender, wrote in “The (In)Equities
of Superstorm Recovery”:
The entire state [New Jersey] was dramatically changed by Hurricane Sandy, and its
effects will be long lasting. Like Hurricane Katrina, Sandy exposed many of the
inequities deeply ingrained in our society. While disaster recovery projects have not
been fully implemented and the final allocation of recovery funds has not yet occurred,
the state’s action plan is representative of how it prioritizes damage. As indicated
above, the state’s recovery plan fails to adequately account for the demonstrated
relationship between race, poverty, and natural disasters. (para. 36)
Such insights and a broader critique of conventional public and private response to
disasters have also emerged internationally. As noted above in a report developed for the United
Nations Development Program, Schipper et al. (2008) argued that adaptation plans need to be
part of a larger vision with short, medium, and long-term goals such as disaster management,
poverty reduction, economic development, and land use planning. This must embrace fine-tuning
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of policy at the local level so that actions were not static and limited to one event, but rather
became part of an ongoing process that evolved over time.
There is of course a strong physical dimension to vulnerability, as certain landforms and
community locations are so obviously more prone to negative impacts than others (Cutter, Ash,
& Emrich, 2014). Almost as obvious but often overlooked, is that when catastrophes strike
within a region or city, some populations are inevitably more at risk and more affected than
others. These tend to be ones that have long been socially marginalized on grounds of race,
economic status, gender, health, and even age. Children are often much more at risk than adults,
all else being equal (see Cutter, 2017). As for gender, Cutter (2017) asserted that the
“disadvantages in basic living conditions and livelihoods are amplified during and after disasters
and humanitarian crises” (p. 118). Enarson and Pease (1998a) earlier had written of the
“gendered terrain of disaster (p. 3)” adding their voice to their edited volume (Enarson & Pease,
1998b), much of which advocated the study of “men and masculinities” (Enarson & Pease,
1998a, p. 3) as a way of grasping the uneven effects of catastrophe on women and men.
The racial dimensions of disaster were nowhere more grotesquely obvious as in the days
after the flooding in New Orleans caused by Katrina, as documented in numerous books (e.g.,
Brunsma, Overfelt, & Picou, 2010; Wailoo, Dowd, & O’Neill, 2010), scholarly articles (Elliott &
Pais, 2006; Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008), and in movie documentaries—S. Lee’s (2010)
When the Levees Broke, for example—and TV s dramas such as Treme (Incaprera, Simon, &
Overmyer, 2010).
Given that the research focused on the effects on and actions of designers/planners in
relation to Sandy, a major theme that was looked at were the impacts of the disaster on
already-marginalized social groups. My reasoning was that designers/planners have long
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wrestled with equity implications of their work (Forester & Krumholz, 1990; Hoch, 1984;
Krumholz, 1982), having had to face up to earlier instances where professional planning had hurt
disadvantaged groups and caused various social inequities (Goodman, 1971; J. Jacobs, 1961;
Krumholz, 1982). Eventually professional associations, such as the American Planning
Association, developed a code of ethics that openly addressed the issue of equity:
2) Strive to give citizens (including those who lack formal organization or influence)
full, clear and accurate information on planning issues and the opportunity to have a
meaningful role in the development of plans and programs;
3) Strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special
responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons [emphasis
added]; (American Planning Association & American Institute of Certified Planners,
1992, p. 2)
Our society requires a fundamental change in their collective moral compass where
inclusion, respect and dignity are interconnected. Physician Lise Van Susteren (2017) believes
that the chronic threat of climate change and its attendant catastrophes is making citizens
become,
climate Cassandras gripped by thoughts of future harm, suffering from pre-traumatic
stress response (a before-the-fact version of classic PTSD) because they know the
world has not heard the warnings forcefully enough . . . Our canon of ethics says we
have a duty to protect the public health and to participate in activities that contribute to
it. (p. 57)
This canon of ethics applies no less to designers/planners who must create ways not just
to solve the technically obstinate challenges of adapting to climate change but meet the public’s
need for understanding and involvement that converts disabling stress into collective action. This
duty may resemble what Heifetz (1994) wrote of as adaptive work, a concept examined in
relationship to the question of leadership in the context of the interviews.
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Professionals in Challenging Times
The impacts of designing and planning amidst (and after) disaster. The preceding
discussion has included a substantial amount of research and writing about the impacts of climate
change-induced disasters, with much of the attention on regions, cities, neighborhoods, and on
people who are especially vulnerable because of pre-disaster marginalization. Here, the literature
on the impacts experienced by the very people who play critical roles in responding to disasters
was explored. The most obvious question, dealt with first, is about how being in the thick of
highly stressful emergency situations impacts professionals as individuals. This analysis is the
personal “pillar,” using the idea introduced in Chapter I of three distinguishable aspects of
understanding the work and perspectives of practitioners: personal, professional, and societal.
Understandably, the preponderance of research on such individual-level impacts and
responses to disasters has been first with civilian victims and then about groups known as first
responders: police, firemen, paramedical emergency workers, nurses, doctors, etc. It is intuitive
that these professionals, exposed as they are to scenes of carnage, amidst broken streets,
transportation and electricity infrastructure, and buildings, are likely to suffer from immediate
and post-traumatic psychological impacts. Mitchell and Dyregrov (1993) reviewed the state of
research into traumatic stress among disaster workers and emergency responders, and their call
for significantly greater attention to the plight of such personnel was met by a steady if not
voluminous array of research and publications. After the attack on the World Trade Center and
the prominent and admirable role of police, firemen, and other emergency personnel, more
research ensued (e.g., Adams, Boscarino, & Galea, 2006; Perrin et al., 2007).
Subsequent studies of mental well-being of emergency responders are insufficient (Surya,
Jaff, Stilwell, & Schubert, 2017), yet in comparison, there is virtually no work probing the
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psychosocial impacts on designers/planners. It may be assumed that, unless such professionals
were accidentally caught up in blatantly traumatic incidents during or immediately after a storm,
that they are unlikely to suffer from anything close to PTSD or other mental distress. However,
such professionals do not go untouched. Their work calls for repeated one-on-one and collective
interactions in meetings with victims of disaster. Such victims are unlikely to be calm
discussants of the plight of post-disaster conditions. Steady exposure to truly touching stories of
loss and grief can lead to what has been called “compassion fatigue” (Figley, 2013, book title),
“secondary traumatic stress,” (Baird & Kracen, 2006, p. 181) or “vicarious traumatization”
(Baird & Kracen, 2006, p. 181). This idea has been applied in the context of several major
climate-change related disasters including “Katrina fatigue.” This term was originally coined by
disaster relief providers in Colorado who found that after a period of months, there developed an
“inability of Coloradoans to empathize with the evacuees” (Peek, 2012, p. 35). It has since been
more widely applied to others who continue to work on post-Katrina rebuilding and adaptation.
Over time, many fell back into racial and economic stereotypes and began to experience what
had initially appeared as a temporary interruption to their lives, as a burden that grew into
exhaustion. It is to be noted that many of the professionals engaged in this research study were
engaged with Sandy, as well as with Katrina and some of the more recent hurricanes previously
noted, and may therefore be subject to similar feelings as their professional work unfolds amidst
traumatized individuals.
There have been several usages of “Sandy fatigue” as well. Katinas (2014) wrote
“Superstorm Sandy helpers suffer from ‘compassion fatigue’” that “now it’s the helpers who
need help” (para. 1). Widespread among nurses and social workers, it is reasonable to
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presume—and investigate—whether designer/planners deeply involved in the aftermath of
Sandy could manifest the symptoms of such disorders.
Exploring this and more broadly what the often-subtle impacts have been of working in
this setting will be, I believe, a significant and new contribution to understanding how
professionals are to cope with a future of more climate change-induced events.
Cote (2011) observed,
Physical urban planning is typically based on historic data, which include avoiding
past incidences of natural phenomena such as flooding and beach erosion. However,
there is little precedent in urban planning policy that incorporates scientific prediction
into decision making processes with respect to physical form of a community and legal
issues that may exist between climate science and law and how that would impact the
role of design/planning professionals. (p. 87)
Secondary traumatic stress and secondary traumatic stress disorder, which is also referred
to as “compassion stress fatigue” (Figley, 2002), has not to date been studied in any depth within
the design/planning profession. This is understandable given the fact that while trauma workers
typically include mental health professionals, victims’ advocates, caseworkers, firefighters, law
enforcement, paramedics/EMTs, emergency room physicians and staff, there have been
widespread studies about this in medical, social science, psychological literature (e.g., Beaton,
Murphy, Johnson, Pike, & Corneil, 1998; Castellano & Plionis, 2006; Knafo, 2004), little of any
depth has yet been studied among design/planning professionals immersed in disaster situations.
This is completely understandable as they are not what are usually deemed to be crisis workers.
Therefore, what I have learned has been primarily through the personal stories of these
design/planning professionals. And while shared informal stories among professionals are a rich
and important source of learning, without more systematic efforts, such tutelage is therefore hit
and miss.
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Research on design/planning practice. Limited but intense efforts have been made to
analyze design and planning practice, with a focus on how professionals reflect upon their own
work. At the general level (i.e., outside the context of disasters), a well-known approach that has
produced a contribution to the literature outside design/planning fields is Schön’s (1983) notion
of reflective practice. He based this on the observation that most of the time, professionals are
taking on problems that have no formulas for ready solution and that unfold in contexts of
ever-increasing complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts” (Schön,
1983, p. 14). In his seminal work, The Reflective Practitioner, Schön developed a model
intended for understanding and educating practitioners of many kinds. Interestingly the chapters
that at least initially inspired the most commentary were about designers (“Design as a Reflective
Conversation with the Situation”) and planners (“Town Planning: Limits to Reflection in
Action”).
Subsequently, there have been a number of critiques and elaborations on Schön’s way of
looking at both designers’/planners’ modalities of action (Roozenburg & Dorst, 1998; Visser,
2010). While the basic concept of reflection-in-action is still seen as worthwhile, there is a sense
that Schön did not draw on a sufficient breadth of cases to infer how design/planning work. Nor
did he look at practitioners in the midst of truly complex and stressful situations. Yet, such
contexts are the very least that designers/planners face amidst climate change-induced disasters.
A small step towards analyzing design practice in relation to climate change has been
made by Dubois et al. (2016). In a study conducted in Toulouse, France, they engaged in two
design workshops based on the role architects, urban designers, planners, and engineers would
play in climate change. The authors concluded that the response to these issues may have
resulted in efficient solutions, but it did not often go far enough, and that by providing more
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holistic and operational information, in essence bridging climate research and practice, more
could be accomplished. Similar issues were raised during the design process after Sandy,
resulting in conventional approaches being expanded and transformed to meet the demands of
the situation. Although quite general, MIT Planning Professor Lawrence Susskind’s lecture at the
University of Idaho Law School, “Managing Climate Risks in Resilient Cities” (University of
Utah S. J. Quinney College of Law, 2016), indicates how planning educators have begun to
anticipate how the profession must itself adapt to what is needed in the face of global warming.
There is also a small but growing literature specifically about the role that planners can
and must play in the aftermath of major catastrophes. At the height of the Reagan-era escalation
of fears of nuclear war, Leaning and Keyes (1984) compiled The Counterfeit Ark. Its primary
purpose was to rebut the then-prevalent notion among governments that planners (with many
other professionals) could successfully lead in the adjustments to nuclear holocausts. Many of
the insights on the limits of design/planning in extreme circumstances may serve as a caution for
contemporary planners and designers facing events like Hurricane Sandy. March and
Kornakova’s (2017) Urban Planning for Disaster Recovery illustrates the growing awareness of
planners’ roles and responsibilities in disaster settings. Of special interest to me is the emergent
discussion and practice of what in Japan is called Machi-zukuri (community-based planning),
which Evans (2002) has described in the district at Kobe after an earthquake. There, planners
shifted away from the traditional establishment view that planning is a technical endeavor to be
practiced top-down. This literature review and the post Sandy experience indicate that different
community-driven planning must be the modus operandi of designers/planners confronting
increasingly frequent and intense climate-change-induced disasters.
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It must be emphasized that the recent and growing literature about designer/planners and
climate change/disaster planning is primarily about what these professionals do—and should
do—in their practice. None really address the issues central to this study: how being part of such
traumatic and unprecedented events impacts designers/planners. This points to a significant gap
and need which the work redressed.
Research on design/planning leadership in changeable and uncertain settings. As
perspectives of my interviewees were gathered and analyzed, an important framework for
understanding their roles and strategies can be found within normative literature on leadership:
How does one lead in contexts of massive uncertainty, complexity, and even trauma? Through
these interviews, some key insights into leadership studies were highlighted, as was how
leadership or lack thereof impacted not just planning and recovery but the justification for
advancing the climate conversation.
Throughout history, leaders have often felt that they are living in unprecedented times of
change and uncertainty. Yet, its seems to be the case that everything at this time is changing at an
accelerated and disorienting pace for which no one is fully prepared. Climate-impactful events
are so much of this rapid change.
In the context of events specifically surrounding earth changes, what type of leadership is
needed that will support designers/planners working in service to individuals and communities
facing an uncertain future? While, the research shows that pressure exists on designers/planners
to help people return to what was lost, that may be neither possible nor prudent; then the bigger
question becomes how to live with uncertainty. To that end, the research looked to the work of
peacemakers to deepen that understanding.
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Research on peacekeepers and others whose work takes place amidst trauma. As with
the leadership literature, my findings with designers/planners working in the aftermath of Sandy
bear some useful parallels to others who work professionally and in the long term within
traumatic settings. While some similarities can be found among healthcare professionals, the
work of peacekeepers seems to broadly parallel the practitioners focused upon in this work.
Unlike first responders at disasters, peacekeepers need to work away steadily and amidst
stakeholders who are by definition in extreme circumstances. While peacekeepers explicitly
struggle with parties who are deeply divided, implicitly, designers/planners also work among
constituencies who may work at cross purposes or turn on each other over matters small and
large. In light of what has been said in this chapter about the often inequitable and deeply
resented impacts on already marginalized populations, it is understandable that metaphors of war
arise in disasters’ aftermaths. Katrina was described as a “war zone” frequently by those who
witnessed or experienced the violent environment that prevailed long after the floods subsided.
Kramer’s (2016) article in Slate simply titled “Desert, storm,” describes the reactions of several
veterans of the Iraq War who, shortly after returning to the United States ended up in New
Orleans during and just after Katrina struck. Similar parallels can be drawn in the aftermath of
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. To that end, many of the challenges and lessons from either
field can be applicable to both.
The exact way that understanding about the work and difficulties of peacekeepers can
shed light on what post-Sandy designers/planners do, is reflected in the analysis of data on their
experiences. However, I have already benefited in my overall thinking about the work of
post-Sandy designers/planners from the writings of John Paul Lederach (2003; Lederach &
Moomaw-Jenner, 2002). It is intriguing that one of his books reverses the metaphor in describing
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peacekeeping’s journey: Into the Eye of the Storm: A Handbook of International Peacekeeping
(Lederach & Moomaw-Jenner, 2002). Lederach and Moomaw-Jenner’s (2002) reflections in the
context of a conflict resolution workshop, are similar to questions designers/planners in this
study raised post-Sandy.
How do I know if this is the right thing to be doing at this time in this context? Will this
be like parachuting into a place with quick answers and then leaving, or is this the start of
something that could be truly important and make a difference in the long haul? (p. xiii)
Kevin Avruch (2002) a professor of anthropology at George Mason University, made two
critical points for peacekeeping practice and leadership that are closely aligned to what
design/planning practitioners need to be growingly aware of in post-disaster leadership: “First,
reflect on your own biases and cultural biases particularly as they relate to your professional
work and the approaches you use. Second, become inquisitive about the way people make sense
of things (p. 75).
Being in the aftermath of a disaster, whether design/planning professionals or
peacekeepers, requires leadership that can attain access to issues unfolding with accuracy and be
agile enough to take decisive action while making informed decisions. This is challenging when
things are developing at a fast pace in real time. It requires agility and the ability to “match the
complexity of the situation by behaving with the set of behaviors necessary to meet the group’s
needs” (Northouse, 2007, p. 209). McGrath (as cited in Hackman, Walton, & Goodman, 1986)
outlined the critical leadership functions of group effectiveness, taking into account the analysis
of the situation both internally and externally and whether this required phased or immediate
action (Northouse, 2007, p. 211).
Final Thoughts on the Literature Review
In the beginning of this chapter, I spoke of the challenges of reviewing a vast array of
literature within the often-upsetting context of Sandy and climate change. Challenging because I
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had lived through the experience and then worked on the recovery, but also because I knew that
the topic itself was complex: difficult to see both “parts and whole” in some presentable pattern.
I have come to see how much there is to understand by way of background and yet how
superficial and selective one needs to be to cover even a partial array of these crucial issues. I felt
that the writing of this chapter was more discovery than authoritative exposition and that what
emerged most compellingly was the dilemma that professionals cannot escape. It is that the
issues are so urgent for designers/planners, yet so wrought with high emotion and social trauma.
In particular, I have seen how the discussion came back again and again to the inequities
experienced by marginalized groups and the need for design/planning to be ever mindful of that.
There were other questions that asked the design/planning practitioners about how Sandy has
impacted them, but none, I observed, that were so challenging and so important.
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Chapter III: Methodology and Research Procedures
This study provides a significant contribution to understanding professionals who are not,
by the very nature of their work, trained to deal with disaster and trauma. With the greater
frequency of these climate impactful events, design/planning professionals need to address these
challenges in the long-term, not unlike people who work in medical or first-responder roles after
a disaster. This study draws particular parallels to peacekeepers in areas of conflict where issues
around rebuilding in traumatized communities take their toll not just on the people who have
experienced the loss but those who are helping to facilitate the rebuilding and reclamation
process.
Many studies address how professional designers/planners impact their work situations
but there is a lack of research about how they (as individuals and as professionals) are impacted
by their engagements in high stress situations. To use a phrase that has become common in
phenomenological qualitative research, what are their “lived experiences? (e.g., Van Manen,
1990).
The findings from this study will at the very least open a conversation essential to
knowing the issues designers/planners have amidst tumultuous and traumatic contexts. At best it
will help to develop a shared strategy with other design/planning practitioners locally, nationally,
and internationally, of how to accommodate these challenges in the face of transformed roles as
climate change continues and intensifies. This objective is in close alignment with the goals of
qualitative researchers who, by inductively gathering their data, are “interested in (1) how people
interpret and construct their experiences, (2) how they construct their worlds, and (3) what
meaning they attribute to their experiences” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 24). Therefore, a
qualitative approach of collecting data through interviews, observations, and documents, rather
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than taking a more quantitative deductive approach derived through surveys and questionnaires,
was the basis of developing a well-defined strategy of inquiry to this study, one that gives
meaning and structure to the research.
Qualitative Research Designs
There are a number of potential qualitative research designs as described by Merriam
(2008). Figure 3.1 is her depiction of the choices among qualitative research studies.

Figure 3.1. Types of qualitative research. From Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and
Implementation by S. B. Merriam, 2008, p. 37. Copyright 2008 John Wiley & Sons. Used with
permission.
Additionally, qualitative researchers can to an extent draw eclectically on these
approaches, choosing aspects of two or more of those Merriam (2008) diagrammed, according to
how the situation “talks back.” A case study was employed with the primary but not sole data
source being the narratives or stories of design/planning professionals closely engaged in
post-Sandy. I used narrative methods to generate a significant part of the data but also turned to
the archives of writings about Sandy found in the media, in libraries, and as much as became
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feasible, the files of centrally involved institutions, such as NOAA, Municipal Art Society,
Sandy Storyline, GOSR, and the New York City Mayor’s Office. Thus, development of the
stories of designers/planners are complemented by archival and documentary research followed
by close reading of materials as described below.
In the following sections, I begin with a detailed discussion of the case study method,
noting its value and limitations. I then turn to the principal data source I used, namely the stories
of the lived experiences of design/planning professionals, describing the pros and cons of
narrative-based research. The discussion then altered briefly to the complementary use of
documentary materials. It should be noted that in working on this research, the documentary
analysis preceded interviewing as going through written records assisted in identifying potential
interviewees: Any media coverage of the post-Sandy initiatives quoted those who were centrally
involved and who could be strong potential participants or, at least, were good first contacts in
identifying participants.
The Case Study Method
A case study, according to Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) is “an in-depth,
multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon.
The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on several data sources” (p. 2). They add
that, while this definition is broad,
there is further supposition that certain kinds of data collection procedures will be
employed, procedures that will permit the investigator to examine the phenomenon in
great depth and detail . . . usually termed qualitative methods and are contrasted with
quantitative methods. (Orum et al., 1991, p. 2)
From the perspective of one of the most prominent advocates and formulators of case
study research, “it is most often under complex social phenomena that focuses on a ‘case’ with a
real-world perspective and is most often found in the social science and practicing professions
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(Yin, 2014, pp. 4–5). For example, in law, in psychiatry, urban design, and, as made famous by
the teaching approach at the Harvard Business School, preparing descriptions of cases is a
fundamental activity central to human learning and creativity (Christensen, 1987; Flyvbjerg,
2006).
The research case study has been defined at length in what is probably by far the most
cited text on using this approach. Yin’s (2014) detailed twofold definition of the case study is as
follows: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are
not clearly evident” (p. 16). Yin (2014) goes on to further describe characteristics he feels
constitute the research case study:
The case study inquiry,
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more
variables of interest than data points, and as one result;
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulating fashion, and as another result;
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection and analysis. (p. 17)
Admirable in its breadth, this widely cited definition does not really set much in the way
of clear boundaries on what is (and is not) a case study. For example, although the approach
“benefits” from pre-existing theoretical propositions, a theoretical grounding to the study is not
essential. Including a term such as “contemporary” also invites controversy and dissension,
because there is no way of telling just how far back one can go and still be contemporary.
The value of case studies. A paradox one soon sees in examining the case study method
is that it is used widely and yet spoken of just as commonly with qualifications, even by
researchers who use it. Researchers are quick to apologize for what the method cannot do
compared to the rigorous experimental designs and quantitative research favored in natural
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sciences. For example, in a paper whose title advances the case study as leading potentially to
“intellectually ambitious inquiry” (Barzelay, 1993, p. 305), it is noted that: “In the canons of
social science research, the single case study . . . is ordinarily judged to be lacking in rigor,
comparability, and replicability” (p. 305). Yin, probably the best-known proponent of research
case studies wrote “‘The Case Study Crisis’ (1981) many years ago and, three decades later was
still lamenting that although the case study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry, for many
researchers it is not their first method of choice” (2014, p. 19).
Gerring (2007) commented, “Practitioners continue to ply their trade but have difficulty
articulating what it is that they are doing, methodologically speaking. The case study survives in
a curious methodological limbo” (p. 7). For others, such as D. T. Campbell and Stanley (1966),
the case study was seen as going way below limbo into a kind of much-deserved eternal
damnation:
Such studies have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value . . .
It seems well-nigh unethical at the present time to allow, as theses or dissertations in
education, case studies of this nature. (pp. 6–7)
But, as Flyvbjerg (2006) pointed out, over time Campbell “made a 180-degree turn in his
views of the case study and has become one of the strongest proponents of this methods”
(p. 391). Heugens and Mol (2005), describing the change in Campbell’s attitude towards
research case studies, touched on important strengths of the approach:
At the core of his [Campbell’s] conversion lies the insight that even single-case studies
are never N = 1 snapshots of an unchanging reality. Case studies are genuine empirical
endeavors in that they always explore covariation between purported causes and
hypothesized effects, sometimes by dividing a sampled case up in subunits, at other times
by comparing formal units (the person, group, or organization of which the researcher has
in-depth knowledge) with informal units (all other units that are brought into the analysis
in a more peripheral way). (p. 118)
Flyvbjerg’s (2006) article, which addressed “five misunderstandings about case-study
research” (the article title) also lays out the main value of doing case studies. He argued that to
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really grasp social phenomena context-rich accounts are essential, in contrast to purely
theoretical works. Flyvbjerg first became interested in case study research for an urban design
project. He turned to Karl Popper’s famous formulations about “black swans” to make the case
for the case study. Flyvbjerg (2006) noted Popper observations:
“All swans are white,” and proposed that just one observation of a single black swan
would falsify this proposition and, in this way, have general significance and stimulate
further investigations and theory-building. The case study is well suited for identifying
“black swans” because of its in-depth approach [emphasis added]: what appears to be
“white” often turns out on closer examination to be “black.” (p. 228)
Flyvbjerg went on to say that his experience of identifying black swans was something he
became very familiar with during this own in-depth urban politics and planning case study, about
which he noted:
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central
to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other
methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development,
whereas “the force of example” is underestimated. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228)
Looking at this in regard to the study, the complex multi-dimensional setting of the
massive New York metropolitan area during and after Hurricane Sandy, makes looking at the
storm’s impact on design/planning professionals something of a black swan. Many were the
observers who in one way or another commented on the unprecedented nature and impact of
Sandy. For example, the week after the storm Scientific American (2012) titled a “Special
Report” comprising several separate articles, “Hurricane Sandy: An Unprecedented Disaster”
Even the harshest critics of case study methods will admit that the approach has exploratory
value: getting first acquainted with the broad strokes of a complex situation and not
underestimating the force of example.
An added advantage of approaching this as a single case study is that this “method” is in
fact not just a single formulaic methodology but an opportunity to use, as Yin pointed out,
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“multiple sources of evidence” (p. 101). Along the same lines, Stake (2006), argued that utilizing
a case study, leaves open the use of a broad range of methods:
Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied . . . By
whatever methods we choose to study the case. We could study it analytically or
holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically, or culturally,
and by mixed methods—but we concentrate, at least for the time being, on the case.
(p. 443)
Additionally, what makes this study a case is that it is bounded, with the study focused on
one event, Hurricane Sandy and on a specific community of professionals—designers/planners.
Within this in-depth bounded system other types of qualitative or quantitative research can be
built into the case study, such as narrative inquiry, presenting individual stories as part of the
case.
This study relied on a mixed approach—not in the now common notion of doing
quantitative and qualitative work together, known as “mixed methods” (see for example Teddlie
& Tashakkori, 2009)—but relying on in-depth biographical or life history style interviewing,
with thorough document analysis, relying on written and media accounts to combine with what
participating design-planning professionals related. What follows is a description of key aspects
of these methods, within the case study research.
An embedded single case study. Yin (2014) describes in great detail the primary
characteristics of a single case study design with specific circumstances and five rationales:
•

Critical—“representing the critical test of a significant theory” (p. 52);

•

Unusual—"represents an extreme/unusual case deviating from theoretical norms of
everyday occurrences” (p. 52);

•

Common—“capturing the circumstances or conditions of an everyday situation” (p. 52);

•

Revelatory—"analyzing a phenomenon previous inaccessible to social science inquiry”
(p. 52);
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•

Longitudinal—studying the same single case at two or more different points in time.
Yin (2014) went on from his explanation and rationales for single case studies to speak of

“embedded case study design” as opposed to “holistic” ones (pp. 41–42). The former describes
cases where there are distinctive subunits that can be and are used for some internal comparison
while holistic, for Yin, is where there is a single unit of analysis.
For the purposes of this study a single embedded case study was used. Each of the five
post-Sandy initiatives mentioned previously in Chapter II, are a “unit of analysis.” These specific
units of analysis, the macro-, meso-, and micro-level are distinguished for this study as follows:
Macro: Contextual Forces: Hurricane Sandy
Meso: Five different initiatives: connections to designers/planners; information rich
Micro: Designers/planners’ interviews and focus group.
The application to this classification to this dissertation is portrayed in Figure 3.2. In
planning this analysis, a revelatory case study was another alternative but upon further review, it
is already implied by the very nature of a dissertation, that the research would need to be
revelatory and not previously studied. In an exploratory embedded case study, while structured
or focused interviews are employed, this design allowed for an array of samplings that can be
embedded into the case.
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Figure 3.2. Research design levels of analysis.
Designing the case study. Yin (2014) identified five components of research design that he
states as critical in order to avoid not addressing the research questions in a case study:
•

A case study’s questions;

•

Its propositions, if any;

•

Its unit(s) of analysis:

•

The logic linking the data to the propositions;

•

The criteria for interpreting the findings. (p. 29)

The study’s question was stated in terms of “who,” “what,” “where,” “how,” and “why,”
with the unit of analysis describing what the case is, which could be groups, organizations or
countries. For this study, the primary research question was: In what ways did post-Hurricane
Sandy experiences impact the design/planning professionals’ approach to future
climate-related events personally (individually), professionally, and societally? This raises the
question of how working on Sandy affected designer/planners’ understanding of their work and
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lives more generally. Have they been wounded and/or transformed by immersion in a context
that is rife with suffering and uncertainty? And, as a result developed, a fuller yet more nuanced
appreciation for their role in terms of the three pillars that was introduced in Chapter I:
personally, professionally, societally.

Figure 3.3. Three pillars used as the framework for understanding the impacts on and strategies
developed for post-Sandy challenges by designers/planners.
Of the 28 professionals interviewed, 20 participants in this study, were significantly involved
in one or more of the initiatives outlined in Chapter I, which were:
•

NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR)

•

HUD’s Rebuild by Design

•

New York Rising/Buy It Back (New York State initiative)

•

Build It Back (a New York City initiative)
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•

Occupy Sandy (a grassroots initiative that overlapped with a number of these
programs)

As seen in Chapter II, there is no great abundance of research on how designers/planners
(as individuals and as professionals) are being impacted at the personal, professional, and
societal level by their engagement in post-disaster design/planning. Therefore, one of the
objectives of this research was to provide a significant contribution to an area of professionals
that are not, by the very nature of their work, trained to deal with settings of disaster and trauma.
Since we knew little about the actual impact to date, I concluded that the use of narrative inquiry
for this study was the best means for understanding the individual’s experience as a means of
developing research on this subject (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Therefore, while narrative
inquiry was a major data source, it was nested within the larger methodological frame of the
single case study. This approach added another level of authority since case study research
design principles lend themselves to including numerous strategies that promote data credibility
or truth value. Triangulation of data sources, data types or researchers is a primary strategy that
can be used and would support the principle in case study research that the phenomena be
viewed and explored from multiple perspectives (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 556).
The Rise of Narrative Research
The idea that story is, in fact, how we structure our lives (Bruner, 1987; Eakin, 2008,
Randall, 1995) is related to the fact that stories surface individual meanings which is different
than what a researcher can infer from structured surveys. Stories blend understanding of a person
with social phenomena (like the impact of a cataclysmic event) that are often what the researcher
really wants to understand better. “Personal narratives thus reveal not only much about the
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narrating self but provide a small window into the engines of history and historical change, as we
both shape and are shaped by the events of our day” (Andrews, 2007, p. 51).
While most academic work continues to be non-narrative and based upon quantitative
data, Clandinin (2007) comments that there has been “a veritable explosion of narrative inquiry
across disciplines” (p. ix), which more generally has frequently been referred to as the “narrative
turn” (Czarniawska, 2004; Glover, 2003).
Pinnegar and Daynes (2007) define this in the context of four different turns toward
narrative:
“Narrative Turn 1: Relationship of researcher and researched” (p. 9)—a change in the
relationship between the person conducting the research and the person participating
as the subject (the relationship between the researcher and the researched
“Narrative Turn 2: From Numbers to Words as Data” (p. 15)
“Narrative Turn 3: From the General to the Particular…a move from generalizability”
(p. 2)
“Narrative Turn 4: Blurring Knowing” (p. 25)—a widening in acceptance of
alternative epistemologies or ways of knowing.
For researchers, these are all turns based on a commonality of research, focused on
language used within the social science and the lived experience. Narrative inquiry is not a new
practice. John Dewey (1930, 1934/2005), one of the foremost early influencers of narrative
inquiry, wrote extensively about the nature of experience, and the way in which an individual’s
personal voices are most often spoken in relationship to a community or within a particular
social context, that is, a personal, social, and physical environment. As Clandinin and Connelly
(2000) interpreted this, we are always in a continuum of moving “back and forth between the
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personal and the social, simultaneously thinking about the past, present and future, and to do so
in ever-expanding social milieus” (pp. 2–3). This mirrors the three pillars structures of strategy
that was employed to deepen understanding of practitioners reflecting through narrative inquiry,
and to see if what they experienced post-Sandy was attributable to that one event and/or if, in
fact, that one event has had ongoing impact that is shaping a different kind of reality.
Anthropologist, Mary Catherine Bateson’s work Peripheral Visions: Learning Along the
Way (1994) is a compelling example of narrative inquiry with resonance to the use of it for this
study. In this reflective interpretation of her life, and using narrative as a form of inquiry, the
world is about change. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) described Bateson’s perspective:
“Everything is changing—the phenomena, the discipline, the agent, the methods, and the
outcomes . . . It is narrative that allows Bateson as an anthropologist to learn, narrative that
allows all of us to learn” (p. 8).
The initial exploration of the literature on narrative inquiry surfaces significant
differences in how experienced researchers bound the field. Clandinin’s (2007) edited collection
on narrative inquiry is subtitled “mapping a methodology” because, rather than trying to resolve
the many different takes on narrative inquiry, she sees demarcating the “landscape of narrative
inquiry” (Clandinin & Rosiek, 2007, p. 35) as the appropriate task in delineating the field. What
she and other narrative inquirers appear to share is the idea, as noted above, of simultaneity and
interactively exploring the personal and the social level. This is well summed up by Pinnegar and
Daynes (2007): “In essence, narrative inquiry involves the reconstruction of a person’s
experience in relationship both to the other and to a social milieu” (p. 5).
One of the leading approaches that aims for the same dual exploration of the personal and
the societal is referred to variously as biographical or life history studies. Both can be conflated
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with other literary work, such as doing what are widely called biographies of famous people,
which, unlike narrative inquiry, are not usually primarily interested in social phenomena of how
the life described speaks to broader issues. Use of that term and life history may be
understandably perceived by those outside the field as describing entire life journeys and not
being equally or more interested in social phenomena (such as is the case here, the impacts of
events like Sandy on professions and professional individuals).
Nonetheless, as practiced by scholars like Dan Bar-On (2006) and Molly Andrews
(2007)—whose work is more fully described below—life history interviewing, and analysis are
more focused on broad, often challenging societal events, than on the specifics of particular
individuals’ experiences.
Dan Bar-On’s work demonstrates how storytelling can be used to work through
intergenerational intractable conflicts. While the focus of this study is one specific event, which
to date now spans close to eight years, the way in which he demonstrates data systematically
through the use of storytelling as a mode of narrative inquiry has particular relevance. Bar-On
developed theoretical constructs through the analysis of the interviewees that created a bridge
between the events, the people impacted directly by them and those brought in to help with
recovery. Bar-On (2006) went on to say,
While in many quantitative studies hypotheses derive from existing theoretical
structures and are confirmed or contradicted as the data is generated, the process here
is an explorative one. The data is generated in order to develop new, yet-unknown
theoretical constructs. This does not mean that there are no theoretical explanations or
thoughts that apply to a given situation. But this method requires putting them aside at
least until after the newly generated data is analyzed, in order to see if other,
unexpected theoretical explanations can work. (p. 27)
This approach can be particularly useful when analyzing the experiences of the
interviewees through the lens of the three pillars.
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Similarly, Molly Andrews (2007), focused on the “relationship between the stories
people tell about their lives, and the political frameworks which form the context for these
stories” (p. 2). For her, stories over time take on different meanings particularly as is the case for
this study, as more and more design/planning professionals begin to take on similar roles within
other environmentally impacted communities.
Once the interview process begins, a greater understanding is developed that clarifies
which among these various perspectives is most relevant. That reveals itself when the
interviewer has the lived experience of working with the respondents. For now, the flexible
boundaries evident in Connelly and Clandinin’s (1990) Stories of Experience and Narrative
Inquiry, was employed:
Narrative inquiry in the social sciences is a form of empirical narrative in which
empirical data is central to the work. The inevitable interpretation that occurs, something
which is embedded even in the data collection process, does not make narrative into
fiction even though the language of narrative inquiry is heavily laced with terms derived
from literary criticism of fiction. A number of different methods of data collection are
possible as the researcher and practitioner work together in a collaborative relationship.
. . . The sense of the whole is built from a rich data source with a focus on the concrete
particularities of life that create powerful narrative tellings. (p. 4)
Given the research implications of this study with the use of narrative inquiry, I thought it
pertinent to once again refer to the work of John Paul Lederach and the impact and role of
narrative in the context of disaster:
When I first came into this field I bumped into the word "storytelling" in reference to a
phase in the mediation process, but it was actually a rather narrow definition of story: tell
us what happened and why you're mad so we can get you past being mad and find a
solution . . . the term I'm referring to, or the content, or the understanding I would give to
storytelling is much more about finding a way to reflect in a much wider sense on what's
happening in a situation and/or the experience of people . . . help break you out of an
exclusively cognitive, linear rational understanding of both conflict analysis and solution
seeking. And whoever the listeners are interact with it like it's a painting. If you stand
before a painting, everyone has an opportunity to say, "this is what it's saying to me. This
is what I see." And the story very much has that component to it. It is both on the side of
the storyteller to put forward things, the ways they configure it, the ways they draw it out,
but then it becomes very much of a live process in which there is an interaction and the
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interaction itself is something that's open for interpretation. So suddenly you're in a
community of meaning-creation, and I think that's a lot of what conflict is about. It's
about the search for meaning; it's about how do we makes sense of these things that are
going on, and what are the ways that we might respond to it, that can move it toward—at
least in terms of my wider goals—finding our way back to being human, being in the
community, in as constructive a way as we can? (Lederach as cited in Portilla, 2004,
para. 4)
Why Use Narrative Inquiry for This Study?
The adaptation of human communities (including cities and nations) to global climate
change is almost unthinkably complex. Despite a near consensus of scientists who are expert in
disciplines relevant to climate change that it is a real and present danger, “an inconvenient truth”
as former U.S. Vice President Al Gore famously called it, for others the topic is very difficult to
grasp. When, for example, part of the earth faces a blizzardy winter as much of North America
did in 2017–2018, and faced a milder winter in 2018–2019, confusion abounds, some of it
intentionally spread, but much just due to the intricacy of cause and effect in patterns of air flow,
ocean currents, etc. Thus, as someone grudgingly shovels out a snow-filled driveway in March,
they can be forgiven for asking, “Where the hell is this ‘global warming?’”
One might contend that most designers/planners, while well versed in analytic thinking,
are also caught up in webs of this physical complexity and, yet, must take a lead role in helping
non-professionals understand what’s happening and participate in strategies to mitigate and adapt
to increasingly unpredictable meteorological events—like Hurricane Sandy and the future
superstorms that are sure to be coming. Moreover, as emerged in the discussion in Chapter II,
designers/planners need to also take the pre-disaster marginalization of certain groups into
account in their work.
To grasp their innermost feelings about climate change, weather and sea level
catastrophes, and the effects of these, and how to do their essential work in the future, is not
amenable to some of the more common approaches used in social science such as questionnaires
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or highly structured interviews. To create such a survey would mean having to already grasp the
complexities, conflicts, and nuances arising for such professionals as they experience and work
during and after events like Sandy. Narrative inquiry does not depend on the researcher’s
foreknowledge of complex feelings and experiences, but draws on the stories of participants,
structured in ways close to their lived experience, and which bring out details that no one
researcher could hope ever to anticipate.
Such stories are sure to be full of surprises not only for the researcher but for the narrator.
It is a common observation both in narrative research as well as in the work of creative
professional storywriters, that only in the process of telling does the narrator deeply probe,
reflect on, revise, and develop his/her own understanding. Some have called this “narrative
knowing” (Polkinghorne, 1988). Or it could just as well be called narrative discovery: getting to
know one’s own world better by telling stories of one’s experience in it. As Randall (1995) so
well put it: “The way we story our lives directly affects the way we understand ourselves; the
way we understand ourselves directly affects the way we act; and the way we act directly affects
the way the world is” (p. 9). Underlying this topic and this researcher’s commitment to it is the
belief that nothing is more important, as cities, nations and individuals face up to climate change,
than an intimate knowledge of this process of self- and situational-understanding. The stories of
design/planning professionals who play and will play such vital roles in humankind’s coping
with climate change, are central to survival.
Additionally, narrative inquiry is a “collaboration between researcher and participants,
over time, in a place or a series of places, and in social interaction with milieus” (Clandinin &
Connelly, 2000, p. 20), all commonplace to the lived experience of design/planning
professionals.
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The Challenges of the Narrative Case Study Approach
Narrative inquiry, not unlike other forms of research, involves data collection and
analyses with the emphasis of the study done through stories. It is a form of making meaning by
consolidating, reducing, and interpreting what the interviewees have said and what the researcher
has seen and read. The confluence between data and abstract concepts, between inductive and
deductive reasoning, between description and interpretation, become the basis of the findings for
the study. Identifying themes, categories, patterns, or answers to the research questions are the
basis for the interpretation of the data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, pp. 202–203). The language
used to tell the stories is part of the analysis.
However, as noted by Savin-Baden and Van Niekerk (2007), how the researcher is
managing the story and the ownership of interpretation is critical:
Understandings of concepts such as credibility, validity or trustworthiness that are used to
ensure rigor must be addressed with honesty in narrative inquiry. Thus, we must engage
with the issue of ownership of interpretation, so there is a sense that what we are
presenting is shared truths and shared values. Thus, people’s norms and values, including
our own, are always evident in the way data are presented and portrayed. Yet such
negotiation remains a difficult, complex and time-consuming task. (p. 467)
Therefore, how stories are interpreted, the clarity with which the interviews are set up and
the manner in which the stories are gathered become all the more critical. It is also critical that
that the researcher is very clear about what it means to be a good interviewer. The differences
between ordinary conversations and in-depth interviews need to be clear from the beginning as is
the distinction of if someone is providing the reader with a narrative or a story. When one is
interviewing, the questions are more consciously linked to one another and there are more
deliberate transitions when topics are being changed. Additionally, the researcher has a different
intention in that when interviewing someone, she/he has a deliberate intention in terms of
information gathering that will later be analyzed. An interview is not as informal as ordinary
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conversation: notes are taken, and the discussion is usually recorded for the purpose of analyzing
data. While these distinctions seem obvious, it is easy to get so engaged in the flow of a
conversation during a research interview as to lose track of the objectives. Therefore, while
allowing for spontaneity, I kept interviews focused on the research question throughout by
asking follow-up questions that guided the conversation as well as provided greater depth and
detail.
The way that a researcher listens is as important as the questions asked. How actively
researchers listen determines the strength and quality of the connection with the interviewee.
This is foundational for creating an exchange of respect, safety, responsibility, and empathy so
that when more sensitive questions are asked, both the researcher and the interviewee have a
high level of comfort with each other. An additional consideration is that for this particular
study, I interviewed a number of people with whom there had been a prior professional
relationship. This made the clarity of all of these distinctions all the more critical.
This becomes all the more important in considering the ethical issues of conducting
narrative inquiry. Josselson (2007) speaks of the “ethical conundrum [that] derives from the fact
that the narrative researcher is in a dual role in an intimate relationship with the participant
. . . and in a professionally responsible role in the scholarly community” (p. 535).
Interviews for Story-Gathering
In a narrative, the speakers put together what they believe actually occurred, recognizing
that what they say might be incomplete because they only saw part of what happened or
only remember a piece of what went on. In contrast, a story is told to make a point or
present a theme, either stated or implicit, irrespective of the accuracy of the details. In
telling a story, events may be edited or reordered, and exaggeration may be added for
effect. (Rubin & Rubin, 2011, p. 109)
General approach and philosophy in using stories from interviews. Stories from
professionals could conceivably be gathered in other ways than face-to-face interviewing (Van
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Manen, 1990). For example, professionals individually need to have ways of charting their
activity, sometimes even using reflective journals. Others will create written “traces” of their
work and thought through correspondence, meeting notes, transcripts of their participation in
public sessions, etc. Access to such materials is likely to be limited at best; who of us would
willingly turn over diaries, memos, etc. to an eager researcher? Moreover, there is something
quite different about writing than talking about experiences. Van Manen (1990) suggested that
participants in a study could, in principle, be asked to write what he calls protocols: “The most
straightforward way to go about our research is to ask selected individuals to write their
experiences down” (p. 63). He suggested that researchers could ask participants “to write a direct
account of a personal experience as [they] lived through it” (Van Manen, 1990, p. 65). This kind
of approach may work best in participatory action research, such as with educational research
where the researcher is also the professor of her “subjects” with the resultant extra leverage to
“persuade” the researched to do this. In contrast, in a context such as this study, there is much
less likely to be concurrence and acquiescence with such a strategy; exceptionally busy
design/planning professionals usually have pressing commitments that are more part of their
everyday role fulfillment; diligently journaling so as to meet this study’s purposes is unlikely to
be as high a priority. As well, participants are always sure to worry about the eventual fate of
things that are written.
Moreover, Van Manen (1990) argued for interviewing because of the predictably
different kind of product, as opposed to written accounts.
Sometimes it is easier to talk than to write about a personal experience because writing
forces the person into a more reflective attitude, which may make it more difficult to stay
close to an experience as it is immediately lived. (p. 67)
In this study, the objective was to seek both the “immediately lived” experience and
reflection but a minimalist interview technique as advocated by Bar-On (2006), based on
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Rosenthal (1993), and utilized also by Andrews (2007). These authors recommend interviews in
which the researcher begins with a brief explanation of the subject matter and requests that the
participant tell his or her story as it relates to the topic. And then, for the most part, the researcher
stays quiet. Bar-On (2006) describes the approach personally:
I favor the biographical method developed by Rosenthal (1993), based on a German
study in which the interviewer opens the interview wide at the outset—for example:
“Please tell me your life story, starting wherever you would like”—and then lets
interviewees narrate their life stories undisturbed. Clarifications or questions of interest to
the interviewer come after the main narration. (p. 29)
The interviewee as storyteller is then wide open to structuring and recounting a story in a
way that gets to the heart of their feelings. It should be pointed out that while Bar-On’s (2006)
words imply that participants may end up describing everything from their moment of birth (or
before) to the present, the description of the study that the researcher will have given in advance
of meeting should cue the them towards discussing themes close to the research topic. The key
point is that how each interviewee relates the topic of interest to a broader flow of life
experiences is what is needed. Disembodied generalities on the importance of climate change
and how we all must do our part, etc., are not what is needed to shed light on the topic how
Hurricane Sandy (and its aftermath) impacted and was experienced by design/planning
professionals.
As noted, as they do this, with all the freedom that traditional storytellers have had since
the earliest of times, they will access ways of looking at the impacts of and changes in them
caused by so dramatic an event as Sandy. This approach has been used to deal with extremely
difficult and personally and politically sensitive matters. Whether it is the experiences of
individuals caught up in rapid social transformation, Whites and Blacks in the transition away
from apartheid in South Africa or as East Germans after the Berlin Wall came down (Andrews,
2007). Distinct from such political transitions, the people who are the center of this research have
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also lived through what are literally tempestuous events; their stories can be used, broadly
speaking, as Andrews (2007) says: “to provide a small window into the engines of history and
historical change, as [they] both shape and are shaped by the events of the day” (p. 51). An
example is the Sandy Storyline, an outgrowth of Occupy Sandy, that began with individual
stories evolving into a “participatory web-based documentary and exhibition that
explores the immediate and still-unfolding impacts of Hurricane Sandy through the
experiences of some of the millions of people whose lives were affected by the storm”
(Sandy Storyline, n.d., para. 1).
Data Gathering
I conducted two tiers of narrative research with participants: an initial round of
one-on-one conversations and, based then on the results and emerging themes from those, a
focus group of three professionals who through the response to some pointed questions around
some prevailing themes, either agreed with or challenged some of the responses.
Sample size and sampling strategy. “It is said that qualitative methods tend to generate
large amounts of detailed information about a small number of settings” (Mays & Pope, 1995,
p. 109). Comparatively small sample size is often raised by critics of qualitative interviewing as
a weakness as it will inevitably be much smaller than what would be done using surveys. Lincoln
and Guba (1985) provide a credible response to this suggesting that sampling be only until one
reaches a point of saturation or redundancy: “[Using this] means that you are hearing the same
responses to your interview questions or seeing the same behavior in observations; no new
insights are forthcoming” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 101). Therefore, as part of the structure
of this study, the goal was to reach a point of saturation which,
entails bringing new participants continually into the study until the data set is complete,
as indicated by data replication or redundancy. In other words, saturation is reached when
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the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns, when nothing new is being
added. (Bowen, 2008, p. 140)
I recognize that “nothing new” is itself a fuzzy concept and that my search for and
eventual interviewing of a sample was guided also by a subjective sense that “an adequate
sample size is one that sufficiently answers the research question” (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013,
p. 192).
The sample was comprised of design/planning professionals as well as allied
professionals who were integral to the design/planning process and were present in the New
York/New Jersey region during Hurricane Sandy (all or part of the period, approximately
October 22, 2012–November 2, 2012). They subsequently had an opportunity to work on one or
more of the five post-Sandy initiatives described in Chapters I and II—the NYC Special
Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency, Rebuild by Design, New York Rising, Build It
Back/Buy It Back, and Occupy Sandy, or other closely aligned climate impactful events.
The research utilized a mix of approaches to actually locate interviewees, starting with
people whose professional work I had become familiar with through my own engagement in
aspects of several of those and other post-Sandy initiatives. From there I utilized snowballing as
part of purposeful sampling, which basically means a chain referral approach (Biernacki &
Waldorf, 1981), with current interviewees being asked who else one could speak with and,
sometimes, even getting the person’s help with making initial contact. I also anticipated locating
some potential interviewees from a detailed analysis of documents (newspapers, reports,
published articles, and dissertations); often, such written materials identify professionals,
including designers/planners, as report authors or as experts cited or thanked by other authors. In
preparation for the focus group, emerging themes from the impact of Sandy on design/planning
professionals was prepared as a case highlighting findings for focus group review and discussion.
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One-on-one interviews.
For a narrative research approach that will rely heavily on interviews, setting up clear
expectations in the beginning is critical for having a respectful relationship with
participants. While this is important in any social research, it is all the more critical where
the participant’s life is interwoven with a particular phenomenon; therefore, the
researcher has to be transparent about his/her interest in the study so that there is an
authentic alliance with the participant. (Josselson, 2007, p. 540)
The strategy was to prepare a clear and concise interview protocol (S. A. Jacob &
Furgerson, 2012). While working out the detailed structure of interviews, the research structure
was developed from the topics arising from the three pillars discussed in Chapter I:
•

Personal—Impacts on the self/individual; psycho-social challenges, such as
empathy/stress

•

Professional—Impact to professional practice, reflections on strategies
post-Hurricane Sandy, and impact on future events.

•

Societal—Local and global impacts, leadership.

Participant Demographics
What follows is a thematic analysis of 28 participant interviews. Table 3.1 briefly profiles
the participants, including their profession, experience, years in the profession and gender
identification. The names are all pseudonyms.
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Table 3.1
Interview Participants’ Characteristics (n = 28)
Name

Profession

Eli

Architect

Years in
Profession
20

Gender
Identification
Male

Race/Ethnicity/
Nationality
Euro American

Penelope

Architect

12

Female

Latina

Hannah

Planner

30

Female

Euro American

Roberta

Architect

25

Female

Euro American

Leah

Architect/Planner

15

Female

Euro American

Paul

Engineer

30

Male

Euro American

Ross

Architect/Professor

40

Male

Euro American

Muriel

Communications Specialist

35

Female

Euro American

Talib

Architect

12

Male

Jamaican

Liz

Engineer

20

Female

Greek

Esther

Activist/Storyteller

10

Female

Euro American

Melissa

Architect/Professor

30

Female

Euro American

Samuel

Architect

20

Male

Euro American

Lyla

Architect

30

Female

Euro American

Nahla

Architect/Professor

15

Female

Turkish

Edward

Architect

20

Male

Euro American

Thomas

Landscape Architect/Urban
Designer

15

Male

Latino

Grace

Engineer

20

Female

Euro American

Brianna

Architect/Professor

15

Female

Indian/Asian
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Name

Profession

Years in
Profession
25

Gender
Identification
Female

Race/Ethnicity/
Nationality
Euro American

Beryl

Landscape Architect

Joseph

Social Activist

15

Male

African American

Susan

Urban Strategist

30

Female

Euro Canadian

Kaasar

Planner

12

Male

Latino

Robert

Architect

40

Male

Euro American

Mya

Architect

15

Female

Latina

Claire

Architect

12

Female

African American

Vic

Architect

30

Male

Euro American

Jeanine

Landscape Architect

35

Female

Euro American

Table 3.2 provides information about the profession, experience, years in the profession
and gender identification for the three focus group participants. Again, all of the names are
pseudonyms.
Table 3.2
Focus Group Participants’ Characteristics
Name

Profession

Years in
Profession
40

Gender
Identification
Male

Race/Ethnicity/
Nationality
Euro American

Adam

Architect

Zac

Architect/Planner

30

Male

Euro American

Therese

Landscape
Architect/Architect

20

Female

Euro American

In the discussion in Chapter IV, I have relied on both the interviews and the focus group
for insights related to the pillars and emergent themes.
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Preparing for the interviews. An Informed Consent Agreement was created and provided
to participants in advance. In preparation for the interviews I circulated a briefing note for
participants describing the study details and means to be used to assure anonymity and
confidentiality. Ways of achieving this were considered below.
A consent form was prepared, modelled on commonly available templates but tailored to
fit the context. It was further recognized that many of the participants hold significant positions
in ongoing post-Sandy work, settings where they are expected to be always strong, fast, and sure
in their professional judgements, and invulnerable to the very kinds of doubts and fears and
self-transformations that the study sought to explore.
Conducting interviews. Prior to the interview permission was sought for audio recording,
accompanied by confidentiality protocols (see on “Ethical Considerations,” below). Recordings
that were made were professionally transcribed. Security of the actual recordings and the
transcripts were committed to in the consent form. Interview sessions were all conducted on the
phone. Each session ran between 60 and 80 minutes.
Interview Analysis
Phase One: Transcriptions. The recorded interviews were uploaded to a secure
computer. Of the 28 interviews, 23 were transcribed by a single investigator from Upwork to
ensure confidentiality. Four were transcribed by me. This resulted in 457 pages of single-spaced,
one-sided interview text. The interviews were then read through in their entirety, and initial
themes and comments were noted in the margins of the documents. This same approach was
followed in the focus group, which is further expanded on further in this document.
There were many hours of listening and re-listening with the transcript and note-taking
with the recordings produced during the interviews. It is further acknowledged what Bar-On
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(2006) says, that “moving from the interviewing phase into the analysis phase can represent a
crisis” (p. 32). In using “crisis,” Bar-On is referring to the transition from often coming to feel
very close to, and empathetic with interviewees, to adopting a more distanced analytic stance. He
emphasizes the usefulness both for enhancing validity and just for “ventilating” (p. 32) of having
another researcher brought in to assist in reviewing themes and patterns in this stage of the work.
While I anticipated prior to beginning the analysis that this might be necessary, I found that I was
able to maintain my objectivity. This was achieved by structuring enough time between the
interviews and the actual analysis. As a result, reflection was built into the schedule and a more
distanced analytic stance was maintained. In terms of enhancing validity and just for
“ventilating”, that was achieved through the focus group.
Phase Two: Coding. After the interviews, and all documents were transcribed and
uploaded to Dedoose,10 an analysis of interview data began. Notes, comments, observations, and
queries in reading the data began the open coding process. Parent codes were developed for the
thematic analysis that drew inferences to the interviewee’ stories as they relate to the research
questions and thus began the assignment of codes to specific data. The initial coding process in
this study generated three primary or parent codes that aligned with the three pillars: Personal,
Professional and Societal. All together there were 947 text excerpts, and with multiple code
applications per excerpt, a total of 965 code applications were part of the final analysis.
Through the use of thematic analysis, inferences were drawn about the interviewees’
stories as they related to the research questions. The details of the strategy were worked out
based upon the results of the interviews, the form the stories and data took. Braun and Clarke
(2006) helpfully point out that each researcher can and must consider quite an array of different
10

This software is described as “a cross-platform app for analyzing qualitative and mixed methods
research with text, photos, audio, videos, spreadsheet data and more” (Dedoose, n.d., para.1).
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approaches in drawing from his/her corpus of results, themes, or patterns most pertinent to the
research question. Therefore, in developing this study’s thematic analysis approach, depending
on the form of the data, I turned to Braun and Clarke’s (2006) approach as well as Aronson’s
(1995) “Pragmatic View of Thematic Analysis,” which is aimed at ethnographic interviewers;
Kvale’s (1996) “six steps” (p. 189) of analysis; and Burnard, Gill, Stewart, Treasure, and
Chadwick’s (2008) thematic content analysis, which involves “analysing transcripts, identifying
themes within those data, and gathering together examples of those themes from the text”
(p. 429). In some instances, the interviews yielded longer biographical accounts—given the
relatively unstructured and open-ended approach in the interviews. Bar-On’s (2006, pp. 32–33)
three-step approach to analyzing interviews, relying on chronology, linguistic and sequential
analysis, was also utilized.
The results of the analysis were useful for my research in and of themselves and also
became the basis of preparing questions, featuring themes, for use in the second tier of data
gathering: focus group discussion.
Conducting the focus group. The second step of my data gathering involved holding
one focus group to discuss the question of impacts and changes design/planning professionals
experienced during and after Hurricane Sandy. Prior to arranging the focus group meeting, a first
cut thematic analysis was completed. This was followed by a concise discussion document,
outlining (without attribution) results of interviews and posing a set of questions for group
discussion.
The selection of participants raised a key question: Is it best to rely on a sample of the
professionals who have already been interviewed or recruit a different group who would be
unconstrained by any thoughts of having to support or be consistent with points they have
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already made? After reviewing all of the data, the decision was made to recruit three individuals
outside of the study sample to act as the focus group. This was utilized through a snowballing
technique. While I knew each of the participants through reputation in the industry, they were
not well known to me either professionally or personally. They consisted of one architect, one
architect/planner, and one landscape architect/architect. One of the architects and the landscape
architect were very engaged post-Sandy. One was particularly focused on recovery in NYCHA
housing. The second architect was engaged with Sandy through one of the non-profits. He had
ongoing recovery and planning experience post-Katrina and was heavily focused on resiliency
and vulnerable communities.
The main purpose of the focus group was to “to clarify, extend, qualify or challenge data
collected [in interviews]” (Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008, p. 293). It is to be noted
that while what is said in a focus group can be protected with the same measures for anonymity
and confidentiality used in interviews, there is, by definition, the added issue that group members
will inevitably be revealing their views and experiences to others than the researcher. Bloor,
Frankland, Thomas, and Robson (2001) note that while every effort may be taken to assure
confidentiality of the discussion—what comes up in the group, stays in the group—there is
bound to be a risk that participants will reveal some of the conversation later outside the group.
The best approach, they advise, is to have protocols but make focus group participants aware of
such risks before they agree to attend. Reference to such risks were included in the informed
consent agreement that each participant reviewed and signed.
Decisions on venue, length and structure were agreed upon in preparation for the focus
group tier of research. The guidelines I used were as follows:
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Venue: As with all the other one-on-one interviews, the focus group was conducted on
the phone.
Length: This was subject to participant availability, which ended up being 60 minutes. As
Stewart and Shamdasani (2015) observed,
Time is a finite resource in modern society. The time budget of the average individual
may be more constrained than the financial budget. Asking individuals to spend 90
minutes to 2 hours in a focus group discussion—plus the time travelling to and from the
group—is asking for a significant sacrifice. (p. 66)
Structure: I had a pre-circulated discussion document that explained the study purpose,
provided an overview of key emergent themes (while pointing out that this is not necessarily a
complete list of such), and outlined a few questions to guide the discussion. The latter was
“suggestive” and room was left for new matters to be discussed. One of the participants
answered all of the questions and sent them back to me. The other two did not.
One further matter that comes up in designing focus groups for research is the question of
group moderation or facilitation. Ideally, someone other than the researcher takes care of
managing the meeting and interactions, freeing the researcher to listen deeply and make highlight
notes as the discussion unfolds. For my work, budgetary constraints would mean being able to do
this only if a volunteer facilitator could be recruited which was not feasible.
The focus group session was taped and transcribed as with the interviews, based on prior
notification and concurrence of the participants.
Focus group analysis. The analysis of the focus group transcripts followed closely the
approach this interviewer developed for the one-on-one interviews, as outlined above. This
interview was transcribed by the investigator. It resulted in 13 pages of single-spaced one-sided
interview text. Additionally, one participant provided a one-page written response to the
questions in advance of the actual interview.
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The interview thematic analysis was considered in formulating the questions that were
posed in the focus group. This researcher is mindful of remarks made by Gill et al. (2008) on
some special challenges to analyzing the text from focus groups:
It is important to note that the analysis of focus group data is different from other
qualitative data because of their interactive nature, and this needs to be taken into
consideration during analysis. The importance of the context of other speakers is essential
to the understanding of individual contributions. For example, in a group situation,
participants will often challenge each other and justify their remarks because of the group
setting, in a way that perhaps they would not in a one to-one interview. The analysis of
focus group data must therefore take account of the group dynamics that have generated
remarks. (p. 294)
Document Research
While the interviews and focus group were the most time-consuming and influential data
gathering for this research, in this embedded case study involving designers/planners engaged
with or highly influenced by five post-Sandy initiatives, it was important to have an independent
understanding of how each initiative worked and what critical incidents and developments may
have been central. This not only assisted me in gaining a strong sense of the context and
chronology of each initiative but helped me to come to my own assessments of their professional
experiences: their victories, their setbacks, their existential moments. I needed to be ready to
constructively challenge11 those who contribute through interviews and focus groups within the
analytical and interpretive frame. There was a substantial collection of materials germane to the
design/planning professional roles, actions and reflections garnered well in advance of those
interviews. Beyond this role, the documentary records of individuals and organizations, as they
struggle through crisis situations, provide important insights into how they see and present

11

A major contribution to understanding and even resolving the tension between taking what an
interviewee says on faith, and yet being scientifically skeptical of it, is Josselson’s (2004) article, “The
Hermeneutics of Faith and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion.” Documentary research can be an essential
part of being able to be a believer and a constructive doubter simultaneously.
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themselves, the stories they tell, even in comparatively dry documentation, about their work, its
challenges, their successes and (sometimes) their failings (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011). This was
part of the study’s analyses along with expanding my familiarity with all relevant written
materials.
Jarvis (1999) has described the range of materials that those research professional
practitioners may try to access and study. A goldmine among these would be the personal notes
and/or working journal of actual professionals. He suggested, “Such documents . . . are useful
accessories to understanding the practice because they capture a view of its transitory process
and shed some light both on what occurred and, on the reasoning, and feelings of the
practitioners” (p. 113). While actual studies, drawings of plans and site photos of projects under
construction or completed were easily accessible, given the specific parameters of this study,
while the researcher could have access to them, it was deemed not worthy of further exploration.
Jarvis (1999) identified an array of other “more formal” (p. 113) documentary materials
from within organizations which he recommends be found and studied: “minutes of meetings,
official correspondence, policy directives, outlines of procedures, statements from management,
rule books, job descriptions, and so on” (p. 113). He pointed out that, many categories are in the
public domain though a few are internal; the latter include internal communications which are
increasingly electronic.
More readily available documentation, beyond the reports and scholarly literature
reviewed in Chapter II, include:
Newspaper articles about Sandy along with letters to the editors;
Presentations by design/planning professionals at conferences, public meetings;
Transcripts from community meetings about Sandy;
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The frequently super-abundant reports, memos and the like, sometimes referred to as
“grey literature.”
Document analysis. This work proceeded concurrently with the interviews and also the
focus group as materials came up in discussion. As themes emerged from analysis of discussions,
focal points for documentary analysis developed. Additional documents, beyond those that were
used to describe the contextual characteristics of the study, were sought during and after the
interviews as initiated by the participants’ reference to types of sources/information.
Ethical Issues of the Research Relationship
Narrative research consists of obtaining and then reflecting on people’s lived experience
and is inherently a relational endeavor. Every aspect of the work is touched by the ethics
of the research relationship. (Josselson, 2007, p. 537)
In narrative-based research, the researcher seeks, hears, and later writes about stories that
are usually momentous to those who recount them. Ethical matters needed to be addressed over
the entire narrative inquiry process beginning with application for and obtaining approval from
Antioch’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). This application was prepared and submitted after
the proposal was accepted and the research process was begun with participants. The ethical
challenges—and how I planned to meet these—were fully developed for the IRB application,
and is underscored, as Kvale (1996) suggested, by noting the different ethical issues arising at
the several stages of the completed research.
Ethical issues in recruiting participants. Having worked as a participant and
collaborator post-Sandy in a variety of roles—researcher for a professional organization,
communications liaison on one of the Rebuild by Design teams, volunteer with Occupy
Sandy, and facilitator at public events in communities struck by Sandy—I acknowledged this to
the participants to maintain transparency and be cognizant of any potential bias that may arise.

139
Many of the participants held civic positions or government contracts as design/planning
professionals. I anticipated that interviewees might feel restricted in their responses given the
professional role they currently held, or any non-disclosure agreements they may have signed.
Under such circumstances they would be limited in terms of what they could or would be willing
to discuss beyond the “party line” of their organizations. Clearly, in seeking their agreement to
be participants I needed to show how, as a researcher, I would balance their possible reluctance
to reveal innermost thoughts and feelings about post-Sandy experiences with my need to bring
out valid and meaningful accounts. This was resolved through my characterizing to each
participant the interview as a mutual project for which both they and I have responsibility. The
initial consent form and ancillary materials, such as the description of what the research entails,
was the main way of working towards this balance, along with the discussion prior to their
commitment to participate. The fact that some of the participating designers/planners were
people with whom I had varying degrees of prior amicable working contact had implications.
Brewis (2014) explained,
The stories we are told by friend-respondents are more likely to be heard stories, so we
need to reflect on how it might feel for them to narrate these as well as considering how
much of a “scholarly good” we serve by reproducing these stories in our publications.
Moreover, friend-researchers and friend-respondents alike have to live with these
publications after the fact; something which may get neglected in the process of research
itself. (p. 860)
Clearly, when one is doing research among people one has worked with before and
expects to again, the approach and suitable limits must be “negotiated,” the word used and
explained in detail by Taylor (2011). Additionally, the questions and discussion that I asked so as
to understand the full array of impacts that Hurricane Sandy had on participants, in some
instances brought up traumatic memories. It was important that as the researcher, I did not force
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that direction but rather guided the participant in a manner that allowed a moment like this to
unfold in a reflective rather than reactive manner.
As the interviews were recorded, consent was sought from each of the participants with
full assurance that they will be used only for this research and destroyed when the work was
done. The participants were given a copy of the transcripts to sign off on and had the right to
withdraw from the study at any time. Consent was additionally sought verbally at the beginning
of each interview.
Note should be made of the particular ethical concerns that are involved with focus group
research, for as a researcher one can confidently guarantee confidentiality on what happens in
interviews, when groups convene there is much less control both over what goes on during
meetings and what is said afterwards. Experienced moderation of sessions—a role I have
previously played—helped to create an environment where a candid discussion could take place.
This was challenging at some junctures when deep feelings and conflicting opinions came to
light, particularly around issues of marginalization and resiliency.
Insofar as what participants say or reveal outside the sessions, I discussed a guiding
protocol to minimize “leakage,” emphasizing the adage “what’s said in the room, stays in the
room.”
The summation of this chapter is best conveyed through the telling remarks made by Van
Manen (1990) and later, separately by Bar-On (1996), which accentuate the ethical difficulties
and yet the moral good that can come out of well-planned narrative research. Most important is
to know for what, a researcher is responsible.
The research may have certain effects on the people with whom the research is concerned
. . . They may feel discomfort, anxiety, false hope, superficiality, guilt, self-doubt,
irresponsibility—but also hope, increased awareness, moral stimulation, insight, a sense
of liberation, a certain thoughtfulness, and so on. (Van Manen, 1990, p. 162)
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I feel that finally, after all that we do, even when we think we are doing a lot of good to
our interviewees, we have to take into account how they are thinking of themselves, how
this is changing over time . . . Although we are also only human, I feel we are responsible
because in such a delicate kind of research, we hold the meaning of people’s lives in our
hands. Our successes will be gratifying, but our failures may become irreversible.
(Bar-On, 1996, pp. 19–20)
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Chapter IV: Findings
The unpredictability and sheer force of Hurricane Dorian in 2019—which, in the late
summer of 2019, swept destructively through the Caribbean devastating the Bahamas and then
tracking from the southeast United States through Atlantic Canada—was just one more marker
of how climate-impactful events are influencing the built and natural environments. New York
City has never experienced a storm of the size of Hurricane Sandy that had caused so much
damage and affected so many lives. Close to eight years later, how much longer will this
statement hold true and what will be the lessons learned in response to the next event? This is
raised not to provoke fear or to question the viability of this study, but rather to further stress the
importance of insight and understanding into the impacts on and work of design/planning
professionals. They are the women and men on the front line of rebuilding and future planning
within climate-vulnerable areas.
The research question is: In what ways did post-Hurricane Sandy experiences impact the
design/planning professionals’ approach to future climate-related events personally
(individually), professionally, and societally? The intention is to not only shed light on what has
been learned in response to this question but to determine what collective insight can be garnered
as we move forward into a rapidly changing future.
A cross-section of design/planning professionals—architects, planners, landscape
architects, and engineers—were interviewed for this study. As one would expect, their responses
were quite varied, some teetering on the edge of extremes, with many nuances and gradations in
between. While the participants each brought something unique to the research, there was a
common single thread that ran throughout their stories; it emerged consistently at the intersection
of where the personal, professional, and societal. Kaasar, a planner, said it most succinctly. In
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response to being asked what advice he would give other professionals facing challenges similar
to the ones he faced after Hurricane Maria, he stated, “So, I try to stay hopeful by staying curious
and staying critical by staying demanding and also being completely reflexive and thanking fate
for allowing me to have this opportunity to do that.” This statement illustrates the intersection of
the three pillars used as a framework for this study—he tried to stay hopeful (personal), and
reflexive (professional), and demanding in terms of his aims to make a difference in a dire
situation (societal),
Purpose of the Study and Research Question
While it is understandable that many of the studies in the aftermath of a disaster focus on
the actual work of rebuilding or the experiences of those within a community directly impacted
by the disaster, this study’s objective was to provide insight into a relationship-based profession
that responds to the needs of community within a human-made built environment within the
natural world. Whether one lived on a barrier island like The Rockaways (in Queens), or a
densely populated urban community in Lower Manhattan, when Sandy struck, design/planning
professionals responded in ways that ranged from the immediacy of targeted short-term to
longer-term solutions. Herein lies the genesis of the primary research question.
In summary, the intent of this study has been to examine an area of literature that has
only begun to surface. More specifically, I have focused on the following dimensions of the
research question:
How working within highly charged post-disaster or pre-disaster climate-vulnerable
communities, such as in New York post-Sandy, impacts design/planning
professionals (architects, planners, landscape architects, and engineers) personally,
professionally, and societally;
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While initiatives in the New York region are central to the research regarding
design/planning professionals, the discussion broadens to include interviews that look
at strategies and approaches used nationally and internationally guiding post-disaster
efforts: rebuilding, adaptation, leadership and the emergence of resiliency and
managed retreat are especially popular concepts on what needs to be achieved or what
is hotly debated.
While the above themes were part of the initial primary and interrelated research
questions, an additional theme emerged in the analysis as a central element. This theme, the way
in which issues of diversity, equity, and inequity within the profession impact societal and
professional realms, as well as the way in which they effect design/planning professionals
emotionally and psychologically, broadened and deepened the research. This is of particular
significance because (a) it emerged in the context of recovery and planning in marginalized
communities where public agency attitudes and responses are more often than not based on a
perspective that is non-inclusionary; and (b) it is difficult to design inclusively when the very
people doing the work are not representative of large segments of the impacted populations.
Introduction to the Findings: Study Process Outcomes
Framework for interpreting design/planning practice after Sandy: The three pillars. The
research data has been organized utilizing three pillars for breaking down and understanding the
data and the impacts. While the concept of the three pillars, personal, professional, and societal
has not changed since the inception of this study, how they have each been defined shifted in
light of the data. Post-data collection, and based significantly on what I learned from the
participants through the interviews, each is now defined as follows:
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•

Personal: Self/individual, psycho-social challenges, empathy/stress. Critical
moments of professional designers/planners that have most deeply impacted these
individuals emotionally, psychologically, or existentially as an outgrowth of one of
the following: (a) lived in a Sandy-impacted area; (b) dealt with empathy/stress
that in some instances were referred to as PTSD; (c) had life-changing events
post-Sandy that permanently impacted or changed the course of their lives; or (d)
had experienced the long-term impact of the racial and gender composition within
the profession.

•

Professional: Impact professional practice, reflection on strategies post-Sandy,
impact on future events, including, (a) as professionals engaged directly
post-Sandy or another climate-related events; (b) tangential to a situation related to
an event that they were not directly engaged in but impacted them personally; or,
(c) were professionally engaged post-Sandy or with another climate-related event
that circumstantially impacted them.

•

Societal: Local and global impacts from climate-impactful events and their models
of leadership: (a) the consequences within vulnerable communities and
populations; (b) the intersection between the built and natural worlds; (c)
resiliency, sustainability, and managed retreat from a local and global perspective.
This also addresses the nature of leadership from a global perspective within the
design/planning professional community.
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Figure 4.1 depicts the three pillars.

Figure 4.1. Three pillars used as the framework for understanding the impacts on and strategies
developed for post-Sandy challenges by designers/planners.
Coding Structure of the Findings
The qualitative and mixed-methods software, Dedoose, assisted in developing a structure
for the study’s themes, categories, and descriptors (referred to here respectively as the “parent,”
“child,” and “grandchild” codes). The parent codes are foundational; the child and grandchild
codes are subordinate codes that further the thematic development. Through an inductive
method, the codes were applied to excerpts from the transcripts that aligned with the codes. The
emergent codes were then placed inside each of the three pillars according to their relevance.
They were further coded to identify those themes within the pillars that had the greatest
relevance to the research question, and to classify them according to the density of the theme
across all interviews. This data driven research approach resulted in the thematic structuring (for
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parent codes) outlined in Table 4.1 and elaborated on in the ensuing extended discussion for each
pillar.
Table 4.1
Themes in Relation to Parent Codes for the Three Pillars

PILLAR 1—PERSONAL
Theme 1.1: Lives and works in
Sandy-impacted area

Parent Codes In . . .
PILLAR 2—PROFESSIONAL

PILLAR 3—SOCIETAL

Theme 2.1: Five post-Sandy
Initiatives
• NYC SIRR
• Rebuild by Design
• New York Rising/
Buy It Back
• Build It Back
• Occupy Sandy
Theme 2.2: Design Strategies in
Response to Sandy

Theme 3.1: Vulnerable and
marginalized communities

Theme 1.3: Critical Moment

Theme 2.3: It’s not just about
design it’s about—
• Data Assessment
• Safety Training/ Deployment
• Codes and Policies

Theme 3.3: Resiliency and
Sustainability

Theme 1.4: Impacting the
narrative

Theme 2.4: Lessons Learned
from other hurricane/
post-disaster events, e.g.,
• Hurricane Katrina
• Hurricane Maria
• 9/11

Theme 3.4: Managed Retreat

Theme 1.5: The personal
impact of the racial, gender,
socio-economic composition of
the design/planning profession

Theme 2.5: Reflections
post-Sandy

Theme 3.5: International
Connections

Subtheme: Leaving or
staying within your impacted
community
Theme 1.2: Empathy/stress

Theme 3.2: The intersection
between nature and the built
environment

Theme 3.6: Leadership

Note. Shading is for ease of reading and has no significance in distinctions among themes.
A disaggregation of the data into the three pillars provided by excerpts from the
transcripts illustrates these themes. Pseudonyms and professional affiliation are listed after each
excerpt so that the individual is identified beyond the overarching phrase designer/planners but
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by their specific professional expertise. In the research, the professional affiliations architect,
planner, landscape architect, engineer, communication specialist, urban strategist, social activist,
and activist/storyteller are important differentiators. Patterns of similarities and differences
within each of these affiliations highlight patterns within the themes of the three pillars.
Pillar 1: Personal Impacts
One of the first questions I asked participants was why they choose to go into the
design/planning profession. My intent was to understand this as something of a starting point for
each professional in their journey into the unprecedented personal challenges following
Hurricane Sandy. Figure 4.2 summarizes the themes I identified in regard to Pillar 1, to be
discussed in this section.

Figure 4.2. Themes identified for Pillar 1(Personal).
Not one person interviewed for this study said they went into it for the money. Some
talked about initial motivations in the context of creating a lasting legacy, only to be faced with
the reality after Sandy about the impermanence of buildings. Others had had personal events in
early stages of their life that impacted their understanding of the importance of having a voice
that spoke out for others in our shared environment.
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While I have no illusion about the number of design/planning professionals who are more
driven by ego than altruism, those interviewed as part of this study varied greatly in this regard.
These professionals were able to balance healthy professional egos with a drive to be successful
and have an impact, with altruistic intents and inclusive behavior. Sandy and other such
climate-impactful events, as illustrated in this study, have begun to ignite much more reflection
within the community of design/planning professionals. This is illustrated in this excerpt from an
interview with Vic.
I don’t think there’s any field of experts that is more suited for bringing about change.
Change, meaning, dealing with the world. Once I got into architecture, I realized how
completely touching the mission is. How many areas of lives it would touch, how
important it is to think of the quality and the environment we live in. I think everywhere
you go, you’re in an environment touched by people. (Vic, architect)12
The following section begins the discussion individually of each of five themes and one
sub-theme of Pillar 1.
Pillar 1 (Personal): Theme 1.1: Lives and works in Sandy-impacted area. For
professionals living in Sandy-impacted areas the storm had substantial effects on their personal
lives and their professional worldview. The heartbreak, devastation, and loss also showed the
power of the human spirit and their commitment to community. Some professionals like Vic,
who lives in Sea Gate, Coney Island, Brooklyn, lost everything. Others like Thomas, though he
lived in a vulnerable area near the Gowanus Canal (Brooklyn), which flooded but spared his
home, came to provide a safe haven for friends who lived in the vulnerable Rockaways. Brianna,
an architect in Red Hook, Brooklyn, experienced her second flooding from a hurricane, the first
being from Irene. She did not lose everything like Vic did but dealing with flooding for a second

12

In presenting quotations from the participants, I have listed both the given name (pseudonym) and
profession so that the reader is always aware of each’s occupation, rather than having to repeatedly turn
back to the list in Table 3.1.
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time gave her pause about the long-term community impacts, the future for Red Hook, and her
own long-term future there.
It’s been a journey about discovery, but it really integrates my understanding of my
whole life. Any time that human beings experience a trauma, it opens up old wounds.
Being an architect by training and experience helped unmeasurably because I understood
the nature of the physical challenge. I can exercise whatever muscles I have that will
help us and others survive this situation. (Vic, architect)
Unlike Vic’s, Thomas’s home became a place of refuge for others who lived in more
vulnerable areas than where he lives—The Rockaways in the borough of Queens, New York.
The Rockaways was one of the hardest hit areas during Sandy, and the disparity here in the
recovery process was very different for people living in private homes and those living in public
housing. That will be further discussed in the societal pillar of this research.
We have a lot of colleagues in this coastal area, Rockaway Beach, which is kind of an
ocean facing section of New York City. We convinced a lot of the folks, who were
friends of ours, to evacuate, even though they were on the fence about staying. I was
watching the canal and it started to swell, and then it started to surge and flood out our
street. It didn’t quite make it to our doorstep, but it made it to our block. (Thomas,
landscape architect/urban designer)
During the interview, Thomas never spoke about wanting to leave his home in Brooklyn near the
Gowanus Canal (Figure 4.3). However, the issue came up in my discussion with Brianna who
resides in Red Hook (Figure 4.3) which is bounded by the Gowanus Expressway to the North,
the Gowanus Canal to the east, Upper New York Bay to the south, and Buttermilk Channel to the
west. Brianna, who is a long-time resident of Red Hook, Brooklyn, was hard-hit during Sandy.
We were flooded during Hurricane Irene also. I guess we expected to be flooded during
Sandy a little bit, but not quite to the extent that we were by the second-high tide, I was
watching the water come up the street and then I realized that it wasn’t going to stop, and
it was actually coming incredibly quickly. We watched the water come up into our first
floor, and then we left. (Brianna, architect)

151

Figure 4.3. Locator map for Red Hook and Gowanus neighborhoods (Brooklyn) . Adapted from
a map by Julius Schorzman. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA
2.5). From Wikipedia Commons (2005).
Leah, who also lives close to the Gowanus, unlike Thomas and Brianna, left her home
during Sandy because of what she described as suffering from “hurricane fear.”
I’m someone who has a lot of hurricane fear. When I saw that storm [Sandy], I decided I
was leaving. It’s just straight up fear. I do have a house full of emergency candles, solar
power battery packs, flashlights and I have all that stuff. When I chose to leave during
Sandy, I gave them to my neighbors. I am too close to the Gowanus. (Leah,
architect/planner)
However, after Sandy, she came back and began to help friends in Red Hook who had been hit
by the storm.
So, after Sandy, I came back two days after the storm made landfall and the first thing I
did was jump into Red Hook because I had friends whose homes had flooded in Red
Hook. I did the first level immediate actions of helping them. I had done this with so
many friends in New Orleans. (Leah, architect/planner)
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Leah described this fear in subsequent conversation as related to her experience post-Katrina.
Subtheme: Leaving or staying within your impacted community. The issue of whether a
community should rebuild, and what the considerations are for an individual in staying or
leaving the place that has been home, is a complex one. It is something that will be looked at in
greater detail under the Societal Pillar (within the theme Managed Retreat). However, because of
their professional background, designers/planners understand more than most people what the
risks are. It is a complicated and painful decision—whether you are in a position of privilege to
even entertain relocation as a choice, or not, knowing the vulnerabilities and risks so as to make
informed decisions about your own life, your community, and the generations to come. There
was no conversation with Thomas about relocation, as this was not an issue he was even
remotely considering. He had known far greater exposure to storms and living with the water
than most other participants had. While he lived for a time in The Rockaways, he grew up in
“hurricane alley” in Florida, and still actively works in Puerto Rico, has family there, and was
impacted personally by Hurricane Maria in 2017.
The internal debate for design/planning professionals, even with all that they know about
risk, adaptation, recovery, is challenging. Do you stay or do you go? And for some
design/planning professionals, they personally had a very different experience of the storm. It all
depended upon where one lived. Jeanine, who lived on the Upper East Side, didn’t lose power.
That was a very different experience for Brianna who not only lost power but was flooded out of
her home.
My husband [pause] we have fights all the time. He’s like, we’re leaving. We had dinner
last night with friends. We’ve all lived in Red Hook for 15 or 20 years and it’s coming
to the point like, are we leaving? When are we leaving? Every year it’s like, when are we
leaving? It’s not if we’re leaving, it’s when are we leaving. (Brianna, architect)
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It is human nature to think that one bad event is an isolated event and will not happen
again for decades—maybe not even within one’s lifetime. In a place like New York, affordability
plays a big role in this decision, not to mention the significance of community that one has built
up over time. These are very difficult issues that climate-impactful events are going to make
more frequent in the years to come even for those who understand the ramifications better than
most: the design/planning professionals.
I was planning on dying here, and I still can’t wrap my brain not being here. So, that’s
going to be a really, like hard moment to leave. I believe that every person living in Red
Hook right now, or that has been here for a very long time, is beginning to realize that
the city doesn’t care, and the city isn’t going to do something in time. Therefore, we
need to figure out a secondary solution, and that solution right now is to leave and that’s
a really sad moment. (Brianna, architect)
While Brianna experienced damage during Sandy, Vic lost everything and had to decide
whether he wanted to rebuild and stay in Coney Island.
Is this really the right direction for us? Is this the right thing for us to do as a family to
stay here after we lost everything? Is this an opportunity for me to build my dream
house? Is this a waste of my time? Is this something I simply cannot afford to take on?
All of those doubts and considerations, repeatedly hammered at me, and my wife, and
my family. Let’s just sell the property, take what we can get, pay off our mortgage, and
run. And when we looked at the numbers, they were low, and we couldn’t. (Vic,
architect)
This kind of poignant debate resonated for hundreds of families after Sandy who have had to
make decisions that will impact them for the foreseeable future. These are difficult choices under
any circumstances, but most especially when the loss has been sudden, unexpected and the
ramifications life changing.
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal): Theme 1.1 Lives and works in the Sandy-impacted
area. For professionals impacted by living in Sandy-impacted areas they had the professional
experience to navigate post-disaster strategy better than most. However, with that knowledge
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often came the burden of understanding just how vulnerable their community was and how the
future could unfold with more Sandy-like events.
Pillar 1 (Personal): Theme 1.2: Empathy/stress. In a post-Sandy scenario,
designers/planners enter a space of disequilibrium where the urban fabric and the physical
structures of communities, are suddenly torn apart. This intensifies the disruption that people
must suddenly adapt to after an event such as Sandy. For the design/planning professional most
deeply engaged on the ground in the recovery, the impact can be stressful enough to incapacitate
helping professionals temporarily or longer. In some instances, several design/planning
professionals referred even to PTSD as something to consider among those who have been most
deeply involved in dealing with such events. It can also be a time for many, when the impact of
experiencing empathy and resulting stress amidst the unforeseen or the unforeseeable,
significantly altered their own personal world views in irrevocable ways. Empathy, defined as
“the ability to tune into and share another person’s emotions from their perspective plays a
crucial role in bringing people together” (Wallace, 2017, para. 2). It builds trust, yet can also
create anxiety, stress, or low-level depression if someone becomes more consumed with another
person’s feelings well beyond their own (Manczak, DeLongis, & Chen, 2016).
Just as nature’s force within a storm has a variety of category strengths, design/planning
professionals are also impacted personally in varying degrees of empathy and resulting stress.
How a number of these professionals processed, adapted, and reacted to these circumstances
from the perspective of empathy/distress are further noted in the following selections from the
interviews.
Eli has built a professional practice that directly addresses the impacts of a multitude of
climate-impactful events and community vulnerabilities locally, nationally, and internationally.
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Of all the people interviewed on this question, he was the most direct in speaking to grief as part
of empathy and distress.
All you can do from a design standpoint is hear what that grief is, listen, and not take it
in too much. Being human is to empathize with what is taking place. From a greater
standpoint, the concept of nothing is permanent has really been driven home from these
circumstances and experiences. Not just this disaster, but other disasters. (Eli, architect)
The discussion evolved to the professional’s own experience of grief not clouding their
judgment when assisting traumatized community members post disaster.
Most people say to you, I want it back, I want it back. It’s not a response of wanting their
house back, it’s a response of, I want it back, I want my life back. But grief is real, it’s
tangible, and it’s a huge hurdle for the design profession to take in. People just want to be
heard after the disaster and once you hear them and take that in, it may be best to see if
you can drive people towards a clear-eyed design effort. (Eli, architect)
Ideally, a professional maintaining a boundary between feeling and witnessing ultimately
helps people think through their options and guides them to make the best decisions. But this is
an experiential process and even with holding boundaries, one cannot help but be impacted by it.
The grief after Sandy—it’s definitely transformed me in a lot of ways, personally. But, as
a designer, you have to listen to it but alongside it to make sure that you keep coming
back to clear-eyed decisions, which are very hard to get it. Very, very, hard to get at. (Eli,
architect)
Design/planning professionals are not trained in psychology or grief counseling. In
expectation of more climate change-related traumatic events, FEMA has put programs in place
as part of their communications disaster program. There is training for responding after disasters
for a safety assessment program and a national assessment safety program so that one is prepped
before going into the field. Eli spoke of a decompression process after what he termed
“deployment.”
Your deployment is for a maximum of five or seven days of field work. Even after a
disaster, and you’re working with government agencies, you are supposed to have two
weeks on and then to have a break. It’s really how you protect yourself from taking on
other’s people’s grief. Sometimes I have to go back to that, just to recognize, in myself,
how do I deal with this grief is a heavy, heavy piece. (Eli, architect)
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As part of the snowball sampling, a number of professionals who worked in Puerto Rico,
post-Hurricane Maria, became integral to deeper insight into the personal impact of
climate-impactful events on professionals.
When you start identifying injustices, you see how very little power you have in a
colonial system which is condescending and racist. Then you get mad, you get unnerved
and you empathize from that place. Some days you think maybe nothing is going to
work. But as planners we are trained to be hopeful in some ways. (Kaasar, planner)
What made this insight particularly important in the context of Sandy is that it is
reflective of how many marginalized communities felt impacts from the storm and its aftermath
even in one of the wealthiest cities in the world. While it would be misleading to compare what
happened during Hurricane Maria—with its most deadly impacts centered in relatively
impoverished Puerto Rico—to Hurricane Sandy, a better comparison would be Hurricane
Katrina: what is similar was how professionals themselves felt personally impacted even though
they were certainly dealing with levels of grief and loss on very different parts of the spectrum.
We are trained to try and think that the future may bring positive outcomes. That’s why
we plan, we try to look forward, so we keep going. At the same time, I am deeply
reflective in part because I have to understand my position of privilege as a professional
sitting in an air-conditioned office where I earn a good living and I actually work on
something I was actually trained. So, I don’t take that for granted. (Kaasar, planner)
While Kaasar was not directly engaged in Sandy, he has tremendous insight into empathy
and distress post-disaster through working as a professional planner in Puerto Rico after
Hurricane Maria struck in 2017. While our conversation surrounding empathy and distress was
more focused on anger and injustices, the direct and positive action he took came from a fiercely
empathetic space and from a position of owning his privilege. What is also particularly critical in
Kaasar’s insights and responses is that he is experiencing empathy/distress as a professional
within a community/country that has been historically marginalized. While, as stated, overall
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New York is far more affluent than most of Puerto Rico, at the neighborhood level, it is also rife
with communities that have long been economically oppressed and marginalized.
The one enduring piece of this is constant impermanence. I remember in post-Katrina
days that vicarious trauma is a real thing and it is in the health profession and I don’t
think people in design and engineering appreciate that until they go through it
themselves. (Susan, urban strategist)
Susan has worked on the ground within communities and in non-profit leadership roles
during Katrina as well as Sandy. Her role, though not specifically a designer/planner, has been
critical in the aftermaths and subsequent planning in both events; she was the only person
interviewed who mentioned vicarious trauma, as a term. Although in looking at what
architect/planner Leah experienced, one could categorize her experiences as such.
I don’t talk to anyone about my disaster recovery experience. I was deeply traumatized
post Katrina, for a huge range of reasons—the amount of deaths, decay, corruption. It’s
just terrible to see the world turned upside down. I receded talking about it because it was
emotional. I was like, actually enraged in a constant state for two or three years. (Leah,
architect/planner)
While Melissa did not discuss the same stressors that Leah did, she did speak quite a bit
about empathy not necessarily being a given with all design/planning professionals.
It certainly increases your empathy, but I don’t think that’s always the case. I was
working with a structural engineer who couldn’t feel any empathy; but I think for a lot of
people, though not for all, it increases their empathy. I’ve absorbed some of the stress, for
sure. It’s come down now, so I’m not quite as aware of it. (Leah, architect/planner)
Melissa spoke about empathy/distress in the context of how it impacted her and her
younger staff. An important marker during this interview was her mentioning that experiencing
empathy/distress as a professional was not a given. She pointed out her own assumptions and
unconscious bias about empathy/distress. That bias goes like this: how could someone not feel it
for others in this context? But the point was that not everyone will empathize strongly. From
Susan’s vantage, that does not make that person hollow or give cause for negative judgement. It
just makes them human with a different set of coping mechanisms.
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The engineers interviewed in this study had experiences directly with Sandy but also
brought a plethora of experience from an international perspective. For Liz, a civil engineer,
every disaster is personal, and an understanding of empathy and distress is built into how she
pragmatically executes her role.
These are life-changing events for me. I have seen loss of life in hospitals because they
were in the ICU and the emergency batteries do not work. New York in particular. I
have been through 9/11 and Hurricane Sandy. It’s my city and very personal but every
city I have gone through something like that; it becomes personal. (Liz, civil engineer)
Liz further spoke of her role in the context of a code of professional conduct to make conditions
safe and protect people. This was further underscored in Paul’s background, empathy, and
compassion.
As an active duty Army Officer, 27 years plus, being involved in a number of operations,
I’ve seen some things like Somalia where people are starving, literally, and dying on the
streets, and in the villages. When you see stuff like that it gives you a whole different
perspective on life. And being in a combat situation, things are happening around you,
that are life threatening. My spectrum is different than everyone else’s. (Paul, engineer)
Paul is an engineer who has seen active duty. He has seen the ravages of war and has
brought to his work a level of empathy and an understanding of distress that is unique to anyone
interviewed in this study. While I am not inferring that architects, landscape architects, planners
and engineers need to have this level of insight and experience, his viewpoint even after all that
he has experienced, reflects someone who values life and the importance of interacting and
connecting with people as an engineer in a post-disaster or planning role.
In the context of Sandy and other events like that, my first thought is to make a real
connection to people. I don’t think we do this enough today, this idea of community
bonding. I got a chance to do this in Katrina, Andrew, Lee, Irene, and then Sandy. It’s
really satisfying for me to be able to help and to be able to be involved in bringing
solutions through empathy and understanding distress. (Paul, engineer)
Though Robert was not a military career professional like Paul, he is a member of the Air
Force Association and the Navy League of the United States. A healthcare architect for more
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than two decades, Robert was one of the first people who mentioned post-traumatic stress in the
context of Hurricane Sandy.
Right after Sandy, going into The Rockaways, talking to homeowners, I not only calmed
them down, but also started talking about potential solutions, potential funding sources,
and got into literally house by house discussions; it became quite tragic. It is a difficult
experience that in the aftermath feels like post-traumatic stress syndrome. (Robert,
architect)
Robert’s response is certainly reflective of an empathetic approach and a deep
understanding into the distress of those he is there to bring assistance to. According to the
American Psychiatric Association, “post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a psychiatric
disorder that can occur in people who have experienced or witnessed a traumatic event such as a
natural disaster, a serious accident, a terrorist act, war/combat, rape or other violent personal
assault” (Parekh, 2017, para. 1).
Thomas, a landscape architect who grew up with hurricanes, has a particular poignant
perspective on Sandy in this context given what he witnessed as an adolescent during Hurricane
Andrew, a Category 5 hurricane that struck the Bahamas, Louisiana, and Florida in 1992.
I think Sandy helped me heal a traumatic time in my life, with Hurricane Andrew. I
mean, you are going from adolescent to adult and your own life is changing and then to
see the world around you transform, it was a lot to take in. To understand that and
communicate that with folks in the field is really important. (Thomas, landscape
architect/urban designer)
Thomas went on to discuss how the personal directly impacted his professional approach in
training others in post-hurricane scenarios.
And a lot of our volunteers, we were training them to not just turn the lights on in a
hospital but also to give hugs. Everyone you meet is going to be in a PTSD type of
environment. You never really heal from that. Just like grief, when someone dies, the
pain is just as intense—but when you do remember it, it’s just as intense as day one.
(Thomas, landscape architect)
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It takes courage and fortitude to confront and respond to these issues. As reflected in this
quote, often one doesn’t often grasp the level of personal stress that is absorbed in these
interactions over time. It is my objective that this study will begin to be a first step in asking
some of the right questions as more professionals are called into post-disaster action.
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.2: Empathy/stress. As illustrated by the
designers/planners in these excerpted narratives, many entered a space of disequilibrium where
seeing the urban fabric and physical structures of communities suddenly torn apart impacted
them deeply. Likewise, was witnessing the suffering of people within the communities who
professionals were there to support. Some designers/planners met that with empathy, others
grief. Several plannindesign/planning professionals referred to PTSD as something to consider
among those who have been most deeply involved in dealing with such events. This is an
experiential process and even with holding boundaries, one cannot help but be impacted by it.
Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.3: Critical moments. The theme of critical moments grew
out of narratives shared during the interviews revealing personal turning points directly related to
post-climatic events. These were either events related directly to Hurricane Sandy or even events
pre-Sandy that impacted their lives dramatically and affected their approach to the Sandy event
and aftermath. These are insights and changes that made a permanent impact on their lives.
In many ways, this disaster was the best thing that ever happened to me [pause] to my
family. Because it brought us together, it brought my wife and I together, in a way that
we had never. We’ve endured many challenges personally, as a couple, and this was one
that would have broken anybody’s back. We bound together, and our kids call us the
dream team. There was nothing we couldn’t take on. (Vic, architect)
Both Grace (engineer) and Thomas (landscape architect/urban designer) had experienced
critical moments in previous climate-change related events, ones that deeply affected the
direction of their professional lives. For Thomas, it was as an adolescent dealing with the loss of
his best friend’s younger sister after Hurricane Andrew; for Grace it was as a young professional,
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working on the ground in New Zealand on the recovery effort after the 2011 Christchurch
earthquake. She recounted,
I have dealt with the impact of these events through so much of my career but being in
the trenches after the earthquake in New Zealand is probably one of the most impactful
things for me. In a personal way it has impacted what I do in my career. I’m really
focused now on the proactive side of disasters rather than just being on the reactive side.
(Grace, engineer)
The earthquake in New Zealand was a turning point early in Grace’s career. For Thomas,
it is what happened to him directly as a teenager during and after a Category 5 hurricane that
impacted what he wanted to do in life. Claire—who is from Haiti—was impacted by the death of
her grandmother and other members of her mother’s family during the Haitian earthquake of
2010. When she went back to Haiti after the quake to support in the rebuilding, the family homes
she had stayed in just months before had been destroyed. Claire described,
I had [previously only] seen architecture as a positive thing. But after the earthquake in
Haiti I saw architecture as an element that could kill. That architecture can be both a
protagonist and an antagonist. As a woman of color, I am 0.2% of the profession of
architecture. So, while I can’t solve all the problems, I can support the community and
tell the story of what has happened. I also need to share my knowledge so that I can help
people in their own communities use their power to make their own changes.
This resonated with Thomas’s recollections from his youth in Florida in relation to
Hurricane Andrew.
My best friend lived across the street from us. We were like, as teenagers, “Oh chaos, it’s
so cool!” We had all these plans that we were going to drive around and see the
wreckage, we had no idea how bad it would be. And I go to his house. He goes, “Naomi
[his sister]is in the house. A beam flew through the wall and hit her. We’re waiting on the
ambulance. She died last night.” It impacted the direction of my life. (Thomas, landscape
architect/urban designer)
Esther is an activist/storyteller and works with Sandy Storyline, an outgrowth of Occupy
Sandy that described itself as “a participatory documentary that collects and shares stories about
the impact of Hurricane Sandy on our neighborhoods, our communities and our lives” (Sandy
Storyline, para. 1). In our interview, Esther described a critical moment in which she came
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face-to-face with her own despair as an activist and storyteller. She seemed wary of digging up
the past any further during the interview. In honoring the limits being set in the conversation, I
asked her why she sounded so sad and engaged her in the present moment as opposed to asking
her a question that would have meant recalling the past. This self-described poignant moment
was also a critical moment for me as a reminder of the boundaries that need to be respected in
conducting research within a moment of observed fragility. “I am sometimes sad because I think
these stories are so important. And sometimes I feel like it is so hard—even with all the
storytelling skills in the world—to break through and get these stories out there” (Esther,
activist/storyteller).
As I listened to Esther, unavoidably I was also reflecting on what had brought me to the
dissertation subject. How my own despair and sadness went back to the neighborhood I had
grown up in and Sandy’s impacts there and, therefore, on me. I shared the feelings of impotence
Esther described. At the same time, I wondered: Would any of the narratives in this study
ultimately make even a small dent of awareness into such a large issue? Would it matter?
Remarks by Eli (architect) were meaningfully parallel:
Nothing is permanent, the precious object, or precious memory, or photo albums, those
types of things . . . not even buildings. As a family of immigrants, I wanted to build
something permanent. It was in part why I became an architect. It’s definitely been driven
home to me that nothing is permanent. It is kind of liberating in a certain way. I
appreciate some things more, that you might take for granted. (Eli, architect)
The experience of impermanence in a profession of solidity and structure became
something of a theme throughout the research. For some professionals, impermanence came in
the form of knowledge. This is like the Buddhist space of the beginner’s mind (Shoshin) where,
even after decades of practice, you are always starting over (Suzuki, 1970/2010). A seasoned
professional returning to a place of not knowing is a critical moment.
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In college, life seemed so black and white, something was right, or something was wrong.
It was kind of easy to see the world that way. This issue of how we get our arms around
climate adaptation—[I] might as well have just gotten out of school. I feel as much at a
loss professionally today as I did the day I graduated from graduate school. So, it is very,
very humbling, is all I can say. (Beryl, landscape architect)
While both Eli and Beryl spoke of their work in deference and respect to the communities
they worked within. Susan (urban strategist) was more focused on the loss of dignity which she
experienced as a critical post-Katrina moment.
Post-Katrina New Orleans was struck by two disasters. One was the hurricane itself and
the other was people who came in as professional experts to force solutions on them that
had nothing to do with the people that they were meant to serve. (Susan, urban strategist)
Susan also described professionals who came to New Orleans, learned what they could from the
community, took those ideas, wrote articles and books (not attributing the narratives from the
local sources appropriately, in her view) and made names for themselves. When Hurricane
Sandy struck, Susan was already working with the Municipal Art Society of New York, one of
the oldest civic organizations focused on the built environment. As a member of the Society’s
roundtable that Susan chaired post-Sandy, I felt that it was all about inclusionary leadership.
Notes from the first meeting of that roundtable on February 25, 2013, described its work as
follows: “As there are many initiatives underway post-Sandy, the Roundtable can provide civil
society leadership organizations to come together monthly (Municipal Art Society of New York,
2013, para.1).
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.3: Critical moments. Among the participants in
this study there was a wide range of responses about critical moments—events that changed the
course of a person’s life or made a fundamental change to how they perceived themselves in
relation to the profession or in their personal lives. Through the loss of his home, one participant
found his way back to what was really meaningful—his family. For another, as an adolescent in
Florida, the death of a friend’s sister during Hurricane Andrew, impacted the direction of his life.
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For several designers/planners the belief in permanence gave way to the wisdom of
impermanence.
Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1.4: Impacting the narrative. Design/planning professionals
have been exploring how to best communicate the challenges and solutions around
post-climactic events such as Sandy to the public as well as to others in the profession. They
need to find ways to communicate these sometimes harsh or unwelcome realities in a manner
that is truthful but not fatalistic. Beryl’s narrative exemplifies this conundrum:
It’s become easier now that Sandy has stayed a bit in people’s trauma memory to suggest
to them that there is no magic bullet here. Even looking at some of the tide gate
alternatives that are being proposed across the mouth of the New York Harbor, aside
from the fact that they probably won’t live to see that ever completed. (Beryl, landscape
architect)
Predictions about sea level rise are changing rapidly. The design and technology being
proposed to address those issues can be tenuous because by the time it gets built it may no longer
be relevant. How one communicates this narrative is particularly demanding.
In terms of landscape architecture, there is an impermanence to it because it is always
changing. I think architects think of what they do as permanent. When you’re dealing
with something like Sandy, you really get pushed up against the reality that what you’ve
built to last a lifetime, is really, within a certain context, as impermanent as the
landscape. I mean, it can be. (Jeanine, landscape architect)
The theme of impermanence is again being raised but, in this case, in the context of
impacting the core narrative in the professional’s life. When you are designing for storm
protection the underlying objective is to build to last; but if critical conditions are changing, and
there is no precedent in one’s lifetime for that kind of change, how then do you design with an
eye on the future? How do you communicate this challenge to a community that is putting their
safety in your hands?
Agility is a fundamental component, and if we go back to the idea of impermanence,
what you need is agility. Agility is the ability to move among various issues and
opportunities and to deal with them successfully. We have to develop that agility in our
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narrative. We have to have agility and will. I think those two things together could serve
us quite well. (Ross, architect)
Agility is a key point Ross raised here in regard to impermanence. Reflective-based
action rather than reactive-based decisions. This is an important distinction, one that I find a
crucial component of the design/planning professional’s narrative in responding post-disaster or
in pre-planning within vulnerable communities.
Another point of discussion in this research of communicating the narrative is how to
convey just how vulnerable a community may be to the next storm. In the aftermath of a disaster,
how do you keep people engaged without creating fear or lethargy? This is a very important
issue especially when informing those affected that perhaps the impacted area should not be
rebuilt. This dilemma for the professional will be discussed more directly in the societal pillar.
On one hand the sky is falling and on the other side, the sky may fall in 10 years or in 20
years, but somewhere out there the sky is falling and it’s all about the speed in which
you would expect it to happen. How do you plan for that? (Beryl, landscape architect)
A number of the study participants who shared concerns similar to Beryl’s connected this
level of climate challenge to challenges during war where there is an enemy—and a plan of
attack to defeat the enemy. But they questioned, “Who is the enemy here?” Nature? The waters
and the earth that sustains us?” In terms of the impacted and changing narrative that the study
participants had turned to, there were many more questions than actual answers.
When you sit down and you say to people, one of them is a war monger, the other is
Gandhi, how do you get that message out that promotes peace with power and with
passion and really taps into emotion. That is where the struggle sits in the global climate
debate. To get people to feel emotional about the climate coming from a place of peace
and not from a place of the adversary, the enemy. (Edward, architect)
Current global narratives make almost everything seem of the same level of urgency. So, how
then does a professional communicate the urgency and far reaching impact of climate change on
future generations?
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Design/planning professionals were most effective in this process when they truly
engaged the community with open-ended questions. This encouraged collective perspectives
more than setting up the problem and pushing for a solution. Liz found that communicating to
diverse groups of stakeholders so that they understand the issues and potential vulnerabilities
was clearly a major part of what she did in the aftermath of Sandy.
So, you have Hurricane Sandy in 2012. And people have a mechanism of protection
against what is very scary and that includes loss of life. The memory of people is very
short lived, and I think it is our way of not being afraid or causing others fear, to forget
these things. So, I think that is a very important thing to communicate these issues in
ways that people understand. (Liz, engineer)
Not unlike Liz, Samuel sought to communicate the complex messages around Hurricane
Sandy in a way that could reach people emotionally and across generational lines.
I’ve thought a lot about what we could do on an emotional level to communicate this
message in a more meaningful way. I think it’s how you talk to one generation about the
future of the next generation. I deal a lot with how to communicate science and data. I
have found storytelling gets people emotionally involved in this, and then they care about
what the data is showing. (Samuel, architect)
The global youth movement on climate change has shown that many younger people feel
that older generations are not invested in protecting the earth for next generations (Foran, Gray,
& Grosse, 2017; Sengupta, 2019). Eli, one of the architects in the study, suggested “kitchen table
conversations” where adults and children discuss these issues at home. This would help in the
sharing of information on a more intimate level and help to integrate these realities more into the
day-to-day. This is a similar theme underscored by both Hannah (planner) and Roberta
(architect). Hannah said,
Well, what is a motivator in this narrative? I mean, maybe some people are motivated by
fear. Some people are motivated by science. I think the people that are doing work in this
area are people who are able to not think about themselves all the time, and they can kind
of see ahead and think about other generations.
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This statement reflects the importance of design/planning professionals thinking more
inclusively and intergenerationally in how ideas are conceived of and communicated. Recovery
from Hurricane Sandy or other climate-impactful events takes years and, in some instances, the
same communities can be hit by multiple events. Similarly, Roberta brought the intergenerational
narrative back to storytelling in a very creative and experiential manner. She called it the power
of putting your finger on the map.
Impacting the narrative stories are going to be so important for that—the power of putting
your finger on a map. If you know a place, and you put your finger on that place on the
map, that connection brings back your history. If you don’t know a place and you put
your finger on the map, you project desire of what you think it’s going to be like.
(Roberta, architect)
Roberta then tied this analogy to arriving in a disaster area, underscoring that not understanding
the people and the location can be as damaging as the disaster itself.
For those of us who parachute in and do work, how can we understand someone if you
put your finger there? Do you know what they’re truly trying to tell us? Do you
understand their narrative? (Roberta, architect)
One of the study’s themes is the importance of design/planning professionals not pushing
their own agenda on a community that they are there to serve. Esther further built upon the
importance of this inclusive approach by expanding the narrative to honoring the dignity of the
person telling the story and being a witness to another’s experience.
It is about honoring the dignity of the person telling the story. Not every story is meant to
be told the same way. But telling the story in a way that is meant to create a narrative that
is collaborative. You know there is some value to being a storyteller and being a witness
to someone else’s story. (Esther, activist/storyteller)
This theme reveals that the perspective and practice of the designers/planners, on the
front lines, can be improved by identifying and seeking out voices of those more vulnerable and
are often silenced amidst the rush to recover from catastrophes. As such events become more
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commonplace, the future of the profession may need to become far more inclusive of those
people who have suffered the loss of community through natural disasters.
Summary—Pillar 1(Personal), Theme 1.4: Impacting the narrative. With so many
competing global narratives that make almost everything seem of the same level of urgency, the
design/planning professional is challenged to deliver an account that is constantly changing, and
for which there is no precedent in their lifetime. Although the participants offered a number of
different approaches to tackle this challenge, they consistently endorsed the value of simplicity
and factual clarity.
Pillar 1 (Personal) Theme 1. 5: Race, gender, and inclusion with the design/planning
profession. In 1968, Whitney M. Young, Jr., a civil rights activist and, at the time, the executive
director of the National Urban League, gave the keynote address at the Portland, Oregon,
American Institute of Architects National Convention. He stated, “You are not a profession that
has distinguished itself by your social and civic contributions to the cause of civil rights . . . You
are most distinguished by your thunderous silence” (American Institute of Architects, 2019, para.
4). At the time, Young was critical of the high-rise housing projects that were being built in some
of the poorest and toughest neighborhoods. He questioned why there wasn’t push back from the
profession. While this goes to the point of the ongoing lack of diversity within the profession, it
equally shows the lack of inclusiveness in the recovery and planning process within racially
diverse communities. Participant Talib stated,
Designing for disaster relief, disaster preparedness comes from really well-intentioned
folks. Yet, it’s always assuming a kind of general sense of universal needs instead of
specific needs, attitudes or understandings of culture and community that are worthy of
being preserved. Community members need to be part of whatever structures are built.
That goes for refugees from disasters or wars, it’s all kind of the same thing. (Talib,
architect)
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Talib’s remarks were reinforced by Penelope who more bluntly brought up infamous
historical domination while also distinguishing the perspectives of planners versus architects.
Part of it is that we have to decolonize how we think about space because we are building
on layers that really, at one point, enforce segregation or slavery. And a lot of that has
perpetuated itself. We think it’s normal and it’s quite surprising how we don’t even
realize some of these things. I think with the profession itself it needs to diversify in lots
of different ways. (Penelope, architect)
To achieve this kind of fundamental change in the profession requires focusing on
potential entrants to the profession before college and even before high school. Planner Kaasar
further expanded upon the importance of professional practitioners being involved in the
university’s training of the next generation of designers/planners. A significant number of
professionals interviewed within this study are also educators; their appreciation of the
importance of (re)education seems almost a given.
I assume a sort of practitioner hat on a daily basis but also [have] engaged in a more
academic role . . . in the immediate days after Maria. One of the things I learned was that
the classroom was a very important place for conscious reflection and critical thinking
around what needs to happen in the post-disaster period. It opens up the conversation
with the next generation of planners. (Kaasar, planner)
Part of what Kaasar is highlighting is the importance of being a reflexive practitioner as a
way to shape discussions and call out injustices. It is also a way to begin to influence the mindset
of the next generation of professionals in a far more inclusive manner.
Asking the same question of Joseph regarding racial and gender equity and the need for
greater diversity resulted in quite a different response and perspective. Joseph, as previously
noted, was heavily engaged during Sandy as a social activist and worked closely with
designers/planners on the ground as part of the rebuilding process. Climate justice is a focus of
his work. He had a unique perspective on his next steps on tackling the injustices as a result of
climate crises and referenced his commitment to the existential crises of climate change and
White nationalism.
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The far right and climate—these two problems are intertwined. I am trying to understand
White terrorism. It’s key to building structural racism and is a huge barrier to addressing
the climate crises. Systems on the planet are collapsing and the ability of humans to live
on this planet; and with this is a resurgence of White nationalism. (Joseph, social activist)
Summary—Pillar 1 (Personal), Theme 1.5: Race, gender, and socio-economic
composition of the design/planning profession. While women in this study acknowledged that
the number of women in the design/planning profession had increased exponentially in the past
20 years, participant designers/planners acknowledged that the same could not be said of Black
or Brown professionals. They remain underrepresented in the profession. This substantial
underrepresentation negatively affects design/planning, in predominately Black and marginalized
communities. Through the sheer lack of diversity, the very democratization of space is impeded.
This sentiment is reflected in comments about the need to decolonize how we think about space
and integrating social justice into design. Education plays an important role in shifting this
paradigm. An increase in Black and Brown professional practitioners at the university level who
help to train the next generation of designers/planners would therefore be vitally important.
Pillar 2: Professional Impacts
Despite the metaphor of pillars, there is not a clear separation between the personal and
professional dimensions of the interviewed practitioners’ response to Hurricane Sandy. In fact,
the interrelatedness of what it is to experience the world as “just another” human being and to do
so as a highly trained professional, should not be siloed. The findings underscore the desirability
of making the personal, the professional, and vice versa. This said, I have separated the personal
and professional themes for the purposes of discussion and clarity. In the concluding chapter I
return to the inevitability of cross flows between personal and professional lives in
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design/planning. This section looks at each of five themes of Pillar 2, which are summarized in
Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4. Themes identified for Pillar 2 (Professional).
Six months before Sandy, Lyla, one of the architects interviewed for this study, was
contacted by the NYC Mayor’s Office about her role on the Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital on
the Boston waterfront. It is a building Lyla’s firm designed, but her particular role on the project
was to lead the resiliency and sustainability conversation. She went on to describe how after the
people at Spaulding watched the media coverage post-Katrina they wanted to put measures into
place so they would not recreate another scenario like Katrina.
If something akin to Katrina happened in Boston, people would not be throwing furniture
through the windows, and the building would be inherently more passively survivable. It
would be elevated to prevent flooding. And so, it became the first building on the Boston
waterfront designed to take into account sea level rise and the first one to be designed
where you have all the infrastructure on the roof. (Lyla, architect)
Lyla’s comment referred to the curiosity and interest the Mayor’s office representatives
had recognizing that Boston voluntarily built to withstand ocean rise effects. Although the city
was challenged in convincing property owners along the NYC waterfront to take building
resiliency seriously, these actions suggest that City of New York was beginning to assess their
own coastal vulnerabilities long before Sandy. During the Bloomberg mayoralty in 2007,
PlaNYC was introduced (and updated in 2011) with the objective of what NYC should look like
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in 2030 as a city that was greener and had a more equitable quality of life that addressed the
climate issues as a coastal city (PlaNYC, 2007, 2011, 2013). Unlike these reports (e.g. NYC
SIRR), PlaNYC was completely focused on Sandy relief and recovery. After Sandy, many
other initiatives began to emerge.
Pillar 2 (Professional), Theme 2.1: Five post-Sandy initiatives. To adequately
understand the professional dimension of the impacts Sandy had on the participants, it is
necessary to revisit the five post-Sandy initiatives overviewed in Chapters I and II. Here,
emphasis is on the difference that Sandy made to designers, planners, and related practitioners
professionally.
As noted in earlier chapters, I have chosen to focus on professional work that arose
through participation in five somewhat overlapping but substantively distinct initiatives. These
were arguably the most comprehensive responses that institutions—governmental and
non-governmental—made to the overwhelming challenges Sandy left behind. I rely on my
participants’ experiences primarily in the context of these five programs, to probe the impact of
Sandy on their professional lives.
NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR). In December 2012,
approximately a month after Sandy struck, the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency
(SIRR) convened to address the creation of a more resilient New York City in the wake of
Sandy. Its long-term focus was on preparing for and protecting against the impacts of climate
change. A final report released in June 2013—A Stronger More Resilient New York (PlaNYC,
2013)—laid out plans for a $19.5 billion program to reinforce disaster protocols and prevent
damage from future climate events. The Administration of Mayor Bill de Blasio, who took office
in January 2014, continued to back the plan.
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While the designers/planners interviewed as part of this study categorically
acknowledged how important this report by the Mayor’s office was right after Sandy, and how
important the in-depth research and initiatives set forth report were, most of the focus in these
discussions was on the actual programs that were implemented as result of these reports.
I participated as a facilitator in a rollout of this report in Coney Island at Abraham
Lincoln High School, Brooklyn in 2013. Video footage of that rollout was recorded as input for
this research study. However, when I attempted to play it, I received this message: “Video
unavailable. This video contains content from Mayor Bloomberg. It is not available in your
country” (New York City Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency, n.d.). As “my
country” was squarely in the location of the work and the hurricane, this was worrisome; I saw
this as an ill-starred example of the outreach efforts the initiative purported to emphasize.
Participant Robert commented on SIRR:
From my perspective this, [The NYC Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency
had a lot to do with things that architects, planners, engineers, zoning experts got
involved in right after Sandy. It was a good important step. This continued as more
reports were produced and then those reports were translated into codes. (Robert,
architect)
As he further discussed, after the storm many different reports were produced and many
guidelines were proffered. All of those guidelines were made into changes in zoning, planning,
and building codes. “The changes in the building code, which is known as Appendix G, was
particularly critical” (Robert, architect). What he was referring to is noted below and was vital to
the rebuilding process for design/planning professionals. The 2014 addition to the code’s
purpose was as follows:
The purpose of this appendix is to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare
and to minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions in specific flood hazard
areas through the establishment of comprehensive regulations for management of flood
hazard areas. (UpCodes, n.d., Section G101.1)
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Additionally, changes were also made in the New York City Zoning Resolution of
October 2013: “The provisions of this Chapter establish special regulations which are designed
to encourage flood-resilient building practices for new and existing buildings and in so doing to
promote and protect public health, safety and general welfare” (City of New York & City
Planning Commission, 2017, para. 1). Robert commented,
Ultimately, what happened, is that many national codes were affected, building codes,
zoning codes, FEMA codes and insurance company guidelines, even hospital codes. It
had a great impact on the profession. Again, that’s what made reports like NYC SIRR
and others were so important. Many of the FEMA maps that people had been guided [by]
needed to be revisited. That was another big change that happened. (Robert, architect)
FEMA produces flood maps that rate areas from vulnerable to safe, and from moderately
hazardous to hazardous. New York was first mapped by FEMA in 1983. With only minor
changes made since that time, Hurricane Sandy far exceeded the map zoned flooding areas.
Leah further underscored that the Stronger, More Resilient initiative (PlaNYC, 2013)
helped to provide guidelines and a roadmap of what communities would be facing in the
recovery period.
Being able to tell people in Red Hook, this is what it’s going to be like, the long-haul of
the process and what’s it’s going to look like. A report like this is useful. So, I felt like
that fact that New York City had a relatively quick response and could deliver so quickly
[on the initiative and the report] was impressive. (Leah, architect/planner)
Rebuild by Design. Rebuild by Design (RBD) began as part of former President Obama’s
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy led by a task force that was chaired by the HUD Secretary
at the time, Shaun Donovan. It began in June 2013, resulting in an international design
competition led by the United States in cooperation with Henk Ovink, the then acting director
general of spatial planning and water affairs for the Netherlands (see Chapters I and II for a
detailed description of this initiative). The participants in this study who had engaged in Rebuild
by Design emphasized that Ovink’s focus was on the importance of collaboration. The
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Rockefeller Foundation played a pivotal role in Rebuild by Design. In a review, of the program
funded by the Foundation, the Urban Institute’s (2014) review called the RBD vision “more
aspirational than operational” (p. ix). I have noted this here because it foregrounds the struggle
between the aspirational and the pragmatic, a challenge that many of the participants clearly had
on their mind in our conversations. Eli’s remarks go to this dilemma.
So, Rebuild by Design—great that it came up. Great that we had all these amazing
projects be developed and engage the design and communities. An amazing program for
demonstration projects. Once the design winners were announced, you got almost a false
sense of security, that the general public said, “Oh, great, once these are all built, we’re
going to be fine.” But not everything was funded or will be built. (Eli, architect)
RBD was part of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities initiative that put
resiliency on the map across the country and around the world. However, another participant,
Kaasar observed,
We collaborated with the Resilient Puerto Rico Advisory Council . . . [we] worked with
the now defunct 100 Resilient Cities program and intersected with the folks in Rebuild by
Design. My impression with what was going on there was that they had a template of
things they do on the ground from somewhere else. I don’t think that you can expect to
do the same things over and over again and call it a success. (Kaasar, planner)
Kaasar talked about pushing back on many of their ideas and strategies. He was skeptical
if they were going to be in Puerto Rico for the long haul or if they were just checking off another
box in the global landscape. At the time of this interview, The Rockefeller Foundation had
announced that it was changing direction in regard to 100 Resilient Cities. The 100 Resilient
Cities organization’s work concluded on July 31, 2019. Kaasar reflected on this change:
100 Resilient Cities is there no more. I have no ill feelings whatsoever with any of the
individuals who worked here. I don’t blame individuals for what is deployed by
multinational foundations or international NGOs who sometimes feel they are doing good
by jumping into a disaster situation or parachuting into a situation without necessarily
respecting or understanding events on the ground. (Kaasar, planner)
Kaasar felt that RBD provided lessons learned from Sandy most specifically in engaging
and, even, fighting with stakeholders on concrete ways by which to engage the community early
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and often. Kaasar also mentioned that, while the lessons learned from Rebuild by Design in the
context of Sandy were important and valuable reminders, the tactics proposed to attain what they
did may have worked in New York but not necessarily in Puerto Rico.
Susan also shared her views on the experience of RBD:
Rebuild by Design was for me always an interesting experiment. I have a lot of
ambivalence about it because I am not convinced that design is always the answer but I
do think if you are going to invest in infrastructure that is supposed to be catalyzing
resilience then [RBD] was a fabulous in making the design profession more
collaborative, better listeners in the design community, and more integrated with other
disciplines. (Susan, urban strategist)
Dawn Zimmer had been Mayor of Hoboken, New Jersey, during the Rebuild by Design
project at the Hudson River. The objective of the design was to protect Hoboken and parts of
Weehawken and Jersey City from rising sea levels and storm surges, rising tides and heavy
rainfall. During Sandy, there was $100 million in damage (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2014).
In our interview, Susan reflected on the support Mayor Zimmer had relied on from RBD.
The access she [Dawn Zimmerman] had to help Hoboken through RBD she couldn’t
have done that by herself. It would have been a real challenge. But when you had HUD
and the Secretary so elevating the profile of the role of design and the recovery as an
opportunity to do something different, it meant the Dawn Zimmerman’s of the world got
a lot more attention and a lot more resources. I think that part is pretty damn good.
(Susan, urban strategist)
Because of Sandy, understandably, all the focus became about water. Henk Ovink being a
water expert and in a leadership position with RBD, contributed to this awareness, which helped
everyone acknowledge those risks.
Susan continued in the interview with her sense of limitations of this perspective.
A lot of this has to do with policy, codes, and procurement. The agencies themselves are
not very interdisciplinary. If we expect policies to be more place-based and holistic then
the professions will be more collaborative, reflective, interdisciplinary. Again, RBD was
good in that it brought architects together with geologists, sociologists, engineers.

177
However, Paul (engineer) brought the topic of collaboration back to the need for a wider
realm than just professionals.
The idea was that the community is going to be there from the very beginning. And their
input is essential and that must be included in the design process. And really investing in
the community’s ideas and you would drive your designs. So that was the RBD program,
was a game changer. And the head secretary deserves the credit for that, Shaun Donovan.
(Paul, engineer)
Melissa, an architect interviewed for this study, spoke about how she engaged with many
of these same guiding principles in her own work. It’s not a new language for the
design/planning profession but it was very much in the forefront as a result of Sandy.
That’s what I did in Sheepshead Bay Brooklyn [hard hit after Sandy] and that’s what I
did in New Orleans [referring to Katrina] and it was effective in my own little way. But
that’s what Rebuild by Design tried to do too, to a certain extent. Whether it gets built or
not . . . engages people in envisioning a different kind of future. (Melissa, architect)
Rebuild by Design was a unique moment in time. In 2020, it is hard to imagine generating that
same level of political will for a federally funded design competition. As staunch advocates for
building resilient infrastructure through Governor Cuomo’s proposal for the Restore Mother
Nature Bond Act, RBD does continue to impact policy on a local level.
New York Rising Community Reconstruction program. As previously noted, the New
York Rising Community Reconstruction program (hereafter, “New York Rising”) was
administered at the state level by the New York State GOSR. It was intended to be a
community-based program that covered both New York City and New York State. The program
actually began during Tropical Storm Lee (September 2011) and provided assistance to New
York State communities after Hurricane Irene—which struck in August 2011) as well as after
Sandy. As part of the post-Sandy initiative, the GOSR also managed the State’s voluntary buyout
and acquisition programs (Buy It Back) in which homeowners could ask the state to buy back
properties that were substantially damaged or destroyed. A similar buyout program was
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developed by Governor Christie of New Jersey. Eli spoke of the multiplicity of actions that
comprised New York Rising.
We had a bunch of projects for [New York] Rising. The process from my standpoint is
quicker and much more successful from the design perspective than other programs at
that time. From the standpoint of getting the drawings done, getting these things rolling
through that process versus the Build It Back program. (Eli, architect)
I asked Eli what kinds of responses he would have liked to have for this program seen
from the hindsight of seven years later. He responded, “What would be very helpful is to have
some reflective analysis from the design community. I think there is no sort of feedback with the
lessons learned.”
On September 30, 2013, I attended the public engagement program of the New York
Rising public engagement session at the New York Aquarium at Coney Island. This focused on
Brighton Beach, Coney Island, Manhattan Beach, and Sea Gate. The session has been described
in New York Rising’s (2013) meeting document, “Working Together to Build Back Better.” The
session included an update of recent New York Rising actions, an overview of the public
engagement format, visioning, description of the organizing committee role, a project review and
action items.
This resulted in a plan released the next March by the New York Rising Community
Reconstruction Planning Committee (2014). The report explained,
In the span of approximately one year, the State of New York experienced three extreme
weather events. Hurricane Irene, Tropical Storm Lee, and Superstorm Sandy wreaked
havoc. These tragic disasters signaled that New Yorkers are living in a new reality,[and]
that we need to rebuild our communities in a way that will mitigate against future risks.
(New York Rising, 2013, p. i)
The report explained that Governor Cuomo “led the charge to develop an innovative,
community-driven planning program on a scale unprecedented and with resources unparalleled”
(New York Rising, 2013, p. i). Participant Brianna explained,
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When the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery in New York Rising programs formed, I
was nominated to be the co-chair of the New York Rising Community here. I led that
process for Red Hook with another co-chair. Because of the way the New York Rising
program was structured, I think that it created a structure for us to sincerely get involved.
(Brianna, architect)
Part of the funding that is mentioned below is from the Community Development Block
Grant Program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, n.d.). The program is a
flexible one that provides communities with resources to address a wide range of unique
community development needs. Beginning in 1974, the program became one of the longest
continuously run programs at HUD. The Community Development Block Grant Program
provides annual grants on a formula basis to 1209 general units of local government and states.
These grants are made available to state and local governments that the President of the United
States designates as disaster areas. As part of these Federal grants, community participation is
encouraged. Participant Brianna (architect) reflected on the block grant program in her interview
for this study.
From an internal structure there are many different perspectives. I was very excited the
funding that came down was from the Federal Government and not to be allocated by the
Governor’s office or politicians alone who were cherry picking their own projects. I feel
like by having the communities voice in the process, that’s really great and that’s super
interesting.
Having the communities voice in the process, as has already been established in earlier
report of the findings, is important. Brianna noted that even when there was a more integrated
community approach time constraints and focusing on specific projects rather than holistic
planning limited that actual impact .
We went through an eight-month planning process. As part of Rising we were given
wonderful planners to work with. We didn’t come out with a master plan, and we didn’t
come out with a more holistic kind of thinking, partly because we just didn’t have enough
time. In terms of funding these projects. We didn’t know at the time that we were only
recommending projects.
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As part of the interview for this study, I asked Brianna, what kind of support would be
needed by design/planning professionals if this was going to be addressed in a future
storm-related event. She responded.
I think some sort of community, organizing, training, could have helped—long-term
vision planning would have helped. I think helping us get further funding to be able to
fund a secondary planning process. It just didn’t feel like there was very good closure.
It’s really just opening the door to the next 100 years of thought process.
Buy It Back. The GOSR had a Buy It Back program to purchase homes impacted by
Sandy, at pre-storm value. The city offered buyout programs as well as previously noted by Vic,
above. On Staten Island, neighborhoods including Oakwood Beach and Ocean Breeze (for
location of these neighborhoods, see Figure 4.5), had people who were bought out on the
condition that the land was returned to nature and not resold to developers who would buy low
and rebuild and sell at a higher profit.

Figure 4.5. Location of Oakwood Beach and Ocean Breeze neighborhoods (Staten Island).
Adapted from a map by Julius Schorzman. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5
Generic (CCBY-SA 2.5). From Wikipedia Commons (2005).
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Not all properties bought were returned to nature. Yet, this was a condition that Oakwood
Beach community residents collectively had put on the buy-back.
Beryl (landscape architect) elaborated on this challenge:
In terms of managed retreat and buyouts, I think we are basically nowhere on that topic.
What are the different techniques that states are using and cities in some cases, to
encourage people to walk away? We had an experience in one community in Staten
Island, Oakwood Beach, where folks did take a buyout.
In an article in an online news service covering Staten Island, Kashiwagi (2019) noted,
Since Sandy hit the region in 2012, the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery has
purchased 612 properties as part of its buyout and acquisition programs, spending $234
million in that effort. Oakwood Beach has the highest rate of buyout properties in the
state. (paras. 4–5)
In our conversation, Beryl brought the dilemma reflected in the Governor’s Office report
into the personal and professional context of her life and work:
As a landscape architect, and just as a person, imagine your friends, your family, and
your neighbors that you’ve known for X number of years, and kids that your kids have
gone to school with, just sort of slowly disappearing. Leaving you as the only resident on
the block. Which has got to feel kind of both scary, and sad, at the same time. So, I feel
as if, this notion of managed retreat, does have to be a rather democratic process.
The “dismal prospect” of managed retreat also intersects with economic disparity.
Individuals who do not own their own home, but rents are at the whim of a landlord. What kind
of flexibility would a tenant have? What kind of flexibility would a working-class,
middle-income renter have? Depending on your economic situation, even if you were a
homeowner, re-locating could be challenging even with a buyout.
I asked participants in my study, what the profile was for a typical buyout.
The State was looking for a particular profile of community where the area was
vulnerable to future storms of people [who] had been hit by storms before Sandy. It also
had to be a piece of property that was large enough and ecologically situated enough to
be the environmental benefit if they returned it to nature. Then everybody, or mostly
everybody, had to decide as a community to stay or to go. (Melissa, architect)
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Further it was left to residents to discover where they might best relocate. Some realized that
they could buy a house in upstate New York but there was no way they could take that money
and buy another house in New York City. Esther observed,
Even where my parents lived in Brighton Beach, there is so much development. There
was a Sandy auction where they were auctioning off these homes to developers who
would raze the homes and then turn a profit in rebuilding and reselling. Does that really
make people safe? (Esther, activist/storyteller)
It became clear that not all homes abandoned or bought back by a government entity
were returned to nature. Climate gentrification, as described by Baptiste (2019), became a part of
the Sandy aftermath:
“Climate gentrification is when the response to climate impacts indirectly increases
disparities in communities,” Jennie Stephens, director for strategic research
collaborations at Northeastern’s Global Resilience Institute, says. Wealthy people
seeking refuge from the effects of climate change are starting to move into
neighborhoods that were once considered undesirable. The term is fairly new, but there
are already examples of this new kind of gentrification taking place—and not just in
coastal areas. “It can happen, and it is happening in all kinds of communities,” Stephens
says. (p. 22)
Thus, in their professional involvement in what may first seem to be primarily technical
and financial work, the practitioners I interviewed often find themselves embroiled in dealing
with the consequences of much longer-term inequities.
Build It Back. While New York City SIRR (PlaNYC, 2013) was an initiative that
resulted in a report, Build It Back evolved from an initiative to a structured program designed to
repair, rebuild, elevate, and in some cases—which Vic noted below—a buyout. While wellmeaning, it has had a very controversial history. The participants’ comments underscored themes
of leadership, structure, delivery, and ethical behavior. As described in Chapter I of this study,
the Build It Back Program was part of the New York City Mayor’s Office of Housing Recovery
Operations. It was launched eight months after Sandy to help New Yorkers with the construction
funds needed to rebuild their homes.
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Vic is a resident of Sea Gate, which is located at the far western end of Coney Island in
the borough of Brooklyn in New York City (see Figure 4.6 for locator map). Vic and his family
had lost their home during Sandy. His perspective is particularly unique as someone who was
both a victim of Sandy and a member of the profession that was relied on to assist others in the
aftermath.
We got into the Build It Back program. It was a very, very badly employed program
[and] extraordinarily frustrating in terms of bureaucratic minutiae. We were one of the
first participants invited in the program and we jumped in, but it became harder and
harder to thank them because the performance and the program was so badly managed.
The value really became questionable. Vic (architect)

Figure 4.6. Location of Coney Island and Sea Gate neighborhoods (Brooklyn). Adapted from a
map by Julius Schorzman. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA
2.5). From Wikipedia Commons (2005).
It took Vic four years after Sandy to get a house designed, built, and for them to move in.
I recall many conversations with Vic during that time. He, his wife, and two sons had to find an
apartment they could afford to move into while their house was being rebuilt—which was not
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easy in the New York City rental market. All the while, they had to keep paying a mortgage on a
house that no longer existed.
There were many false starts. Many times they would call us up and say, “You have to
come back in. We have to get all of your information again because the system that we
used to scan all your information got lost.” The people didn’t know what they were
doing. There were third-party consultants that were hired who, I think, really took
advantage of the system. The city really did just a miserable job. (Vic, architect)
After the end of Mayor Bloomberg’s Administration in early 2014, Mayor de Blasio’s
Administration came in and took the program over. More staff was hired to cut through the red
tape that had led, among other effects, to delays such as Vic had experienced. But after
Bloomberg, Build It Back became a political football. Vic learned there was talk of another
option. He shared,
At one point they said, “Well, you have an option now, not to continue. We will pay you.
The state will pay you for your property. Would you like to participate?” And my first
question was, “What are they going to pay me?” And the answer was, “We’re not
sure—and you have to make the decision before we’ll figure it out.” (Vic, architect)
Vic was also on the local community board in Sea Gate (Figure 4.5). He understood
building codes, zoning ordinances, and what it takes to get through the design and rebuilding
process. He went on to describe more of the details as noted below.
If you want to pursue it, you have to commit to it, and thereby, you lose your ability to
continue rebuilding your house. You walk away from your property and we’ll pay you,
but we’re not going to tell you what we’re going to pay you until you make the
commitment. So, it was clearly a Catch-22. It was a very bad offer. (Vic, architect)
I have reflected on just how challenging it would be for someone with less access and
knowledge than Vic had to navigate these same circumstances. Thousands of people were in that
position. Vic was among an informed and savvy minority as a professional architect with lots of
city planning and permitting experience.
Occupy Sandy. Occupy Sandy was a major and immediate intervenor in the aftermath of
Sandy. They were on the ground as a post-Sandy relief organization, early and fast in some of
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the hardest hit areas such as Red Hook, The Rockaways, and Coney Island. Their work
underscored the importance of community organizations as first responders to the disaster.
Occupy Sandy was a volunteer grassroots disaster relief organization which is the final
and quite independent post-Sandy initiative comprising the first theme of Pillar 2. Each of the
other initiatives arose originally from government intervention albeit, to varying degrees, in
response to public demands; Occupy Sandy did not. While it grew out of Occupy Wall Street,
after Sandy struck, the focus moved to relief work. Eventually the Occupy Sandy initiative
worked in partnerships with local communities, FEMA, the Red Cross, and various
design/planning professionals. Occupy Sandy was by no means the only grassroots group to
address decades-old questions of helping those least able to handle extreme situations like
Sandy’s aftermath. Other important efforts include but are not limited to We Act (n.d.), an
organization “to call attention to and organize against environmental racism” (para. 1), and
Uprose (n.d.), a Brooklyn based Latino public interest group. Both have been on the ground in
their communities for decades, fighting for social justice and, increasingly, on climate justice.
Both were also integrally involved in the Sandy recovery as was Pratt Institute’s RAMP, which
was referenced earlier by one of the research participants, Brianna. RAMP was initiated by Pratt
Institute’s Program for Sustainable Planning and Development by Ron Shiffman (MANY, n.d.).
Students and faculty who were part of the RAMP initiative worked closely with community
partners and clients to develop plans and strategies for rebuilding and adaptation. Occupy Sandy
was a focus rather than on these other initiatives because they simultaneously provided outreach
in a creative and facile manner to a wide range of communities.
We started talking with friends in the organizing world, Occupy Wall Street was one of
them but not exclusively. We started tracking the storm, [asking] “What’s going to
happen? What are we going to do?” The morning of the storm Bobby had started a
Facebook page almost immediately, Laura had a car, and said, “Let’s just see what’s
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where?” And the first place we went was Staten Island, and Red Hook. (Joseph, social
activist)
Joseph and his colleagues were able to marshal resources from outside the community and bring
them to Red Hook. It was the first hub. They started that initiative on the day of the storm. I
asked Joseph how they were able to marshal the resources so quickly.
We surveyed and talked to people and we put out a call on Facebook, Twitter, email,
word of mouth. First and foremost, we connected with people in other parts of the city
that had things that others no longer had, and we started a call out to bring to Red Hook.
Then more spots started to pop up and from there neighborhoods developed pop up
donation centers. It grew like that. (Joseph, social activist)
There was a desire to create a community-led recovery effort based on locally-run
organizing centers, including faith-based organizations, that would act as a hub and spoke,
connecting networks. The Red Cross worked with Occupy Sandy because of their social
relationships with people within the community. Joseph talked about how this would be
transferable to designers/planners.
The connection is addressing these issues from a systems perspective. I think when you
look at natural systems there is a diversity of scale and organisms that function at
different scales and they both need each other. It is really important that they co-exist and
serve different functions.
Joseph referred to the relationship of Occupy Sandy with the Red Cross as “the bottom
and the top coming together to meet in the middle” (Joseph, social activist). That’s why this
example of the Red Cross and Occupy Sandy is such an important paradigm. It has some
valuable guiding thoughts applicable to the design/planning profession and the concept of seeing
design leadership as points in a concentric circle rather than a linear hierarchical model.
The Red Cross plays an important function to marshal resources at scale. Occupy Sandy
helps it to move, be agile and marshal a lot of resources really quickly because of the
network approach. Like basically there was like all these little hubs and at the center
spokes—pathways of both information and goods. It wasn’t flowing out just to one place,
it was going to many places. (Joseph, social activist)
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Accessibility is key both in the flow of information as well as the funding. This concept is further
expanded upon by Eli in the context of community-driven design, as he noted the innovative
nature of Occupy Sandy.
Since Hurricane Sandy, you could talk about community-driven design, and before
Sandy, it existed but did not go into full power. With Occupy Sandy, I think it was the
first time you could see how the power of social media, and that type of technological
awareness at the grassroots level, could bring to a community-driven design effort that
turned into action. That was actionable in real time. (Eli, architect)
Eli further expanded upon the point in the context of communication and being part of a
system that is already a trusted structure within a community.
If you engage a group, like Occupy Sandy, or We Act, or any of the other really amazing
groups out there, they are already set up for communication, and you are part of that
stream, then there is an extraordinary real-time design that goes on. It has a level of
pragmatism and practicality and it reflects the intimacy of the neighborhood and then you
can begin to infuse into that conversation, long-term goals and objectives and completely
driven by a hugely successful buy-in. (Eli, architect)
Eli also discussed how the design/planning community could leverage a type of approach
as part of the profession’s own model of leadership.
I’d love to see more of it. I’d love to see that, that opportunity taken hold, and taken out
by either side. Or in a sense a sort of partnership of the grassroots folks saying, “Hey,
we’re going to bring on these designs and designers as we did in the past and begin to
reflect where we want to go and where we want to be.” To me, that is a business model
that doesn’t exist yet, and if it does, I’d love to see who’s doing it. (Eli, architect)
Susan also focused some of her discussion on the changes people experienced as a result
of the involvement of Occupy Sandy.
Occupy in my view was tremendously important. I was fascinated to watch how the
Occupy movement morphed because of course it existed pre-Sandy, and then Sandy
happened, and it immediately moved into this on the ground resourceful responsive
community-based ground up. (Susan, urban strategist)
I asked her if and how she thought Occupy Sandy had important lessons for the design/planning
profession. She began by referencing their resourcefulness.
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This is one of the smartest things, and I use it all the time as an example [in the
profession]. In the past we would have said, “Oh here is a community in trouble and we
are going to send them what we think they need”—[even] when we don’t have a clue
what it is that they need. Then there is Occupy. They set a function on Amazon and
create an Amazon wish list to ask for what is it they [the community] needed. (Susan,
urban strategist)
Thomas also referred to Occupy Sandy and FEMA. He pointed out how the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Studies & Analysis Institute, 2013) had
actually been studying Occupy Sandy to “broaden future disaster relief efforts” (Schjonberg,
2014, para. 1). He stated,
Occupy was so efficient that FEMA ended up hiring a few of the Occupy Sandy,
computation managers to make FEMA more efficient. And, what happened theoretically
is that you have the slow-moving vertical system, and you serve the horizontal system
formally for employment and both of them were improved by it (Thomas, landscape
architect/urban designer)
Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.1: Five post-Sandy initiatives. These
initiatives were foundational to the direction of post-disaster planning and post-Sandy recovery.
They also served as points of reflection for those design/planning professionals in the study.
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.2: Design strategies and challenges. It was difficult at
first to grasp the magnitude of the storm and even once on the ground in the most heavily hit
areas, devastation was mixed with disbelief. The seasoned professionals, those who had been
through similar events like this before, were better prepared to cope with the aftermath. While it
did not diminish the shock, it did diminish the paralysis. Brianna, as previously noted, lives in
Red Hook and was hit hard during Sandy.
I would say that it didn’t resonate right away because it was almost too much to deal
with. I started participating in work that Ron Shiffman had started with the students as a
reaction to Sandy to figure out how they could help mobilize communities. That was
called the RAMP program. That was when I started to realize just how big an issue this
was. (Brianna, architect)
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Leah, also an architect/planner, left her home near the Gowanus prior to Sandy and
returned after the event, helping friends and colleagues hard hit in Red Hook. During this period,
Leah brought in Architecture for Humanity, an organization now sadly defunct, that was
dedicated to rallying “the world around the cause of humanitarian design, inspiring designers
. . . with the idea that design can make a difference in improving people’s lives” (Winter, 2015,
para. 1). The organization helped to clean up on Coney Island in areas that would not be eligible
for government funding. Parts of Coney Island were filled with small business owners who did
not own those spaces and the land. They were therefore ineligible for money from FEMA to
rebuild their businesses. Leah also used her connections in academia as a way to bring resources
into that community. She cites one specific example through the RAMP initiative.
I encountered you [referring to me] because of RAMP . . . so you saw the resources that
we were able to channel at RAMP because of Ron Shiffman being such a trusted
community advocate and planner. . . . RAMP, for me provided that piece that I had not
experienced before . . . engaging the community on their terms. . . . that was the platform
for me that had been missing. It was that thing that drove me to planning school. (Leah,
architect/planner)
When Hurricane Sandy hit, Paul had already retired from the Corps and had just begun a
consultant career at a firm that I also had joined about six months prior. There were a number of
public clients that needed services after the storm to begin the process of recovery. Given Paul’s
background, he was assigned to this role in the engineering firm he had joined. He reflected on
what he had learned from the Sandy experience during the interview:
What were the takeaways and what do we have to do in terms of design strategies in
response to Sandy? How to marshal the logistics and the resources that are needed to
respond to the needs of the communities?—food, water, shelter, and debris removal to
open up the roadways and so forth. With all that preparation that has to go into it, and
then the recovery to get sorted out. (Paul, engineer)
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Post-disaster recovery is the most critical initial step. The focus then becomes about how
to rebuild in a manner that can prevent and/or reduce these vulnerabilities in the future? Paul
continued,
Recovery is all about establishing normal operations, if you will. But I think the real part
of the discussion here is how do you prevent the level of damages in the future? How do
you reduce them? Or, never deviate from them because you’ve got systems that allow
you to operate throughout the event, whatever it is. I think that that is probably where we
need to focus our discussion in terms of design strategy. (Paul, engineer)
While Paul was focusing on a preemptive holistic systems approach in advance of the
next Sandy-like event noted above, he also spoke about the importance of acknowledging what
has been accomplished in both policy and small projects rather than just focusing on the large
projects that require a different level of funding and buy-in.
There have been lots and lots of policy progress. And then smaller scale solutions, at the
building level or transit station level, that they’ve implemented. So, let’s not forget that.
But it’s the larger scale projects, that’s the piece that really people focus on when they
answer that question about design strategies in response to Sandy. (Paul, engineer)
Similar to Paul, Eli focused on incremental steps through small-scale post-Sandy projects
that actually got built. He referenced a demonstration project in Breezy Point, Queens (for
location, see Figure 4.7) that had been devastated during Sandy.

191

Figure 4.7. Location of Breezy Point (Queens). Adapted from a map by Julius Schorzman.
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA 2.5). From Wikipedia
Commons (2005).
Flooding and high winds and fires destroyed more than 300 homes. The project was
designed and built by Eli with a team of nationally recognized experts. This model was designed
to withstand future Sandy-type events and to be replicated in other vulnerable communities. Eli
contrasted the demonstration project with large-scale ideas that emerged after Sandy but how
few of them had actual been funded:
Post-Sandy, each of these little projects is a bite at a time. I have some reservations about
overarching statements like some of the ones coming out of COP 21, and a number of
other conferences. These are all great, really large-scale amazing decisions and ideas but
how do we actualize down to the common person, is not measurable yet and that to me is
one of the most critical questions.
The demonstration project at Breezy Point has drawn public attention as in a recent
article in Wired magazine that elaborated on the redefinition of both resilience and sustainability.
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In architecture, resilience refers to a building’s ability to withstand the natural elements
(hurricanes, tornados, fire), while sustainability refers to its ability to reside in harmony
with its natural surroundings (passive heating, cooling, minimal footprint). Often thought
of as separate practices, the two approaches were integrated like never before in the
Hurricane Strong Home—a potential new direction for homeowners everywhere. (“The
Future of Resilience,” 2019, para. 2)
Hannah (planner) was similarly focused on tangible implementable steps but in the
context of regulations and codes. She emphasized, “Focus on practical solutions” such as flood
regulations and building codes and other solutions that people could be educated about and put in
place. In contrast to both Eli and Hannah, Jeanine described a specific community-based
scenario in which the damage incurred during Sandy, and the potential vulnerabilities in the face
of another storm, were at odds with a potential solution. A number of members of the community
did not want to relinquish their vistas or accessibility to what they consider key parts of the
intrinsic value of their property and, ultimately, what it was they loved about their
community—the beach. Complicating this were the site-specific challenges. Landscape architect
Jeanine explained,
This community wants to see the beach, but they also want to be protected. So, doing a
levy, for example, they wouldn’t be able to see the beach anymore. The design that came
out of the Governor’s office storm recovery workshop was really a sand capped, stone
cord, a dune. Which worked in some places. This is not going to keep water out. (Jeanine,
landscape architect)
In the interview, Jeanine and I talked about some of the communities she has worked in
and rebuilding in areas that remain vulnerable, including what has been built and if it should
have been built at all. She stated,
People don’t have the money to go somewhere else and to wholesale move The
Rockaways or Coney Island; you’re going to have to rezone Brooklyn or Queens, and
how do they afford that? Some people have lived there, their families have lived there a
long time. (Jeanine, landscape architect)
As Jeanine mentioned, even in the most heavily hit areas post-Sandy, there is a plethora
of new high-end development:
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I mean there are still a lot of developers to build on The Rockaways and Coney Island
and sell those houses to people. It’s as if Sandy will never happen again. And it won’t not
in the same way. Would it be better or worse? No one knows the answer to that.
I asked the study participants about how they dealt with the rebuilding process navigating
both the governmental and the professional challenges. Melissa provided a specific example in
Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn (Figure 4.8), an area that suffered severe flooding and damage.
So, when you give a presentation about how to get the mold out of your house, or how to
get through the paperwork to file forms to get your insurance back, you address the
immediate needs, with your professional advice. You start to hear people’s stories and
you start to get the lay of the land. You survey buildings, and you look around, and you
inform yourself. But you build the relationships. (Melissa, architect)

Figure 4.8. Location of Sheepshead Bay (Brooklyn). Adapted from a map by Julius Schorzman.
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CCBY-SA 2.5). From Wikipedia
Commons (2005).
Communicating common lessons is essential among design/planning professionals. In
fact, part of the impetus for this dissertation was to have the voices of these professionals heard.
Grace (engineer) discussed this in the context of the 100 Resilient Cities Program:
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Sharing learning [among professionals] is something I find a little bit sad about the 100
Resilient Cities program going away. That was one of the benefits—the common lessons
we can learn and can be acquired so that the risk assessment and the resilient building
process before something happens . . . then use that to transcend more broadly the
potential risks that we face in our own communities.
This exchange brought me to the question of where, in professional design/planning roles, does
educating clients fit—and how that part of the work may have been rethought as a result of the
post-Sandy experiences. As a number of participants in this study noted, for many seasoned
professionals’ “normal” practice had not really prepared them for the challenges faced in
post-disaster rebuilding or in longer term planning in climate vulnerable locations. Grace, one of
the engineers interviewed for this study, observed,
There are definitely lots of people who are resistant to it [understanding the unique design
challenges working in post-disaster recovery and planning] . . . a lot of my role has been
to educate clients and design teams in recent years about the different aspects of it . . . if
they come into it with one specific risk or resilient item . . . Then you open the door wider
by deepening the education process by widening that conversation.
Similar to Grace, Beryl (landscape architect) felt that since Sandy, she has engaged in a
design process post-disaster recovery in educating people so they can make the best informed
decisions. This educational process has been for both other professionals and for herself. While
design/planning professionals are bringing a specific level of expertise to these situations, on the
other hand they are all in a process of educating each other. Beryl observed,
So, I think that what I’ve spent, really from December 2012 up until now trying to do is
to help people understand the choices that are being offered. If it’s a project I’m
designing, say, I try to make it clear, so we have lots and lots of charts and graphs and
whatnot sections to show what all of these words mean.
She stressed the importance of sharing the meaning of fundamental nomenclature that can
be confusing and often misleading.
What does “storm surge” mean? What year are we talking about, in terms of the data? Is
it in 5, 10, 20 or 30 years? [We are] trying to equip people with knowledge so there is
less time spent arguing over misaligned facts and more time spent on evaluation of their
options. So, that’s number one, some form of education, without sounding like an
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instructor in a classroom, trying to do this in an empathic way, tailored to that specific
community. (Beryl, landscape architect)
One of the other key lessons is to not mislead people about protection but to encourage
them to investigate adaptation in the short- and long-term.
Encourage people to think about adaptation rather than protection. So, for those folks,
who have a direct personal involvement in a place, their concern is [that] they want to be
protected. They don’t want to hear that they are at risk by 2080, 2100, that notion of
being protected is really not even possible to predict. That’s where things get really
challenging. (Beryl, landscape architect)
There are no federal subsidies for people who rent their homes or those who lose their
businesses and do not own the space or the land. Those who rent, live in NYCHA housing, or
own a business but not the space or the land the business is located on, will not be eligible for
government subsidies in the same manner as owners would be. While people may carry
homeowner’s insurance, they might not be aware that this does not usually cover flooding. Beryl
(landscape architect) explained the delicate challenge of getting this across to people already
reeling from the storm:
I think it’s important to keep in mind, some people are homeowners that could have a
choice of buyout or relocation. There is another whole very large group of folks that can’t
move because there is no alternative for them. We can’t just say, “Too bad, so sad, you
live in a vulnerable place and there’s nothing we can really do about it.” That’s a huge
issue that I think the city really has to grapple with.
We further discussed the importance of not being lulled into a false sense of complacency
and for design/planning professionals to have conversations with people within communities as
honestly as possible. In this regard, it is important to admit to not having all the answers.
The issues surrounding intergenerational communities and how to have this tough
conversation with communities that may not survive staying in place several generations from
now has also been raised within this study. These are not easy conversations for design
professionals to have and in many cases, the data changes based upon the science.
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Beryl reflected,
If someone [a design professional] goes in and says, “Well, we don’t have all the
answers, and what we’re doing now, we’re planning for the next 10 to 20 years.” In a lot
of intergenerational communities, that’s not going to suffice. So, how do you deal with
that? You need to be honest but because you are dealing initially with a traumatized
group, you don’t want to, have people feel like, they’ve been traumatized again.
I asked Beryl, as I did others in the study, how equipped she felt for communicating these
ideas. Her response was,
Well, I feel very strongly that designers are very well equipped to explain things. To
explain a problem, to offer alternatives, and to help communities, again, understand what
their options are. That’s not to say that those options chosen to move forward may not be
the ones that we feel are most appropriate. But at least we’re giving a community the
tools to push back. (Beryl, landscape architect)
Trust—how it is built, maintained, or lost—has been a theme throughout this research
and more broadly, throughout the post-Sandy work of design/planning professionals.
Communicating technically challenging and emotionally stressful ideas takes a lot of trust
between the designers/planners and the recipients of these messages, the community.
Designers/planners are hired by a client—the Office of Management and Budget for the City of
New York, for example. A project is pre-budgeted, the funding is set, and so on. How do
designers/planners have these larger conversations and stay within these pre-set structures? Beryl
expressed her response as follows:
I think that we’re pretty good at listening . . . that communities are more likely to trust a
designer than a city agency. But, if we can’t deliver on that trust, then we have a problem.
If we [designers/planners] could be at the table earlier in the process [with the city], we
could have larger conversations about how the city should be thinking about vulnerable
pieces of geography, vulnerable populations.
Often it is not just a governmental agency that is not addressing a site’s vulnerability. It
can also be the planning team working on the design. This reflects an earlier theme of educating
not just oneself, the community, and the client, but other design/planning professionals.
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As part of the Design Commission I was reviewing a project in Red Hook [hit hard by
Sandy]. I said to them [the design team presenting], “How could you possibly present this
project without presenting its vulnerability? . . . I can’t review this project until you tell
me how you’re addressing its vulnerability.” (Beryl, landscape architect)
What shocked me most in Beryl’s vignette was the client agency’s response. These are
the people who as the public servants are supposed to be the custodians of the communities they
serve.
The client agency said, “Let me see if I understand what you’re saying. Are you saying
that this project is supposed to protect Red Hook?” I said, “No, but it’s got to have an
approach within the design as to how it’s going to respond to these existing
vulnerabilities.” (Beryl, landscape architect)
Beryl went on to describe that the project she had worked on in Red Hook was designed
with elevations that were lower than most elevations in the city. She explained to the team that
they were designing in a community that was already vulnerable and impacted heavily by Sandy
and that there were guidelines. I asked if she had felt discouraged or conflicted by this
experience. Beryl noted that she was “not conflicted but felt an urgency that she had not felt in
many years.” In that context, she shared the story of a project on the Lower East Side. It was not
a predictable outcome. It was a choice the community made after assessing the information
shared by the design team.
I think Sandy hit about a week after we were given a project on the Lower East Side. It
was flooded. Over the course of the next year, 2013 it was a robust engagement process.
We reached out to the Chinese-American community—the kids that went to school in the
neighborhood but didn’t live in the neighborhood . . . [and to] all the NYCHA buildings
because they were also not attending the public meetings. (Beryl, landscape architect)
Beryl is describing a very detailed and democratic engagement process in which
alternatives were discussed and exhibited during the meetings. People were asked to vote on the
programs. At the end of the process there were four alternatives. She further reflected,
What really struck me is that the community voted for the river ecology scheme in spite
of the fact that the river had flooded them… to let the water into the site . . . it was like
we were playing with fire, right? This is the body of water that had damaged a
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community for four months. Now, we’re actually welcoming that water into the site as
part of an educational process, as part of a way to engage with water, et cetera. (Beryl,
landscape architect)
The community wanted a park that was just for them, that would give them a sense of
pride, that would help educate their children about the water. And so, for them, being in an
environment where they could watch the processes of nature was something that they felt
outweighed the negative impact.
And because we were going to provide a buffer on the backside, they felt that the
trade-off was worth it. But, a lot of it had to do with education of the next generation. It
was very touching, it was probably one of the most interesting experiences I had post
Sandy, because rather than the other communities I worked with who said, protect me,
protect me, protect me. This community said, educate me. (Beryl, landscape architect)
Beryl was transparent in her discussion of the challenges of working with public agencies. The
narrative about the project on the Lower East Side goes to what will be discussed below under
Pillar 3 (societal), Theme 2—the intersection between nature and the built environment.
I asked then what the biggest take-away from this project was that she would want to
share with other design/planning professionals as part of this study. Beryl responded as follows:
I do remember one woman. She was actually a woman who lives in one of the NYCHA
projects said, “I just want a place where I can see the horizon, and I can just be.” And
I’ve never forgotten that. [She said] “I just want to see an expansive space. I want to let
my kids run around . . . I just want to be.” That woman has actually made me go on to
think about a lot of things, which is, are we effectively over designing out public space.
I followed up, asking if this compared to her other post-Sandy experiences? Had they all
been this positive?
Yes, it’s a good story and it helped balance some of the tougher experiences we had on
Hunts Point, and certainly The Rockaways, Breezy Point. What was tough were the
people. Facing people who were really hurting because of all that they had lost and
experienced. The people on the Lower East Side were also hurting, but there are different
degrees of suffering and loss. (Beryl, landscape architect)
I discussed with Beryl how to grasp and deal with the high level of aggression that could
be provoked in these meetings. She shared her own residual feelings about public meetings
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having grown up in a NYCHA community. Outsiders, she regretted, would come in and make
promises that were never kept. They would “study you to death” and then nothing ever changed.
There was a rabid determination, like we won’t be put down, we will fight, we will come
back. It was extremely macho, extremely suspicious. Anything that came out of the
mouths of the Parks Department or FEMA was mistrusted . . . people felt that the
response had been too slow. It comes down to trust, people feeling heard, believing they
are sincerely being asked, listened to, and not lied to. (Beryl, landscape architect)
It should be noted that the FEMA regulations in the context of New York City have been
raised as problematic by other design/planning professionals who participated in the study. This
comes out in the NYC SIRR report Stronger, More Resilient (PlaNYC, 2013) which implied that
New York City and the federal government need to better align their objectives. These issues are
further compounded by flood insurance and the national flood insurance programs.
Robert, one of the architects interviewed for this study, further explored the importance
of designers/planners making people more aware of their options and helping to educate the
public. He described this as getting a seat at the table on community planning boards and
planning agencies.
More people need to get involved with local community planning boards and become
members of various planning agencies. It is important, as architects . . . getting the word
out about the growing vulnerabilities we face . . . it’s a requirement that architects and
planners have to take on to make people aware. We are the ones that have the knowledge,
we need to get that knowledge out to the masses somehow. (Robert, architect)
Robert and I discussed how much of a bubble New York City is in. I asked him how he
would deal with climate deniers. Earlier in this dissertation note was made of Mayor of Tangier
Island in the Chesapeake Bay, James “Ooker” Eskridge a climate-change denier on an island that
is rapidly submerging (Johnson, 2018). I asked Robert how he reconciled the position of climate
deniers in the conversation of getting the word out to community groups. He replied,
You have the climate deniers, who will literally get into fist fights with you if you even
bring up the topic. . . I’ve had situations like that with my own family. . . It presents a
challenge, but architects and planners should seek opportunities to really bring this out
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into the open with community groups and specifically addressing planning and zoning
boards. The facts are the facts whether you attribute it to climate change or not. (Robert,
architect)
The phenomenon of climate change denial is widespread enough in the United States that there is
a strong likelihood that community members and even some professional designers/planners
might be skeptics. Yet, no one I spoke with in the study claimed to be climate deniers or reported
significant pushback after Sandy in public engagement in the New York area on the reality of
anthropogenic climate change. Instead, there was a sense of unavoidably heightened awareness
that storms of increasing intensity would be faced.
I think that there is a lot more awareness than what there was before [Sandy], building
codes have been changed—that is good. There is a lot more awareness about equity,
environmental justice, and design justice. I think that there’s a realization that, in a lot of
communities economically disrupted that they’ve been neglected for so long, that when
there is a disaster, it’s even worse. (Penelope, architect)
I asked Penelope what role she felt architects needed to play in this as part of their
inherent design strategy. She responded,
[In economically disrupted communities,] they don’t have, they don’t know, necessarily,
where the resources are. If you don’t have your paperwork, if you don’t have certain
things in order, you can’t get help. You don’t know how to get it. It’s like how to help
them through this process. That’s not really for architects; that’s more a question about
community organizers. Architects need to look at where people cannot shelter in place.
(Penelope, architect)
Within many of the economically disrupted communities, as referred to by Penelope,
people don’t leave their homes for safer ground because they have nowhere to go or no way to
get to a safer space within the community. I followed up, asking Penelope how she thought
designers/planners could contribute to this strategy.
One of the things I’m finding after Sandy actually, the libraries became shelters. And
that’s not something that we’re all thinking about. What are those spaces that you can
build like cooling centers or heating centers or shelters or information centers? How you
build to accommodate for that, is important. I feel like, as architects we can be more
facilitators between government and communities. (Penelope, architect)
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Brianna’s thoughts in terms of implementing design strategies in response to Sandy are
also ones of incredible frustration.
I know that the dollars are astounding in terms of what we’ve looking at to actually get
projects off the ground and construct it, but at the same time, there’s too much planning,
and too much talk, and too much lack of actual action on the ground. (Brianna, architect)
This goes back to an earlier point raised about post-Sandy lethargy of designers/planners
being related to funding.
There is a wide range of resilience, not just flood protection. For instance, putting solar
lamp posts out, that should have been done from the day Sandy hit. Or, dealing with green
infrastructure on a much wider greater scale. And flood protection, there’s a huge one, and
with the Army Corps of Engineers’ new study maybe that’s going to push something in
one direction, but [not] at the moment. (Brianna, architect)
I then asked Brianna about the progress specifically in Red Hook in Brooklyn, as she has
been engaged in efforts there since Sandy. She recounted,
I was at the Mayor’s office, December 2018, when they were presenting their flood
protection system. I was like, I’m done talking about this, we all know what needs to
happen and you’re not taking any action. You can raise a street six inches, 18 inches, and
I know that the FEMA money is restricting you, but you need to come to the table with
another solution because that’s not the solution. (Brianna, architect).
While Red Hook recently created its own community recovery and disaster response plan (Ready
Red Hook, n.d.), Brianna was also referencing new development coming into Red Hook since
Hurricane Sandy.
What they [the city] are saying is, “Oh, we don’t have to use our own money, or spend our
own money because each developer will come in and they will build their own sort of
raised buildings that could then be connected through a wall system that they would have
to build and that would protect the community.”
This kind of building of approach would not include existing building stock of NYCHA housing
or the middle-income wood frame homes on Brianna’s street. It is an approach that can be
perceived as favoring the wealthy and that does not extend risk reduction to the entire
community.
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Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 1. 2: Design strategies and challenges. We
can’t “fight the next war based on the last war” because no two storms are alike and, thus, the
strategies and challenges are as unique as the communities and the individuals that are impacted.
That said, there are lessons learned that are translatable to a variety of storm related events. What
is clear from this study—and reflected in this theme—is that there is no room for complacency.
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.3: It’s not just about design . . . it’s about data. A
main thread through this study has been the tension between the aspirational and the pragmatic.
Part of the pragmatism in the context of design strategy in response to Sandy is tracking and
evaluating the data within the decision making in the recovery and rebuilding process.
I’ve been in so many different situations where I’ve been presenting in conferences and
brought up . . . the importance of benchmarking, tracking data and evaluating our
decisions in a more pragmatic way. People just say, “Well that takes all the creativity out
of what we do.” But at the end of the day, it really doesn’t do any of that. (Samuel,
architect)
I questioned Samuel on how he felt this had a particular impact in regard to Sandy and
responses to rebuilding or planning in climate vulnerable communities. He responded:
Benchmarking of information or data that we’re getting from other places globally, but
then also using local or contextualized benchmarks so that we can understand how the
situation is progressing to a specific area, or a specific region. It’s an interesting question
because the concept for all of this actually started before Sandy. (Samuel, architect)
In the context of Sandy, Samuel explained how, as a design professional, he would
use data to inform communities so that they have a sense of ownership and he would then create
design solutions based on that shared data.
This is exactly the basis for setting up a platform, that doesn’t just track physical
development; it tracks policy issues; it tracks issues of income, issues of diversity. We
agreed to do this with Red Hook. To develop this platform, which, by the way is pro bono.
The data was going to be collected bottom up. We were going to build the analysis around
the views and the aspirations of the community. They are right now, very worried about
gentrification and overdevelopment. (Samuel, architect)

203
What Samuel described is a platform that is built to capture, store, and analyze data
creating a matrix of decisions that provide the 10 or 15 things we need to do to get the outcomes
we want across the different sectors within a community. Samuel was expressing that the
design/planning profession had lost a degree of rigor.
After speaking with Beryl, I began to have a deeper understanding into Samuel’s
concerns. Still, it seemed difficult to fathom how this could go unnoticed. In terms of the
importance of data in the context of design she noted the following:
We realized that the high tide was going deeper into the wetland than we had anticipated.
We went back and realized that our survey and all of our design drawings had been based
on the 1929 NAVD (North American Vertical Datum) elevation. Since 1929,
sea-level had gone up a foot. So, our tidal wetland was essentially a foot off, just from the
word go, as a result of using a 1929 survey. (Beryl, landscape architect)
That was Beryl’s first glimmer of awakening to the realities of not only sea-level rise but
to the data used to produce the design. She went on to describe another type of data vulnerability
in Rockaway.
When Sandy hit, I’ll never forget going out to Rockaway to do, what the Mayor called,
an emergency beach restoration. Everyone was of course highly traumatized and anxious,
and folks were just throwing numbers around like crazy. They were saying, “Well the
flood waters went to 13—no, they went to 14. We have to build this to 16.” (Beryl,
landscape architect)
It became obvious at that juncture that no one was really using the same baseline data.
And after Sandy, everyone realized that the Borough Datum System was just beyond antiquated,
and that we need to be on the National Datum. So, that’s why, as Beryl explained, everyone now
uses NAVD 88, which is the last time the benchmark was created. So, all surveys now,
throughout the United States, are based on that baseline number.
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It’s not just about design . . . it’s about safety training/deployment. The lack of
accessible data was something that Vic (architect) deliberated on. How do you determine the
damage? How does it compare to other similar situations locally and nationally? Based upon that
data, can we salvage our homes? Can we fix it? Is it reparable? What does the data show? Vic
found answers to a number of these questions by embarking on a safety training program.
I became a certified disaster service worker. And the reason I took it from California is
that New York State at that time did not have any kind of Good Samaritan system. So
that means that if I, as an architect, came on the scene to help people identify dangerous
building conditions, even if I weren’t charging for my services, I could be held liable and
sued. I’m not sure New York State has fully satisfied the problem. There is a program
CEDAR (The Code Enforcement Disaster Assistance Response) that allows us to provide
disaster service in the event of an event. (Vic, architect)
As Vic noted, “It’s a bureaucratic nuance to be able to affect a solution.” Vic also took the
HURRIPLAN training course—one that I also took. This training has been described as follows:
“HURRIPLAN Resilient Building Design for Coastal Communities provides the necessary
training to integrate resilient community planning and building design strategies for hurricaneprone sites” (American Institute of Architects, n.d., para. 2). Describing this experience, Vic
stated,
HURRIPLAN was a real eye-opener. It’s basic common sense training that kind of opens
your eyes to areas that you just never thought of before. Like, evacuating people, where
do you evacuate them? How do you make that work? How do you build environments
that are setup to support people that have been displaced? Services related to that
displacement that we just never thought about, cell phone service, pets?
When design/planning professionals are trained in the safety assessment program,
training, and deployment, you are training them not just to handle the psychological aspect but
also to function as a team and the strategy for working with homeowners who may have lost
everything. Eli (architect) also addressed the need for specific training:
You are in a team, a minimum of three, one or two of you set off to do your job, the other
one is tasked to just listen, talk to the homeowner, neighbor, directly affected. They are
seeing the devastation, realizing what they’ve lost, and all of those pieces and all of their
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grief and transformation is happening right there. As a team, you are training to be there
to listen to them. (Eli, architect)
I asked Eli how widespread this training was for designers/planners. There was not much
mention of this in the interviews by others, and frankly, it had not been on my list of initial
questions for I had not previously understood how essential this type of training was.
I think what you’re bringing up is right on. And the profession does have a role in that.
You are bringing your expertise to evaluate rapidly, is that building safe? And right now,
it’s not safe for, or maybe you can go in and retrieve your goods and its needs a later
inspection. Or, don’t go in there, it’s about a life safety and immediate relief of pressure
on the shelter systems. (Eli, architect)
Eli noted that a lot of architects have trained in New York State. He estimating that
almost 300 architects in the last 30 years have fulfilled that role. Across the nation, AIA National
has put together a program that has been pushing very hard to train architects all across the
United States to do the secondary response effort. Eli further discussed the leadership role the
profession has to play with more climate-impactful events happening locally, nationally, and
internationally:
You’re not calling the architect to build an addition onto your house or pick out what
your new porch might look like. It’s not only how the building operates, how all the
systems work, but is it still functioning properly, is it safe? That is a really powerful thing
and not a lot of people out there can do it. There’s a huge leadership position that the
profession needs to step up and step in and I’m glad many of us are.
After 9/11, the design/planning community realized that they were less prepared to tackle
a disaster than they should have been. In response, one of this study’s participants, Ross
(architect), formed a task force called the Disaster Preparedness Task Force. Without knowing it
at the time, this actually became a critical step for setting up a structure that would serve
designers/planners well in the post-Sandy context of disaster preparedness. During this time only
three states had this type of manual: California, Texas, and Kansas.
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The manual was delivered to the AIA chapter and state offices. Ross met with the New
York State Office of Emergency Management to discuss the adaptation of the manual. This
Disaster Assistance Handbook was published to help professionals better prepare and respond to
disasters (American Institute of Architects, 2017). As Ross explained it, the reality is this: If
something like Sandy happens again in New York, the New York Governor calls the California
Governor to activate the California sanctions for second responders that were trained in New
York to be sent to respond in New York.
In 2010, the Task Force morphed into a standing committee of the AIA’s New York
Chapter, titled the Design for Risk and Reconstruction Committee. Ross and Eli became the
co-chairs. I also have been engaged with this committee since Sandy.
It’s not just about design . . . it’s about deployment of codes and policy. Changes to the
building codes and policy were crucial after Sandy. Like data assessment, it is certainly not the
“sexy side” of design but it is critical to implementing design decisions and planning approaches.
This issue was brought up and discussed by several participants. Codes and policy issues are
critical to creating structural changes in the system. After Sandy, the Mayor and City Council
asked Urban Green Council13 to convene a Building Resiliency Task Force that would look at
changes in the building code for best practices in flood conditions.
The first component is policy. I think a lot has been done [since Sandy] that everyone
should feel good about. What I mean by that is zoning changes, the building code
changes, design guidelines being integrated into capital investments. Those kinds of
things, that had to get done or should have got done so what goes up, new, in the future,
is not subject to the same type of damage that happened with Sandy. (Paul, engineer)

13

The Urban Green Council is a non-profit organization working to “transform buildings for a sustainable
future in New York and around the world . . . we convene, research, advocate and educate” (Urban Green,
2019, paras. 1–2).
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How then, I asked Paul, when one is looking at sea level rise and climate change do you
work with science to inform policy from the perspective of designers/planners? He responded,
You’re looking at sea level rise, climate change, climate stressors that inform building
codes. We can’t predict the future, but we sure have science to get us to understand what
the range in the future might be. And then, let science inform policy. That’s what I mean
by good policy change. Science-based policy, so we build in codes and zoning changes
and what you can do if you build, the must dos or the can’t dos that are now in law. (Paul,
engineer)
The manual, Climate Resiliency Design Guidelines, was first released in 2017 with
revisions twice since (New York City Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 2019). Paul
and his firm were integrally engaged with that effort.
Paul described the identification of climate datasets that would be needed by the
design/planning community in the quest for climate resiliency. Future climate data was included
in the framework that would take into account heat, precipitation, and sea level rise/coastal storm
surge. A benefit-cost analysis methodology was developed from that.
Grace, an engineer, also brought up the role and challenge of professionals establishing
codes that would mitigate future climate-related disasters. She observed, “One of the challenges
is that the building code has been designed specifically to protect life safety but not designed to
think about the future and how risks are changing, think climate change, sea level rise.” Grace
described how these challenges varied in terms of the owner and the building type:
They [developers] are not necessarily willing to go above and beyond the codes to
provide long term protection for a property they are just looking to flip today or
tomorrow. If it’s an institution or a hospital they often have a much longer term view or a
real estate developer who is looking to hold on to the property for a long time it is as an
easier conversation to have with them because they care about the long term ROI.
I then asked how design/planning professionals could best address this in response to
design strategies after Sandy. Grace responded,
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Climate science is so complex. And as engineers I don’t think we are in a position to
comment on the work that has already been done other than it is science and evidence
based. We should be on board with it because it is also what we do, right?
Designers/planners are still hampered by regulations or the lack of regulations to include
the data and projections into their design.
Grace referenced what some cities, for example Boston, are now requiring in terms of
future planning. It goes beyond guidelines. The Boston Development and Planning Agency
requires climate change projections into any new significant developments.
While codes are vital, so is policy, which is what Grace was underscoring in her example
with the Boston Development and Planning Agency, “that until we move to a point that banks,
insurers, governments, departments of buildings are all on board with requiring it, it is very hard
to actually change the tide.” In our interview, Liz, an engineer, also connected building codes
and disaster preparedness:
I was a co-leader collecting data on Hurricane Sandy. I worked with NYC Department
of Buildings post-Sandy and heavily involved with the NYC Building Code. There have
been two revisions of the NYC Building Code, one in 2015 and the other this year in
2019 that is trying to incorporate new information from Hurricane Sandy.
An elevator or water system that is not to working renders a building useless. It also puts
people’s lives at risk. There were many people during Sandy that were trapped in residential
buildings where they were unable to walk down the steps and the elevators were non-functioning
as was the water and heat. Liz elaborated on this issue in the context of life safety. The question
of defining life safety is critical to the discussion on codes and policy.
Life safety referring to if the extreme happens the building is going to give you a chance
of getting out of it alive. That is what it means. It doesn’t mean it is going to be
occupiable. And it doesn’t mean it is going to return to service immediately. (Liz,
engineer)
One of the issues that came up in the discussion of policy was the mechanism of
financing and execution to be tied into policy. There is the issue of funding for some of the
larger-scale projects either being cancelled or put on hold. These are shared perspectives between
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the range of design/planning disciplines. The following narrative succinctly summarizes that
viewpoint.
There is a lethargy in the mechanism of financing and execution. That causes lethargy or
sluggishness in the design profession because you have people who are no longer really
interested in trying to appropriate or go after these types of projects knowing that if they
are very large federally funded projects, that we’ve seen the failure or the stopping of
these, or so many things that get in the way. (Eli, architect)
Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.3: It’s not just about design . . . it’s about
data. As illustrated by the designers/planners within this pillar, ideas are strengthened through
the tracking of data after a disaster. It can range from the views and aspirations of the community
to the decisions and outcomes that have led to code, policy and on-the-ground training for
professionals being deployed after a disaster to assist with recovery.
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.4: Lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and
Maria. The fourth topic drawn from the coding of Pillar 2 results was the salience of Hurricanes
Katrina and Maria. Hurricane Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane that made landfall in Florida
and Louisiana in August 2005, causing catastrophic damage, particularly in New Orleans.
Hurricane Maria was a Category 5 hurricane that struck in September 2017 devastating Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Dominica. Maria was especially deadly and, like Katrina,
precipitated widespread condemnation of the federal government response.
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Learning from Hurricane Katrina. Lessons learned—both effectively, and not so
successfully—from Katrina, in subsequent responses to climate disasters, could be a lengthy
study in itself. Therefore, the focus in this section is on the participants whose experiences of
Katrina informed decisions and insights during and after Sandy. This discussion is organized
under the headings of each participant’s name and profession to describe the lessons each drew
from Katrina.
Hannah, planner. Hannah volunteered a number of times in New Orleans. While Hannah
was not there during the actual storm, six months later she began to volunteer on the ground.
While the water had receded, the damage was still obvious. Sandy was seven years after that.
I volunteered with Habitat for Humanity to build houses. I think the thing about New
Orleans that’s pretty amazing is their sense of community. In neighborhoods people
really come together. I think one of the things that I thought was amazing, people in New
Orleans all had hurricane insurance, which is mostly for wind damage, you know, roof,
stuff like that. But nobody had flood insurance. (Hannah, planner)
Hannah also emphasized that one aspect often forgotten about Katrina was that the levees
were breached largely because of prior corruption and flawed engineering. This was summarized
in a report by the American Society of Civil Engineers, Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel (2007).
With all of America’s political polarization around the issues of climate-impactful events,
it has never been more important for designers/planners to remain vigilant as they plan and
design in climate-vulnerable communities whether pre- or post-disaster. As Hannah and I
reminded each other, Katrina is a cautionary tale.
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Ross, architect. Ross had gone down to New Orleans, not under contract, but by invitation
to speak on panels or to advise communities on assessment and strategies for rebuilding. He had
a group of friends who were victims of Katrina and another group of friends who were the
professionals working on planning for the future of New Orleans. He relayed to me this story of
exasperation:
One day without any plan, I found myself screaming at my friends in New Orleans saying,
“Wake up, wake up!” You’ve had a terrible, terrible tragedy and disaster and life is never
going to be the way it was before. You can’t have your old New Orleans back; it’s gone!
You have to look to the future of the New Orleans you’re going to get. You can’t do it by
keeping your heads in the sand about what you want of the old days. (Ross, architect)
As he reflected years later in our interview on this dialogue, he stated,
I don’t know. It was at the time, the side I came down on at the time . . . and then the
whole Ninth Ward idiocy with Brad Pitt and the failure of that to do anything other than
hire some fancy architects.14 The urban attitude, the urban strategy, was wrong. And not
as many people came back to that area wanting exactly what they’d had. New Orleans,
for a while, became a bit of the primer for how we went about looking at a city. (Ross,
architect)
Susan, urban strategist. Susan, who was on the ground for both Katrina and Sandy,
brings an interesting perspective. Susan was on a fellowship with a national foundation and it
began the day the levees broke. The foundation was from the Gulf Coast and Susan was their
person on the ground. She reflected,
How do people self-organize to realize their aspirations and meet their needs? I got a
bird’s eye view of that because so many of their systems had been broken as a result of
Katrina, and many of which had been broken before the storm but then were completely
shattered after the infrastructure failures. In the case of New Orleans, everything was
wrecked, people’s homes were gone. It was a massive devastation. (Susan, urban
strategist)

14

Actor Brad Pitt established a non-profit organization called the Make It Right Foundation in the Lower
Ninth Ward after Katrina. For a description and critical analysis of this initiative and its problems see
Fuqua (2011) and Menza (2019).
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That was of course quite different from Sandy, where most people went back to their
homes and the city was still able to function. New Orleans could not. When Susan came to New
York City it was to focus on urban livability:
We found in New Orleans resilience became the best term, but the recovery needed to
hasten. In other words, the community there wanted the city back, but they appreciated
that they didn’t want the city back to the way it had been, but they weren’t willing to just
have structures pushed upon them by outside experts.
As will be noted in the next pillar, concerning resilience, it has taken on both positive and
negative overtones in the design/planning profession. It is therefore important in the context of
this discussion of Katrina as part of the impact of Sandy upon design/planning professionals to
fully note the concept of resilience as described by Susan:
In New Orleans we started using the term resilience but was trying to create something
that wasn’t an end state but something rather we would choose as a filter of what to
rebuild. What New Orleans was doing was incubating its own made in Louisiana
approach to this which was quite innovative. I became a convert to the right to return the
choice to come back to your home and be engaged in that conversation of resiliency.
Paul, engineer. Paul, a former Colonel in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, indicated
that a lesson from Katrina for him was the need for greater transparency between
designers/planners and the community:
Engineers and designers have to figure out how to communicate in layman’s terms what
their solutions are going to look like and what the impact might be. And what the risk is,
even after those solutions are in place. (Paul, engineer)
Paul explained how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built interactive tools so that
people within the community could see it and understand what it meant in terms of water in and
around your property. You could go online and put in your address and it would show you the
water depth around your residence in different levels of floods through a simulation. It doesn’t
make people happy to know they are not completely protected but it also respects people enough
to value their lives by not creating a false sense of security where there maybe none.
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Melissa, architect. Melissa has written about New Orleans in a number of books
including New Orleans Under Reconstruction: The Crisis of Planning (Reese, Sorkin, &
Fontenot, 2014). She shared with me a number of similarities she found during Sandy.
There are extended family networks that are in need of the properties. So, you might get
somebody owning three or four houses or these little bungalows in Sheepshead Bay next
to each other. It’s legacy and it’s their only form of wealth. It was shocking, but in New
Orleans and Sheepshead Bay, the people didn’t necessarily have bills of sale or deeds so
they’re kind of stuck. (Melissa, architect)
Melissa also told a story about the Alexander family in New Orleans East, who owned
about 20 properties. This goes to the importance of intergenerational communities and their
preservation. She explained,
If there is a young person and they want to move out of the house they’d live in somebody
else’s. And then they would be able to buy one of the houses when they came of age. It
was a whole little self-sustaining socio-economic group of people who build and take care,
repair, and trade houses, employ each other, take care of each other’s kids. (Melissa,
architect)
Esther, activist/storyteller. Working with Sandy Storyline, Esther had spent many months
in New Orleans doing a lot of post-Katrina storytelling around the housing crises. People felt
disenfranchised and that they had lost their voice. Decisions were being made for them in terms
of the rebuilding: schools were privatized, public housing was demolished, people got sick from
FEMA trailers.
One of the projects that grew out of Sandy Storyline was a project called Land of
Opportunity in New Orleans. On the 10-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina we
developed a project called Katrina/Sandy. It’s a timeline project where you can see the
Sandy Storyline alongside Katrina. That is one of the big reasons we started Sandy
Storyline as we knew housing would be a big issue. (Esther, activist/storyteller)
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Leah, architect/planner. Leah has spent a lot of time in New Orleans, initially to help her
friends with their flooded house and thought she would be there for only a few weeks but that
turned into on-and-off for five years. She stopped working there in 2012. She recounted,
When I went down there, I didn’t understand. Obviously you can’t. You can’t understand
what these things are like. One of the many differences between Katrina and Sandy was
that in New Orleans people were forcibly evacuated. It took people a long time to get
back, if they ever did. (Leah, architect/planner)
Leah spoke specifically about the public housing residents. I shared with her how I had
been part of a team that went to New Orleans to do a HUD-sponsored study for a WPA art deco
public housing development. After Leah walked the HUD study site it became clear that the
buildings needed to be dried out but would be livable again. They were not damaged in a manner
that would have required demolition. Our assignment was short-lived. The buildings were
bulldozed to the ground. Leah then further reflected on the direct action of affected residents
after Katrina:
One of the things that we were doing in New Orleans that was such a great demonstration
is that housing residents . . . [was building] these tent cities on the neutral ground in front
of their development. Then they would break into the buildings whenever they could, cut
down the fencing, climb their way in, and try to occupy their units again. I don’t know,
it’s hard to fight, fight, fight, fight. (Leah, architect/planner)
Learning from Hurricane Maria. As noted, Maria was a Category 5 hurricane in
September 2017 devastating Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Dominica. Four of the
participants in my research had been influenced by and made note of their experience with
Hurricane Maria.
Eli, architect. Eli described getting colleagues ready for deployment to Puerto Rico after
Hurricane Maria and sharing documents that he had referenced in some of his own safety
assessment/deployment training earlier discussed:
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If you are going to go down, I need to tell you guys something. You need to take this
with you, and you need to read it before you get on this plane. And they did, and they
thanked me backwards and forwards for it because I gave them the psychological stuff.
(Eli, architect)
Eli had explained to them that what they were going to be running into was “not The
Rockaways”:
You’re going to go into a country where you don’t speak the language. You’re going into
the jungles and you’re going into that had been totally wiped out and the federal authority
hasn’t reached them yet. You are going to reach them first. When you get there, the Urban
Search and Rescue, has not gone all the way thoroughly through the jungles and the rural
community sites. You may be running across dead animals and dead people. (Eli, architect)
While this particular group of design/planning professionals didn’t run into the worst of
what they could have, they ran into grief-stricken people seeing someone from the outside
coming with aide for the very first time bringing solar panels. What they needed was food and
water.
Kaasar, planner. In the context of disaster recovery, Kaasar looked at both Sandy and
Katrina as what he termed “shadow cases” to the experiences in Puerto Rico.
Sandy is, in a way, the storm that devastated a very important area of the United States.
Nonetheless, it is a different area of the United States if we compare it to New Orleans,
Louisiana, and the Gulf area and of course, Puerto Rico. I’ve begun looking deeper into
the Katrina experience an interesting point of comparison, into what is happening on the
ground in Puerto Rico. (Kaasar, planner)
Kaasar underscored how the colonial racism they experience in Puerto Rico as a
commonwealth of the United States was not too dissimilar from the way in which the U.S.
government had responded to their own citizens who are part of marginalized communities and
communities of color in New Orleans post-Katrina.
Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer. For Thomas, Hurricane Maria’s impacts
struck close to home.
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I get a call from my father. He says, “It’s really bad here, the neighborhood is flattened.”
He says there’s no power, no water, the elderly on the block, some of them can’t get
access, they’re diabetic, they have no power. The hospital doors [were] closed and it’s a
hospital for 60,000 people. We found it was much worse than what he described—it was
the entire island. It was flat, like pushed back to the stone age. (Thomas, landscape
architect/urban designer)
Puerto Rico is an island about the size of Connecticut. Thomas rhetorically called on me
to imagine a devastation like what Maria wrought, all across that state. He continued, “There
were food lines and there were mothers with five kids waiting to get water and this clips onto a
little bit of my experience with Hurricane Andrew growing up, getting that water in the first few
weeks.” In terms of navigating on the ground, Thomas said that he interacted with folks he had
worked with under the Obama Administration, who were still in power and had been engaged in
post-Sandy efforts.
Penelope, architect. After Hurricane Maria, Penelope was active in the recovery
conversations as she was personally impacted. She convened regular Puerto Rico expat meetings
to talk about empowering people there and translating resilience through culture and through
looking at just transition, and recovery. She explained,
Personally, it was a pretty big hit for me and my family. We couldn’t communicate with
anybody on the island. The only way people could communicate was with hand radios
and Facebook for those people who had access. So, there were literally Facebook groups
where people would just read off lists of names, to say, these people are here with us. So,
we were moderating and scouring Facebook groups, to try and figure out who was okay.
(Penelope, architect)
One of the root problems for Puerto Rico in coping with Hurricane Maria is that it is so
dependent on outside electricity and fuel that the disruption of transportation and transmission
was severe. Other parts of the Caribbean were not so dependent on these kinds of infrastructure.
They already had alternatives of energy, and were able to come back online, at least on the
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power side and for potable water as a result. Penelope considered disruption in Puerto Rico in
terms of both political and social economies.
They are very matriarchal in the grassroots effort that is leading the recovery. And they
are very much taking on the form of collaborative and cooperative in what’s happening in
the recovery stuff. I think that goes back to Indigenous roots if you really start to look at
it. And I think there are also understanding that you have to work with nature. And one of
the ways that that happens, how do we build in a way that can keep us connected?
(Penelope, architect)
Penelope further described this in the context of her own childhood in Puerto Rico:
Like, collecting water is really important. We had to do it out of necessity, I remember
growing up, we would go and have barrels that we would collect the water, because the
water would just shut off, for weeks. So, the resiliency concept sort of translates into a lot
of different things.
Penelope shared how her grandmother took her to a location and said, “Here, this is clean
water. It’s like a hole in a cliff. There’s like a fresh stream of water coming out of it and this is
how you get there, and if you ever need water, you come here.” Penelope reflected,
And one of the things that happened post-Maria, literally, he [someone in her family] was
trying to figure out how to get water and remembered what his grandmother said. He
went there and brought people from town and they went to this one location to get the
water. The idea is the telling of stories, passing down institutional knowledge, like
neighborhood knowledge. That’s part of understanding your history and your roots.
Learning from 9/11. The September 11 attack in New York City by the Islamic terrorist
group Al-Qaeda against the United States was probably the most impactful single event in
contemporary city history. Not only was there massive loss of life and property all within the
space of a few hours, but the shock and the pains of rehabilitating and building appropriately on
the “ground zero” site severely taxed the capacities of many different kinds of professionals, not
least those from design and planning. For me, 9/11 brought together the personal, the
professional, and the societal. How 9/11 became a catalyst for the design/planning profession
and how that impacted their response to Sandy is the subject of this section of the research. The
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focus in this section is limited to the response of one professional interviewed for this study, a
man who was enormously impacted15 by the human-made disaster of 9/11 in the context of the
natural disaster, Sandy: Ross, an architect. His description began centered on the report of a “pro
bono coalition of architecture, engineering, planning and design organizations committed to
honoring the victims of the September 11 tragedy by rebuilding a vital New York” (New York
New Visions, 2002, p. 3).
9/11 is my fulcrum . . . the first instance was New York New Visions. Everyone came
together and did such monumental work on so many sectors of response. So, in a funny
way, we kind of had a model for what to do with the man-made disaster but we weren’t
even . . . weren’t nearly prepared for the magnitude and the effect of such a monumental
natural disaster—which I think people thought would never affect New York City. (Ross,
architect)
So, I asked, how much have professional lives and practice been changed because of
9/11? He answered,
The planners, urban designers, architects, landscape architects, engineers . . . I still think
it’s something that people still feel as they are touching a hot stove or like you don’t want
to get burned. You don’t want to go through it, you don’t want to quite do it yet. It’s not
what you signed up for [as a professional] . . . but it’s a responsibility that is entirely ours.
And something that we have to do considerably more about. (Ross, architect)
Ross’s history on the World Trade Center site began when he was 18 years old for four or
five months. At the time he thought he had contributed to something that would last forever, as
he notes below, like the pyramids. He felt a personal relationship to those buildings.
I worked on the design of those two towers—the elevator system, tenant layouts, the
dramatic design for Windows on the World [the complex of venues and restaurant at the
top of the North Tower of the World Trade Center]. I think they helped define my attitude
towards architecture. Without going too much into the romance of the stone, I thought this
would be my pyramids. I said, I worked on something that will last forever. (Ross,
architect)

15

This is not to say that others among the participants were less affected or involved; Ross was selected
primarily because our interview turned to 9/11 considerably more than did other interviews.
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After 9/11, his world view was profoundly altered as was his relationship to the concept
of a building’s permanence.
I can’t tell you how profoundly it altered my view of the universe when those buildings
came down. In terms of understanding, I guess, what the Buddhist understand when they
do those sand mandalas. It’s about change and not permanence. It altered my attitude
about my work, what I’m interested in, the preparedness side of the work, the human
support side, rather than the object through the aesthetic nature. (Ross, architect)
Before Sandy, the 9/11 experience and then Katrina began to condition people in the
profession to the fact that big disasters really can happen in the continental United States.
Summary—Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.4: Lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina and Maria. Katrina was a cautionary tale for designers/planners before Sandy, not only
in terms of the level of devastation to New Orleans but also, about the vast inequities in the
aftermath of the recovery. For those designers/planners later deployed during Hurricane Maria,
the Katrina crisis provided another bookend to what has becoming an increasingly morbid story.
It is not the storm that discriminates between class, race, and wealth but how these same
communities are treated in the aftermath and the rebuilding. 9/11 established for so many
designers/planners that this kind of unthinkable devastation is possible in New York. Hurricane
Maria further underscored a sustained horror and loss of life that was met with a level of
indifference by some public leaders.
Pillar 2 (Professional) Theme 2.5: Overall reflections post-Sandy. With the passage of
time comes reflection. Urgency wanes. Lessons are (or are not) learned. The disaster once on the
front page as the hot item of the moment, goes into the archives. I asked designers/planners
within this study their own personal reflections since Sandy. Did they have any closing
statements about professional lessons they learned as design/planning professionals for
themselves and to share with others for the future.
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Grace, an engineer, stressed the ingrained and risky inclination that people have to build
and rebuild in vulnerable areas.
Exposure and vulnerabilities are increasing because we continue to build in more and
more vulnerable locations as development continues to expand and we build in places
that weren’t so smart previously. Until regulators and insurance come to the party with
government it is going to be hard to see a full resilience resolution which I think is what
is required. (Grace, engineer)
Brianna, an architect, similarly, worried about the short memory that residents, especially
new ones have about the risks of places they want to live in.
There are so many people moving to Red Hook, and all sorts of other low-lying places,
that just have no concept of what happened during Sandy. They’re like, “Oh it did, oh
that’s interesting.” And then they don’t really care. (Brianna, architect)
For Beryl, a landscape architect, what came first to mind was again the doubtful reliance
on engineering and constructing protective barriers.
It’s 525 miles of shoreline in the city, so just do the math. We have barriers flopped
around and a couple of sophisticated building [owners] said we’re not waiting around for
the city to get their act together. They’ve put in their own flood barriers. If another
hurricane came, we would be as vulnerable as before. (Beryl, landscape architect)
Hannah, a planner, also focused her response on barriers, human-made and natural, and
the foreboding prospect of their failing through time and climate change.
You have some of the Corps of Engineers-approved projects. They’re not going to build
the Big U [RBD project] the way that it was designed. You have the debate about the
barrier from Sandy Hook, NJ, the Breezy Point side. It will take 40 years. Maybe it won’t
exist anymore. I think it’s ridiculous: it’s the ocean. You can’t fight the ocean. (Hannah,
planner)
The issue of how to create resiliency for critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, is to
first understand why it has failed in the past. Lyla, an architect, boiled it down to four things:
first, the threshold you designed your building for was exceeded by the storm-related event;
second, the geography for these events has evolved—Sandy is a perfect example, a hurricane
further north than anyone had ever thought a hurricane would be; third, the extended duration of
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an event that is not measured in hours but days; and fourth, that critical infrastructure is impacted
by municipal infrastructure going down for an extended period of time.
Since Sandy, I and a number of the people interviewed for this study have observed that
major medical facilities within New York City have worked hard to upgrade their facilities and
develop resiliency plans and redundant systems with design/planning professionals. The stakes
are very high for hospitals. A massive evacuation of hospitalized patients could result in loss of
life during a disaster. When a hospital is getting billions of dollars in National Institutes of
Health grants for research, it cannot afford to lose decades of that research by inundation from a
major storm. Lyla pointed out that in Houston, the Texas Medical Center is completely off the
grid with their own powerplant which was installed after Hurricane Ike in 2008. Lyla, an
architect, saw instituting similar protection and back-up as essential in New York City.
Jeanine (landscape architect) wanted to stress the seemingly neglected but obvious fact
that Manhattan is an island. Perhaps only during a major disaster do New Yorkers, including
designers/planners, grasp this. How do you get where you need to go when travel becomes
restricted and there are checkpoints and lines? How do you get communities to be inherently
more resilient and self-sustaining? We can’t rely on evacuation. We need then to be able to
shelter in place.
I guess maybe I have always felt that New York is invincible. Now after Sandy maybe
there are just places where you can’t live anymore. I think I learned a lot more about that
than I did about design. It’s like those houses kept getting rebuilt and rebuilt, and we kept
paying for people to live on the water. (Jeanine, landscape architect)
I followed up asking how has this changed the profession—Or has it? Jeanine responded,
The one thing I didn’t say was I also see—within the design profession—that it’s become
a market. Before Sandy, yes, there were engineering firms that did work for FEMA, but it
wasn’t a New York thing. So, right after Sandy, it was more of an emotional reaction to
helping and I’m not going to say it’s a bad thing . . . now it’s getting into a new market.
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Muriel (communications specialist) stressed the pressure that community expectations
apply to professional work:
The Department of Parks is doing a study in East Harlem. Like New Orleans, it is
low-lying. These are poorer communities and it is where Hell Gate comes in and the
water table is very high. I went to a few of these meetings and it is always the community
that brings the awareness and thinking OMG are you going to be able to fund it so
something can happen? It’s how many years since Sandy? Has anything really happened?
There are good exemplars of design/planning professionals, the community, and the city,
coming together to achieve heroic results. This is from one of the landscape architects.
Sandy happened at the end of October 2012, and literally, the day before Christmas, I got
a call from the Mayor’s office, asking whether we would be part of a team, to rebuild all
of the beach access in Brooklyn, Staten Island, and The Rockaways . . . I’ve never seen
such focused collaborative, and hard work to make this happen. (Beryl, landscape
architect)
Other professional disciplines represented in this study did not bracket their experiences
with that same level of impressive outcomes. Rather, the focus was on small projects being
accomplished over time. That was how success was gauged. The model house for sustainability
that one of the architects in this study completed in Rockaway was used as a notable exemplar.
Although one landscape architect did question in this context rebuilding there at all.
It is difficult to come up with plans that take into account the possibility that rebuilding
may not be the wisest action when there is no alternative place to either move or stay and have
community-based actions in place so that communities could mobilize themselves. Eli (architect)
concluded,
There is no silver bullet. We can go through all of those analogies that we are all really,
well, at saying: we can pledge to become the greenest and most resilient county on the
planet. But then to get there it comes down to the common person [and] engaging them
with the profession.
With professional guidance comes transparency about real-world constraints. For
example, while a budget of $20 million may sound like enough to make a community safe, in
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reality it will take years to build and it may protect you to a degree but not to the point of the
next Sandy having no impacts.
I asked Paul how we could do better than for the next storm, yet with measures that do
not cost billions and/or take too many years to build? He responded,
If we do a little bit better planning and preparation for the next storm, we might be able to
move certain assets that are part of your life and important to you, out of the way, and get
you and your family out of the way, so there is less threat to your life. You may not get
all of your risk reduced, but you can get some of it reduced. That’s the buying down risk.
(Paul, engineer)
And Roberta also summed up her concerns and frustrations ending on a note that captures
much of what the design/planning professionals I spoke with have as abiding aspirations and
concerns.
I really think that we have to get quite savvy when it comes to the way to finance
resilience and make financing resilience part of the beginning conversation not what you
do when you’ve figured out what you wanted to design. (Roberta, architect)
Design/planning professionals do not go into their profession with a focus on
disaster-recovery or to work within communities impacted and traumatized by natural disasters.
Yet as this pillar shows, there is a willingness and a commitment to be on the front lines
developing and implementing approaches that will guide communities through these
unprecedented challenges. There are no simple answers and no quick solutions. Yet despite
challenges and frustrations there remains a cautionary optimism.
Pillar 3: Societal Impacts
This pillar comprises local and global impacts pertaining to design efficacy—and justice
—especially for vulnerable and marginalized communities. My interviews revealed that
participant professionals were especially moved to discuss issues of equity and social justice.
Additionally, the other themes that emerged under Pillar 3 were at the intersection of the natural
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and built environments; the meaning of and struggle for resiliency; the importance of thinking
internationally (i.e., about approaches being used in other parts of the world), and finally,
leadership—how the greatest adaptative leadership challenge—using Heifetz’s (1994)
terminology—is being met, and how it must change. Figure 4.9 summarizes the themes that were
identified with Pillar 3.

Figure 4.9. Themes identified for Pillar 3 (Societal).
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.1: Vulnerable and marginalized communities. How does
one map power, authority, and silence? Who becomes authorized to know? What voices have
been silenced? How can we uncover the silence? How can we privilege the unprivileged voices
in the system? What are the voices that are not heard? These are the core questions that
participants returned to when considering Sandy’s impact on their own consciousness and the
social structures of community.
I think there is a part of me that’s a bit tired, a bit kind of fatigued by the constant
sensitivity training or desire to become aware of somebody else’s reality all the time.
Instead of just allowing people who have a different reality than yours to exist in their
reality. (Talib, architect)
Talib’s words resonate with what Anthony (2017) wrote in The Earth, the City, and the
Hidden Narrative of Race. Anthony referred to the invisibility of African Americans in the
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context of narratives about the city and how that “reinforced the perception of Black
communities as contained by and subordinate to so-called white people rather than as actors in
their own right” (p. 185). The reclamation or space and place after a climate impactful event for
marginalized communities or communities of color can also reinforce the racialization of space
and how the dynamics of class and race have been reflected multi-generationally in the built
environment. As this research shows, vulnerable communities, whether denoted as such because
of climate-sensitive location or due to class and race, face the greatest challenges prior to and
after an event such as Hurricane Sandy.
So, you just kind of create your own reality and take care of your spaces, take care of
yourself and allow or empower others to do what they want to do with their own spaces
and their own realities. If people are underprivileged or underpowered then give them
more privilege and power. (Talib, architect)
Participant and social activist, Joseph, chose to frame the post-Sandy work in this more
connective way of seeing and being. He asked,
On a more universal level, how can we problem solve better with people who don’t look
like me? I’ve experienced this as an organizer. You don’t know what it’s like living here;
you live five blocks away; you have no idea what my situation is like. (Joseph, social
activist)
Joseph was reminding the profession that all too often assumptions are made based on
unconscious biases and sometimes not so unconscious when working within vulnerable
communities. People coming in from outside think of themselves as leaders and often don’t
consider that what may be needed is working with and listening to individuals who more than
likely have a history of self-organizing and leadership within their own communities. Joseph
continued,
We need to take a hold of the complexity recognizing the leadership of people who are
directly impacted; leadership of women, Indigenous people, folks of color, who have
borne the brunt of marginalization and exploitation. We absolutely have to do that and we
also have to understand that we don’t play the oppression Olympics of people saying,
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“Well, you don’t have it as bad as I have so you need to shut up, step back and go the fuck
away.” (Joseph, social activist)
Ideas about “design justice” came up often in the discussions. The participants suggest
that it requires a paradigm of organizational thinking where people work together as a team that
offers different skills and perspectives. While particularly challenging after climatic events,
staying the more usual course of just tackling solvable technical problems will just add to further
marginalization. Penelope echoed such sentiments and concerns, saying:
Justice, equity, diversity, and inclusion, all of those things really need to be thought about
when we design. What happens now is we sort of fill in later. And there’s not these
integrated designs. Design justice is sort of designing for—I want to say—for the people.
It sounds really silly, but I think a lot of times we design for the client. But the client isn’t
necessarily the end user. (Penelope, architect)
Penelope went on to say,
It’s looking at how we can look at the design process and all of the communities that
maybe weren’t considered in the initial process and rethink what their design is doing. To
be more self-reflective and honest with each other as professionals.
One of the questions I asked was what direct experience design/planning professionals
may have had working in NYCHA (public) housing before Sandy and how those perceptions
may have been impacted after Sandy. One of the architects who lives in an area with a high
concentration of NYCHA affordable housing shared the following insights:
It wasn’t until the storm [Sandy] that I began to realize the bias and the judgment I had
and things I never considered. What their issues were, the challenges they had to face.
How so many people living in NYCHA Housing, despite what so many people think, are
working. Just because you work doesn’t mean you can afford a place to live. (Vic,
architect)
There are a lot of prejudices about people who live in government-supported housing and
many myths about those relying on government assistance programs such as welfare. I recall the
denigrating remarks and racial slurs that I experienced when attending school in a White
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middle-class neighborhood outside where I lived. That was a number of years ago—a stark
reminder that these attitudes linger from generation to generation.
Paul spoke emphatically about his sense of the problem and ways to redress the inequity
that is almost inevitable in times of social crisis:
Vulnerable and marginalized communities are engaged in the conversation about what
makes sense to them, as well as any other community. And, sometimes, you have to use
different methods to reach out to that community, [to] respect the community’s own
internal structure for self-organizing. (Paul, engineer)
Joseph added specific thoughts about the accentuated vulnerability and what it should
mean to planners in the aftermath of disasters:
Through Sandy Storyline we encountered a mobile home community in upstate New
York and are typical of what land/home ownership looks like for working class people in
America. Their mobile home—they are not actually mobile; if you tried to move them,
they would fall apart. (Joseph, social activist)
It was further explained that the after Sandy people were unable to return to their homes.
While they were still sorting their lives out, people from the real estate office came to collect
their rent but no one was there as they were still not able to return. Joseph further expanded upon
what happened next:
They came to collect even though people still in the community were dispersed and
couldn’t even find each other but somehow this company did find them in shelters. And
they went to the shelters and said if you don’t pay your rent you will lose your property.
[emphasis added] Many of those people lost their property.
I asked Joseph if he thought this type of behavior was generational. That younger
generations who had not yet gotten into the workforce might share a different perspective on the
poor and therefore would be less apt to enforce this kind of racial/economically motivated
actions of injustice? This was his response:
I gave a talk at the Columbia Journalism School. A student said, “I really want to find
people who are abusing the system and getting aid when they don’t need it.” I said, “Why
is that important to you?” [The student answered] “Well, because it happens all the time.”
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I said, “No, it doesn’t happen all the time. It is like this racial myth [that they are]
exploiting the system and living in opulence.
The designers/planners on the ground in communities during recovery were humbled and
reminded that when a climate-related disaster hits it can change people’s lives in minutes,
sometimes in mere seconds. I visited Coney Island after Sandy with Hannah, a planner who was
interviewed in this study. She came back to our mutual experience in our interview:
Remember when we were serving that food in Coney Island? Most of those people had
never stood in line for food in their lives. I was like, “Oh my God! These are regular
middle-class people who have never had to do this in their entire lives. You know, it
could be us.” (Hannah, planner)
Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.1: Vulnerable and marginalized communities.
Vulnerable and marginalized communities, whether noted as such because of climate sensitive
locations, class, or race, face the greatest challenges prior to and after an event such as Hurricane
Sandy. Sandy was also a reminder of the critical nature of dignity, justice, equity, and inclusion
being fundamental to design/planning. While those are factors that should be present in the
design methodology, the absence of this is particularly evident after a disaster, as was evidenced
in Sandy. Additionally, what came through time and time again was for design/planning
professionals to respect the community’s own internal structure for self-organizing—stand with
them not for them.
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.2: Intersection between nature and the built environment.
The theme of intersection between nature and the built environment was most often raised and
discussed by landscape architects and a small number of architects within this study. A
philosophical approach of human beings as custodians of the land (an Indigenous perspective)
rather than the colonial dominance mindset of having dominion over nature, was raised often.
My purpose in asking about these two perspectives was to see if design was really being
influenced by an epistemology that looked at land as a place that shapes humans and their
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communities. I wanted also to understand the impact nature has on design decisions in the built
environment. It is also a bridge between the challenges facing vulnerable and marginalized
communities and the dark side of the historical precedent in this country—the “original sins”
(Wallis, 2016) of how Indigenous peoples and African slaves were treated. Anthony’s (2017)
comments make the connection between social justice and design in a way that resonates with
many comments I heard in the research interviews; for example,
Recognition of the price paid in human life and liberty for economic advancement—and
the costs of resources extracted as nature’s systems were exploited—must inform and
guide us as we work to transform our cities and regions. We must forge a new path
illuminated by justice, respect for the dignity of each and every human being, and
determination to maintain and restore the web of life as the foundation for health and
sustainability. (p. 168)
For example, Vic (architect) reflected,
How to start to connect people with the earth? You feel that aliveness every day. And that
to me, is the human and nature experience together. It is what makes living so powerful.
How does one, within the profession, start to translate that into their work? It would be
easy out of anguish, or grief, to further dissociate. And yet, what’s important is to associate.
How this kind of connection with nature gets specifically translated into his work as an architect
is, for Vic, an evolving question; but his ability to associate nature with living powerfully is an
important reflection from a design professional who lost everything during Sandy. Eli, another
architect who was among the study participants, also made the connection between natural
environment, its hazards, and the built environment:
My background is in geography as well as architecture. The geography’s physical as well
as social economic. It is understanding the truth of the land that I saw from the
Indigenous perspective working in Dominica. The underlying circumstances that
pre-dated us and still underlying the city itself. So, I think that is where we start.
This approach makes designing with nature more tangible, connecting geography,
ecology, hydrology, and geographic information systems. What Eli referred to in terms of his
work from the Indigenous perspective is his work on the small and hurricane-prone Caribbean
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island nation of Dominica. This work after Maria in 2017 utilized the practices of the Kalinago
people (Indigenous people of the Lesser Antilles) and their council of chiefs (Azaroff, 2019).
Hannah (planner) poses the challenge of integrating nature and the built environment as
an unsolved mystery:
Post-Sandy one of the things that strikes me about the intersection between nature and the
built environment is that we learned that the East River is eight inches higher than it was in
1970. I think five years ago it was seven inches higher now it's eight inches. The river is
our backyard. How then do you design without listening to what nature is telling us?
What Hannah states is so obvious, yet to many there is a level of wilful ignorance.
Listening to what nature is telling and showing must become part of the public’s and, specific to
this study, design/planning professionals’ reframing of life and work. Brianna (architect)
commented as follows:
The whole geo-mythology is a very big unknown. We don’t know how high the seas will
rise and when they will. Why don’t we just start flooding some locations? Let’s just flood it
now where we want it to flood and how we want it to flood and what that looks like. We
have to be working in a natural system. We have to adapt a model about how we’re going
to let water be a part of our landscape in ways that we really haven’t thought about before.
Deliberately flooding some areas to allow water in as part of our landscape has been tried in
other parts of the world, a point raised by Paul (engineer). Sometimes engineers will flood an
area to restore an ecosystem. Sometimes hydrologists may deliberately flood an area to prevent
damage to a dam during heavy rainfalls; engineers may also flood an area to prevent worse
flooding during a storm. In the Netherlands there is a Room for the River program (ClimateWire,
2012; Rijke, van Herk, Zevenbergen, & Ashley, 2012) which emphasizes flood safety with
deliberate flooding. Thomas built on the theme of designing with not against nature:
Even the most advanced society on the planet . . . has to reconcile with nature. You can’t
just tame . . . harness nature. We didn’t know until we had a real-time planetary
monitoring that we had an impact on the earth on a planetary scale with a lot of the way
we’re building our cities. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer)
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In the Bible it was written that humans have dominion over nature, and some have argued
that this ingrained religious perspective now dooms humans to fight rather than work with nature
(e.g., White, 1967). In America, this was further underscored by the colonial perspective of
Manifest Destiny. Perhaps, as participant Thomas stated, our “real time planetary monitoring”
will shake loose the need to control nature so embedded in most Western dominant cultures.
Participant Jeanine had this to say about awareness of nature as it interacts with designed
environments:
At the city around you that’s all concrete, you say, “Where is nature? There isn’t any
nature in the city.” But every crack in the sidewalk tells a different story and a crack in a
parking [lot] is a place from which a plant can grow. I don’t think it’s so dissociated in
my profession between nature and the built environment. (Jeanine, landscape architect)
While architects speak about contextual design, finding nature in a city of concrete can be
a challenge, yet we are increasingly reminded, especially since Sandy, that we live on an island.
Nature (the water) is our backyard. As a landscape architect, Jeanine has developed a more
holistic perspective. This is also evident in Roberta’s remarks:
There is a lot of expertise around the world that shows us how living on water or living
with water can actually be quite positive. But we need to change our mindset of what that
means that maybe we aren’t looking as carefully as we might in nature’s geology.
(Roberta, architect)
Consider the approach from the Netherlands to adaptive water management as it
influenced post-Sandy practices: it is based on the premise that if water is afforded more space in
designs, it will not have to take space by force (Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012). This is what
Roberta stressed: the need to understand natural geology so as to make informed decisions based
on the history of the landforms, the geology, predictions, and patterns. It is too often forgotten
that nature and especially rivers like the Mississippi have their own personal histories just as
people do. That is a level of reverence yet to be embraced.
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Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.2: Intersection between nature and the built
environment. A philosophical approach of human beings as custodians of the land (an
Indigenous perspective) rather than the colonial dominance mindset of having dominion over
nature, was raised often. I wanted also to understand the impact nature has on design decisions in
the built environment and how one develops a mindset of working in a natural system where one
adapts to nature and not always defending against it. These designers/planners recognize that the
power of nature is a force far greater than humankind and that it will take a fundamental cultural
shift to see nature as having intergenerational histories just as people do.
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.3: Resiliency and sustainability. The concept of resiliency
and of creating structures and communities that will be able to “bounce back” from significant,
often harsh and unexpected events, has high currency in this time of climate change. Not
surprisingly, the word and the idea arose repeatedly in the interviews for this study. Rather than
begin with a definition, I will allow the meaning and interpretations of resiliency to emerge in
what participants had to say. Referring back to discussions he and I had had previously, Eli said,
When I talked to you years ago about being at a crossroads of leaving the profession,
leaving and going and working at 100 Resilient Cities [a Rockefeller Foundation
program] or someplace like that, that was very real. I often think those things because the
greater voice that you have to try to affect change at a larger level. (Eli, architect)
When Eli spoke about leaving the profession, he spoke of the daunting gap between the
early optimism of what could be achieved in Sandy’s aftermath and the reality of recovery years
later. Many of the big, exciting, and innovative ideas and painstakingly designed large-scale
projects remained in the planning stages and were never implemented.
Right now, we lack these artifacts. So, these past several years, my tiny little studio has
been producing these artifacts, resilient projects. There are few and far between resilient
projects. I think that drilling down, into making the actual project, has been my saving
grace, into not leaving the profession. (Eli, architect)

233
Another issue Eli grappled with was how to make what he had begun to do more
accessible to other communities and professionals. He spoke of creating a groundswell, a
“critical mass” of resilient homes built within working class and middle-class communities. He
explained,
Like the house at Breezy Point, we’re giving the design of that house away. People can
download the drawings. People can take these drawings, alter them, and make them their
own. So, hundreds of thousands of people can see, here’s an example of something
resilient that I can build, or have my contractor build, or give it to my architect. (Eli,
architect)
I then asked how he felt this addressed the lack of impact he had just expressed as an architect
and the struggle of co-creating with the community.
Knowing the scale of the problem we have the impact is that I’m training other architects
and people within their own communities to do these things. Now I am really looking
deeply into what I’m doing. How do you leverage that into making a bigger change?
[How do you help] others have a bigger more profound change? (Eli, architect)
The participants emphasized that a disaster can be an opportunity for turning another
person’s pain into a money-making capitalist venture. Financing the recovery from climate
impactful events, or planning for adaptation in advance of them, does require professionals who
can navigate the solutions and requires capital to concretize them. However, there can be a fine
line between creating solutions that are more about turning a profit than evolving accessible
solutions. Samuel, one of the architects interviewed for this dissertation, said this:
I think one of the challenges we've seen globally is that everybody's trying to come up
with a kind of branded and graphically fascinating attempt to address resiliency. We care
less about that, about the brand of the thing, right, whatever that ultimate platform is. We
care more about getting the information out.
Landscape architect, Jeanine also reflected on the shift towards resilience:
I think more people understand that they have to have a relationship to resilient design,
but I’ve also heard people, this was a couple of years ago, not understand the difference
between sustainability and resilience. I think it’s also the concept of social resilience, and
what that means.
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A story illustrating Jeanine’s “theory-in-practice” (a phrase used by Argyris & Schön,
1980) may clarify here the importance of social resilience.
The project I did in Jersey City, some of the people had lived there since it was built in
the 50s—and they were organized. They knocked on people’s doors to help them but
since they had no electricity, they brought out barbecue grills and cooked outside for
everybody. They were amazing. The social resilience of that group was very strong.
(Jeanine, landscape architect)
As I further spoke with Jeanine, we concurred that the community was used to fighting
with the Jersey City Housing Authority for things they needed. This history contributed to their
social resiliency and, as Jeanine aptly stated, “You cannot build social resiliency the day before
the hurricane is coming. It’s got to be there. It’s got to be part of the fabric of the community.”
The question then arose as to how the concept of social resiliency ties into physical
resiliency and sustainability.
Sustainability, if it gets stale, or if you don’t go deep enough, nobody will die or lose
their lives, but in resiliency, if you don’t keep challenging it, it goes to a different level.
Resiliency is a health and safety issue. People do lose their lives if you’re not designing
buildings to be resilient. (Jeanine, landscape architect)
As Jeanine is a landscape architect, I was also particularly interested in how she looked at
landscapes rather than buildings in the context of resiliency. She explained,
There is science in landscapes. Part of the flexibility of a wetland is where the water’s
edge is moving, or the wetland is moving in reaction to a storm like Sandy. But buildings
remain as they are. You can’t say the building is going to move. The landscape is
different. The landscape is resilient because it’s changing, but buildings can’t change.
(Jeanine, landscape architect)
How does one get people connected back to the true meaning of what resiliency and
sustainability are—and what they are not? On this, Eli shared his direct experience.
A lot of great people who have jumped into resilience become great proponents of
advancing adaptation and resilience. I also run into a lot of folks who just want to
profiteer off of the next big thing. If you’re getting into this because it’s a new great field
and you want to make some money, you have to know what you’re doing. Resilience is a
different kind of thing, than what we’ve seen before. (Eli, architect)
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I followed up asking him to be more specific in terms of how this has shown up in the
design/planning profession.
Folks that are like, “Hey, I’m a sustainability officer or I’m a resilience officer.” Well
great, how are they different? They often don’t have a complete answer. If you’re going
to say you know something about resilience, and you don’t, understand you’re
completely liable, on the professional side. You’re going to be in trouble misrepresenting,
not protecting people who need your help. So, please get the training. (Eli, architect)
While I would not personally position myself as an expert in sustainability or resiliency
from a technical perspective, I have taken the HURRIPLAN training (American Institute of
Architects, n.d) which is certified by FEMA. This training “integrates resilient community
planning and building design strategies with civic and commercial projects located in hurricane
prone areas” (American Institute of Architects, n.d, para. 2). From that perspective, I would argue
that what is key in the difference between resiliency and sustainability relates to life safety. When
resilient measures fail, people can die. The same cannot be said of sustainability shortfalls. Eli
helped to clarify this distinction further:
I can give you thousands of circumstances where a resilient measure is not sustainable,
by any stretch of the imagination. But life safety is the big one. If the sustainable measure
fails, no one is going to die, in the short term. The long term, you’re harming the planet.
There is a different trajectory that even those two simple statements are not clear in the
mind of the majority of architects and engineers out there as of yet. (Eli, architect)
Grace also explained her understandings of resiliency and sustainability.
There are lots of people who don’t understand the difference between that [resiliency]
and sustainability. I feel like a lot of my role has been to educate clients and design teams
about different aspects of it. (Grace, engineer)
From both an architectural and engineering perspective, breaking down the barriers
within the profession is one of the biggest challenges because even if people are trained in a
single or multiple disciplinary approach, practicing (rather than just theorizing) a truly
integrative approach is more challenging.
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When you look at resiliency you have to look at everything from the social to economic
to the physical to the environmental aspects of a community or even a single facility.
Everything is integrated. One of the commonalities is the integrated transdisciplinary
thinking that is required. (Grace, engineer)
This brings the discussion back to the integrated nature between the built and natural world
(Pillar 3, Theme 3.2), which while seeming so obvious, and often talked about in green speak
(i.e., discussions among those committed to environmental values), the reality is often very
different. Grace continued, with some visible chagrin, on getting typecast in broader dialogue
with other professionals and leaders:
I often will hear that you care about that because you are a fucking “greenie” or
something. But all of us need fresh air and clean water to drink, correct? The integrated
big systems thinking is required to change the way we build more resilient
cities/infrastructure; a single system in a siloed manner is never going to get us there.
To repeat, during this study, the connection between resiliency and sustainability—and
how they are related or different—was discussed with all the participants. A number of
participants were questioning what the next step was after resiliency. Grace’s response,
differentiating between the terms resilience and resiliency, was a singular one among study
participants—and, in my view, an important step in developing this understanding:
I definitely prefer the term resilience over the term resiliency because resiliency sounds
like you get to your destination and you are there whereas resilience is something we
have to constantly work on. It is an approach rather than something you achieve or a
destination you get to.
Grace’s perspective also highlighted reactive responses to proactive risk approaches to
design. The challenge from my perspective is that having a resilient plan and resilient
practitioner involved can give people a false sense of complacency. As was noted earlier in this
study, there have been a lot of plans developed pre- and post-Sandy. It does give one a sense of
security that people are thinking about these things and have ideas about how to protect
communities from climate-change induced events. But within the larger and often political
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context of making things happen, how much of this is truly realistic and attainable? Grace’s
response:
From a resilience perspective, we need to get past just responding to the last event and
needing an event to actually spur on the action we really should have done before an
event. An entire mindset change has to occur from the reactive disaster response and
recovery built back better to a proactive risk and resilient approach to design.
Replying to my question about how many resiliency projects have actually been
accomplished since Sandy,16—and how effectively they have worked—Beryl (landscape
architect) pointed to several examples:
We probably had six of those significant projects since Sandy. The Rockaways, Pier 42, a
resiliency project in Coney Island, Hunts Point, and then of course, what was once called
East Side Coastal Resiliency.
For a number of the participants in this study, the concept of resiliency went far beyond
definition and the distinction between resiliency and sustainability. Several, in fact, are pushing
against the concept of resiliency. They have seen it as quickly becoming a catch phrase to further
a more colonialist and economically privileged agenda. Kaasar, for example, explained,
The concept in and of itself is a very powerful one. The ability to bounce back—you can
equate it to a superpower. Being threatened or struck and to come back and keep going is
a wonderful thing to be able to do. This is where again we need to make a distinction
between the technical and the political. By the political I don’t mean partisan. I mean
when technical ideas become deployed on the ground and engaged with power. (Kaasar,
planner)
One of the issues that came up several times with the participants was that while they can
all point to times in their own lives they experienced resilience, in principle, it is very different
when it is operationalized on the ground and in community. Again, it was Kaasar who stated,
I think that our resilience has been operationalized. On the ground it has created a lot of
resentment in a lot of places. Part of it has to do with how different interested parties have
16

It should be noted, that The Living Breakwaters project (Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, n.d.-a)
on Staten Island, led by Kate Orff, landscape architect, and her firm Scape/Landscape Architecture, is in
construction. It is a project that I was initially engaged with during the early phases of the Rebuild by
Design competition.
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decided to implement the ideas on the ground and part of it has to do with that fact that
over time it has become an alternative to pushback or resistance.
While both the SIRR report, Stronger, More Resilient, ( PlaNYC, 2013), and later, NY Rising
(New York Rising Community Reconstruction Planning Committee, 2014) implied the goal of
bouncing back to something you wanted to reclaim, there is another crucial question: What
about communities that do not want to bounce back to an unfavorable status quo but to bounce
forward into a new more equitable future? I asked Kaasar about his thoughts on this.

Analytically people have made a distinction between the resiliency discourse and the
resistance discourse. That distinction has served governments and institutions well. When
they have a disaster and people’s needs are not being met, the answer becomes [to] just
be resilient bounce back stronger than ever. Be hit but don’t hit back—just get back up.
(Kaasar, Planner)
Kaasar’s perspective reminded me of the former-Governor Christie’s campaign, Stronger
Than the Storm, a PR campaign to promote tourism in New Jersey. It idealized the concept of
resiliency like a Hollywood movie, making invisible the realities of the pain and anguish still
being faced by New Jerseyites who still suffer from what happened during and after Sandy
(Hutchins, 2014; Izzo, 2013).
I try to understand how resilience is being deployed by observing how it is being rolled
out on the ground. This catch-all term allows us to talk about moving forward in a
sanitized way. It allows us to create a comeback story that denies in many ways our
inability to count the dead and honor their lives. (Kaasar, planner)
When resilience is employed, as Kaasar describes above, it does a disservice not just to
the reconstruction and recovery efforts but to the notion of social justice. A recurring leitmotif in
the stories of survivors of climate-impactful events, prominent notably in Sandy Storyline, is that
for people in vulnerable and marginalized communities, the return to the status quo is not what is
wanted or needed. Instead, the push is to achieve a more equitable community. Kaasar expressed
his mixed feelings about focusing planning for future climate-caused disasters on resilience.
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I am not opposed to the term resilience in its entirety. I am opposed to the usage in a way
that allows it to mask or sweep under the rug all of the other grave things that happen on
the ground. I am not opposed to resilience as an idea as long as the ability to come back
provides an opportunity for us to engage in acts of resistance. The ability to bounce back
and resist, I would deploy resilience for that. (Kaasar, planner)
I asked Kaasar for greater clarity into how he defined and connected the ideas of bounce back
and resist concurrently.
Resilience is not an end undo itself. It’s the ability to come back and do something. That
something is what we as planners should be working on. Yes, we should all be able to
come back, but come back as just what? (Kaasar, planner)
I am reminded that in the aftermath of Sandy, I too have struggled with the role for philanthropic
organizations who seemingly had the best of intentions and performed well in moving some
many of the initiatives forward, but over time, became too comfortable with their own
perspectives on guiding concepts like resiliency. Kaasar shared those concerns.
Resilience narrative and programs being deployed by many major foundations across the
world do not provide what we are talking about. When asked to come back, come back to
what? If it’s to reproduce the status quo, then I am not for that. If it is the ability to
rethink, re-propose, reconfigure, transform, and upend structural inequities, then that’s
when resilience really works for me. (Kaasar, planner)
Susan (urban strategist) had done a lot of work in New Orleans immediately after
Katrina. One issue she focused on quite a bit in our interview was the impact of outside
professional experts (design/planning professionals) “parachuting” in and then forcing their ideas
upon a culture about which they that they had no real insight. In that context she spoke about
resiliency not as a concept to snap back to what had been but rather as something that would
provide the capacity to adapt.
The community wanted to fashion rebuilding in ways that reflected their own culture,
their own challenges, and their own priorities…resilience being more about developing
the capacity to be continuously adaptive to all sort of changes that were coming. Climate
challenges social justice, cultural, economic challenges. It wasn’t an end state but a filter
of what to rebuild. (Susan, urban strategist)

240
In New Orleans, some of the city’s affordable housing stock had been demolished and
then replaced with market-rate housing. After Katrina, people who had been primarily from long
term marginalized and vulnerable communities were relocated to other states, and many never
returned because those affordable homes were never rebuilt. I asked Susan whether there had
been a backlash about the concept of resiliency because of that. She responded that,
Tracie Washington, a lawyer from Louisiana, and President and CEO of the Louisiana
Justice Institute, rejects the term “resilience” because of how it has been used as a term to
justify hardship on vulnerable populations. From her perspective, resilience is a term that
has become permission to inflict more challenges on low income populations. (Susan,
urban strategist)
Susan pointed out several publications that have underscored and reflected this
community concern over resiliency as a name for what is sought in post-disaster planning (Kang,
2018; Woods, 2017). She and I discussed at length how resiliency is no substitute for justice and
how it should never be perceived as such.
So for me, it still is a term that I still want to embrace because it insists, that in order to be
resilient you need to have the resources, you need to have the capacity, the agency, the
imagination and if you are lacking in any of this, your resilience is compromised. (Susan,
urban strategist)
I then asked Susan how she viewed the term “sustainability.” She answered,
I thought “sustainability” had become like “love,” a term used for everything, but I also
felt that sustainability implied a fixed state: either you were sustainable, or you were not.
What I liked about resilience is that it is a capacity . . . [the] quality you continue to foster
and build foster and build. (Susan, urban strategist)
About the time of this interview it was announced that the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100
Resilient Cities initiative was changing to a different mission under its new leadership. I asked
how she felt this would impact the resiliency movement since 100 Resilient Cities and the
foundation had been at the forefront of taking this concept to cities throughout the world. They
seemed to have become a connective tissue of sorts. Susan responded,
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So, I continue to believe that . . . [resilience] is a valuable word. I will be going to
Rotterdam next week for 100 Resilient Cities for its swan song, and I am really interested
to see how 101 chief resilience officers working around the world have . . . assembled a
movement [and] that I hope they have. And I don’t know if the entity became so much on
its structure that it lost some of its movement capacity. (Susan, urban strategist)
I suggested that one of the key elements that appears throughout the resiliency discussion
is the term “interdisciplinary” and it includes not just collaboration between design/planning
professionals but also members of the community and other adjunct professionals such as
builders (constructors), sociologists, psychologists, peacebuilders, social justice activists,
communication specialists, storytellers, and the like. Susan replied,
I ultimately think the answer is [being] more interdisciplinary in pushing authority to the
most local level so that people have more of a sense of their autonomy and their own
agency but at the same time there is responsibility so that you can foster a kind of
grounds-up resilience that I am making an informed decision on behalf of my neighbors
on how I am going to function here. It is hard to do that.
Edward also devoted a sizeable part of our interview to resilience, suggesting,
There feels like there needs to be a new dialogue—like we are in a loop. Part of the
challenge with resilience is that it is all-encompassing and therefore it is hard to pin
down. We have had people try to create a rating system for resiliency like the Leadership
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED, a worldwide green building certification
program). It becomes so watered down. (Edward, architect)
Part of the challenge I discussed with Edward was how to develop powerful yet simpler
narratives that people can understand immediately and get excited about.
I think we have a lot of work to do. We are not separate from the earth. We are not
separate from each other. Everything is interconnected. This is where modernism has a
lot to answer for, that we are somewhat removed from the earth and that we own it, we
dominate it. It is a power thing. It is the same with marginalized communities, exactly the
same. (Edward, architect)
While Edward was addressing these issues differently than Kaasar, there is overlap in the
context of social/philosophical triggers that could help shift this conversation.
As soon as you think of them and us or the earth as part of who we are then the attitude
changes. I think this is what happens to design professionals that fall into resilience work
and then begin to see themselves part of something greater. Far too much of architecture
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is still about the image of the building, the look of it, rather than the performance of it.
(Edward, architect)
This brought me to ask Edward about the interdisciplinary approach in my study as it is
inclusive of designers/planners which, in this study, includes architects, planners, landscape
architects, and engineers.
This might be something you look into the difference between landscape architects and
how they think about permanence/impermanence versus the way architects think about it.
A landscape architect when they start the design process has to think about how it will
grow and change. Architects think in terms of finite objects and everyone strives to be
remembered by a portfolio that people will worship, right? (Edward, architect)
This variability among practitioners when there is a need for an interdisciplinary approach was
one of the perspectives Liz, a geotechnical engineer, shared.
I think this is where we have a problem . . . I call it the new Babel Tower—everyone is
talking about this new thing and this thing is not defined. We all want to be resilient; we
all want to bounce back but bouncing back to how things were, I don’t want to go there, I
don’t want to be in the same situation again. (Liz, engineer)
I then asked her to expand on her perspective of “bouncing back” not being how one can
develop innovative ideas. Liz underscored that “bouncing forward” to a better future is what she
considered a resilient philosophy. Without that she felt we had a missing link between the
technical (which she defines as the technocrats, planners, and politicians) and the human factor
(within which she includes more vulnerable segments of society).
I call it the missing link because they speak in their own terms, and we cannot agree with
each other. The geotechnical engineers cannot agree with the structural engineers who
cannot agree with the mechanical. So, how can we even translate this to people who do
not have the background that we do? Engineers like problems that can be translated into a
formula. This is not that. This requires the human factor. (Liz, engineer)
I raised the same topic with Paul, an engineer who had been a military colonel and former
commander of the New York District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, prior to going into private
practice. I asked Paul, as I had of other participants, about the differences between sustainability
and resiliency from his perspective. He replied,
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You can’t throw out sustainability in order to get resilience. Resilience has to be blended
into the design process, along with sustainability, and that to me is preserving resources,
enhancing the environment, or reducing the impact of the environment as much as
humanly possible. (Paul, engineer)
My follow-up question was on how to maintain the integrity of a community in the
context of resiliency.
You want to maintain the integrity of all of that. You don’t want to just completely
change that for resilience sake. And I think another thing, from Sandy in particular, was
the offer to include, from the very beginning of the planning projects, community input.
From my perspective, we have Shaun Donovan17 to thank for a lot of that. (Paul,
engineer)
Architect Samuel responded to my questions about the role and meanings of resiliency as
follows:
We’ve been heavily involved in resiliency effort within the practice for the last four or
five years, if not longer. It includes things like partnering with the Rockefeller
Foundation, the 100 Resilient Cities program. There was a great article in The New
Yorker in 2008 called “Big Foot” [see Specter, 2008] which talks about sustainability and
the difference between reality and perception.
What is particularly interesting in the context of resiliency and the article Samuel
mentioned, is the idea of focusing on changing people’s perceptions and how that impacts
behavior. From his perspective, the concept of resiliency and sustainability are part of an aligned
efforts of broad sweeping reforms that can actualize those changes.
In regard to the relationship of resiliency and sustainability, Thomas then described
resiliency as relational and non-static in nature as creating a “oneness and inseparability of

17

Shaun Donovan served as United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 2009 to
2014 and Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2014 to 2017. He was instrumental in
developing the Rebuild by Design competition and integral to bringing forward the importance of design
and community engagement
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people and nature.” In further discussing the difference between sustainability and resiliency he
went on to say,
It’s not that [sustainability] is over. It’s just that it was eclipsed by resiliency. But
resiliency is not the same as sustainability, they come from very different philosophical
underpinnings. Sustainability sees people and nature as separate things and then if people
can come in balance with nature then nature will take care of us and it’s all harmonious
and holistic. But it’s also three dimensional and linear; it’s fairly static. (Thomas,
landscape architect/urban designer)
From this vantage point, resiliency and sustainability take on a different perspective
—dynamic versus static. So, in taking this conversation further with Thomas, if resiliency is
equated with dynamism and sustainability is static what would be the next thought model?
Thomas had a clear and though provoking response:
Yes, that’s the big idea…when you go back to dynamic thinking there is a lot of other
ideas that will come from that thought model and one of them is transformation. So, it’s
really our own understanding of nature and how it’s evolved, but it’s where the stuff is
coming from. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer)
I asked: What’s after resiliency? It has always seemed like what followed the word was a
semicolon, not a period. Eli (architect) felt that the next step should be transformation. Others in
the focus group discussion were not as sure what that actually meant and what it would look like.
Thomas however had some very clear thoughts about the concept of transformation.
As long as you understand the thought model of dynamism, static versus dynamic model
of nature, you will then find, what comes next. But it’s important to understand the
philosophical [question of] the limits of resiliency. Where do they come from and how do
you go back to that thought model and then add in new factors of where we are now as a
society and where will that take you. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban designer)
Just as Thomas emphasized the concept of resiliency as a partnership with nature, Joseph
(social activist) focused on resiliency in terms of cohesion and recovery:
I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding about how social change happens. I mean
resiliency is the buzzword now, but is it an accurate word? Social resiliency . . . people
build up relationships with their friends, their neighborhoods, that’s why from the design
perspective we need the Jane Jacobs style of design . . . so people interact with each other
and build up social cohesion. Joseph (social activist)
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Joseph and I further discussed how after disasters one sees the Red Cross, a
well-financed, top-down organization, and FEMA having problems in terms of lack of capacity
and of financing. This makes having designers/planners to support social cohesion and social
resiliency within communities all the more necessary.
Resiliency is about having a social fabric of cohesion and recovery; so, a resilient system
is not rigid; a resilient system is fluid, a resilient system is agile, it is based on
components and has the ability of its components. It has a natural way, and what I mean
by natural is, a self-determined way of interacting rather than those not involved in the
system telling them how they should interact. Joseph (social activist)
If one takes Thomas’s definition of resilience as a dynamic model of nature and Joseph’s
definition as fluid natural system of social cohesion, a bridge between the natural and built
environment is, in effect, created.
Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.3: Resiliency and sustainability. The concept of
resiliency and of creating structures and communities that will be able to “bounce back” from
significant, often harsh and unexpected events, was a debated question in this study. For a
number of the participants in this study, the concept of resiliency went far beyond its common
definition and the distinction between resiliency and sustainability. Several, in fact, are pushing
against the concept of resiliency. They have seen it as quickly becoming a catch phrase to further
a more colonialist and economically privileged agenda. It turned out that they all could point to
times in their own lives that they experienced resilience. In principle it is very different when it is
operationalized on the ground and in community. Most particularly for people in vulnerable and
marginalized communities, the return to the status quo is not what is wanted or needed; instead,
the push is to achieve a different, more equitable community. Resilience is not an end in itself
and may even encourage regressive policies that try to bring cities back to a reality that favors
the well-off and perpetuates inequity.
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Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.4: Managed retreat. Of the several broad strategies humans
can use to adapt to climate change, probably none are as inherently and automatically unpopular
as the idea of managed retreat. People almost inevitably expect that their governments will “fight
the good fight,” shoring up the defenses no matter the threat. In contrast, the underlying precept
for thousands of years among nomadic hunter–gatherers was voluntarily relocating, often in a
cyclic though sometimes in a once and for all move (Fang & Liu, 1992). But for today’s human
communities, especially mega-cities like the New York region, a policy of “packing things up”
and moving to higher, safer ground is close to unthinkable—and, potentially, political suicide for
anyone advocating it. Nonetheless, managed retreat as a concept has quite recently (re)emerged as
a serious alternative (e.g., Freudenberg, Calvin, Tolkoff, & Brawley, 2016; Koslov, 2016; Siders,
Hino, & Mach, 2019), if for no other reason than the enormous costs of disasters and defending
against them.
According to a review by NASA (2020), working with NOAA’s National Centers for
Environmental Information, since 1980 the United States has had 254 weather and climate
impactful events in which damages and costs in each case exceeded $1 billion. Adjusting the
aggregate figure for inflation, this means a price of $1.7 trillion, and that is quite aside from the
massive cumulative loss of life, human and not.
The most common form of policy intervention for the purpose of managed retreat is for
public agencies to purchase privately held property and (sometimes) provide relocation cost
assistance as well as other non-monetary forms of adjustment (Freudenberg et al., 2016). These
are called buyout programs and utilized as a form of post-Sandy and post-Hurricane Irene
response in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut—with mixed results. According to
Freudenberg et al. (2016),
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Buyout programs were employed in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut following
Irene and Sandy, but they were considered politically unfeasible and thus were available
to only a handful of communities. Of the billions of federal aid spent on resilience and
recovery in the New York metropolitan region, at least $750 million has been spent on
buyouts, which alleviated the flood risk for more than 1,500 homes. However, the vast
majority of recovery efforts focused on other measures of adaptation. (p. 4)
At what point does rebuilding in an area impacted by a climate impactful event make
sense and at what juncture does one no longer adapt and retreat from the site? These and other
interrelated stories and observations about managed retreat make up my fourth theme.
Someone living in NYCHA housing in Coney Island or Rockaway who might not have
the ability to move themselves to another locations would be in a very different position than
someone who has a second home in Southampton, New York. Managed retreat and buyouts
could be the subject of its own study. So, while this will not be handled in the course of this
study with the level of detail it deserves, to not focus on it would be leaving out a challenge that
will be facing many communities, local, state, and federal government in the years to come.
Meeting the challenges of managed retreat underscores what John Paul Lederach said in
his acceptance speech on May 8, 2019, at the Niwano Peace Prize Ceremony. He spoke of
“‘in-between wisdom’ . . . Commitment to intergenerational accompaniment opens us up to
unanticipated insight and breakthrough that rise when extraordinarily diverse people commit to
deep listening, mutual encouragement, and courageous joint action” (Lederach, 2019, p. 5).
Melissa (architect) was well aware that in many cases in cities like New York and New
Orleans highly valued built environments go along with beloved communities from which few
want to consider retreating. She was rather surprised when she saw a similar kind of cultural
legacy that she experienced in both New Orleans and during Sandy, which she explained as
“communities that rely on their social networks for their wellbeing in the absence of the
shrinking welfare state.” She continued,
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In the absence of the shrinking welfare state, family networks are really, really important.
The problem with the notion of displacing people, not building in the flood zone—which
is a really good idea, do not build, or rebuild in a flood zone, in these communities—it’s
that if you are not careful you really disrupt the social networks, which are very valuable.
(Melissa, architect)
Melissa went on to give a very specific example of someone in Sheepshead Bay,
Brooklyn, NY, which was hit hard during Sandy:
The man was not in good shape. He was unemployed. He was a former veteran with
mental issues. He was an alcoholic. If he had not had the support of those extended
family in this place with this property, he would not have survived. They had family
networks and they didn’t want to leave [and] they couldn’t afford to move. (Melissa,
architect)
While the issue of managed retreat may have the most challenging effects on individuals
and communities without the financial solvency to relocate, there is a level of fear and denial that
goes beyond economics. There are communities of wealthy people who by their privilege, feel a
level of immunity. Hannah had this story of an elderly woman of means:
She didn’t want to evacuate for Irma, and her husband is in a wheelchair. I told her about
the data predictions and cautioned her about her safety. She wrote: “You’re scaring me.”
I said, “Well, you should be scared.” . . . she wrote back . . . “How much time do I have?”
I said, “Five to 10 years.” A lot of people think they don’t have to worry about it because
they have a lot of money. (Hannah, planner)
One of the questions, I asked the design/planning professionals is if they broached the
subject of managed retreat post-Sandy with residents during recovery and how they were
responded to.
I’ve talked to the Mayor’s office and they are like, “We can’t even begin to talk about
that because of real estate value and land.” I’m like, “Well then, we’re acting in just
denial. You’re putting everybody in greater jeopardy than actually caring for your
citizens.” To me, the Mayor’s office just wants to look at real estate as the solution
eventually, not as an issue. They want to build their way into flood protection. (Brianna,
architect)
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We further discussed the implications for communities that are more economically
vulnerable and how one even begins to approach the difficult and sensitive questions of
relocation. As Melissa suggested, sensitivity is of the utmost importance. She said,
Many people are in bare survival mode; they struggle to keep a job, earn a sustainable
wage, and feed their children. In no way should we force this to be a top priority for
people. And yet, it’s where political will and the government come in, to make sure these
people are safe. (Melissa, architect)
One of the other architects in this study, Vic, had to make a very personal decision for he
and his family as to whether to rebuild or not after Sandy. Given the location of his home, in Sea
Gate at the very tip of Coney Island (Figure 4.3), if there was ever a strong case to be made about
retreating and not rebuilding, this would have been one of them. I also asked how, from the
perspective of a design professional, he would advise others on the subject of managed retreat.
I think in my particular case it was an individual decision. It was for myself and my
family about rebuilding and not retreating. It was a decision we all made together. If the
rest of my community, or any community, were involved I think the decision process
would clearly be different. (Vic, architect)
As Vic and I extended the conversation to The Rockaways, Red Hook, the Lower East
Side, and Lower Manhattan, it was daunting as to just how wide an area we could be talking
about.
But if you take a look at how many linear miles or square miles of an area, in New York
City alone, that potentially are going to be subjected to being under water in the next 20
to 50 years, you’re talking about a lot of people, a lot of area. And I honestly don’t know,
logistically, or economically, how to make something like that work. (Vic, architect)
Beryl (landscape architect) related the need for managed retreat to the natural underlying
ecology that several prone communities are located on, The Rockaways and Coney Island:
They are both barrier islands. They are in constant motion . . . from wave action and tides
and sand deposit. They are geologically very transient bodies of land . . . [In] 500, 1000
years, Rockaway will be really skinny in one part and really fat in another part, or it may
get breached and become two or three islands. (Beryl, landscape architect)
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NYCHA has 326 housing developments across the five boroughs. Many of them are
within the highly vulnerable communities that Beryl mentions. As stated in the Sandy Regional
Recovery Agenda, “Sandy impacted nearly 20% of all NYCHA properties (i.e., 402 buildings
with over 35,000 units)” (Sandy Regional Assembly, 2013, p. 1). These statistics give an even
greater understanding into the kind of massive effort Beryl is talking about. We discussed at
length that managed retreat was an urban planning issue more than an urban design issue and
how, after Sandy, many of the residents Oakwood Beach and Ocean Breeze (both on Staten
Island) chose to take a buyout plan.
Another study participant, Hannah (planner), has been highly focused on managed
retreat. She described a project by Concordia, the architecture firm engaged with developing the
Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement Plan (2019). This plan is mentioned in more detail in the focus
group at the close of this chapter. During the interview we discussed how the terms
“transformational adaptation” or “resilient relocation” have been used instead of managed
retreat. These are attempts to find wording that is less loaded than “retreat” with its strong
connotation of giving up and conceding defeat.
Ross, who is both an architect and an educator, talked about a studio he had taught at City
College of New York that focused on a project about managed retreat:
I looked very broadly for a community that would be willing to work with my studio,
openly, without paranoia, looking at the pragmatic aspects that we were going to confront
with managed retreat. I did find one community off the Hudson River—not the first place
I would have looked at, but a community that was slammed by the surge from Hurricane
Sandy—the town that Klaus Jacob18 lives in, Piermont, NY.

18

Klaus Jacob is a research scientist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. He
has been advocating for the development of fair and equitable plans to relocate flood-threatened
communities, ones that have a fair probability of being under water before the close of the 2lst century.
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One of the primary issues in working with any community on this subject, is trust. Ross
immediately earned that because Klaus Jacob had been a resident there for 15 years, had worked
with the community who, as a result, already had a climate sea-level rise committee. Ross went
on to share more of the details of the actual planning exercise. I was curious as to how far Ross’s
team went in devising actual solutions for Piermont. He responded,
We’re not giving them a solution. Amongst eight, you can be sure that you have some
very, very modest ideas about how they might secure their shoreline. What if their park
land up the hill becomes their urbanized land? Piermont asked us if we would ready our
materials for a later spring conference (2019), that they can use what we did for them as
examples of alternative futures. That’s about as far as I’ve been able to go. (Ross,
architect)
Part of what Ross and I further discussed was the time frame people are willing to
consider. While scientific authorities like Klaus Jacob may talk about the very long-term and the
impact on our grandchildren’s children, most people are not ready for nor willing to engage the
long term. Ross argued,
We’re dealing with the immediate, since we know people have rebuilt in West Hampton,
South Hampton, and Jersey Shore. People rebuild in extremely vulnerable areas. People
would rather die than move in some cases. Moving a discrete number of families by some
funded mechanism, you can kind of do, but nobody has suggested that we move a major
American city. In that case, when you talk about retreat, retreat to what and where?
For many, including me, one’s brain goes blank forecasting 60 years into the future. How
does one get past this? It begins with not thinking about this framed only by one’s own sense of
longevity and mortality! Rather, what is needed is to adopt a philosophy based on legacy, tied to
altruistic pragmatism—an intergenerational form of leadership or what Milfont and Sibley
(2011) called “environmental generativity” (p. 21). This important insight that arose during the
research will be discussed further in Chapter V.
So for example, there are places where communities are at a huge and significant risk;
there is no doubt about that. But I think before “experts” or practitioners look at the maps
and say to people that they have got to go, I think the communities themselves need to
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realize when they have to go or when they don’t. The idea that communities really don’t
know is a little bit condescending. (Samuel, architect)
Samuel also noted the difficulties created by the idea of, and, even, just the word retreat.
So now they’re calling it “adaptation” as opposed to “managed retreat because” it was a
hard and scary phrase. How do you maintain the social infrastructure when you’re
moving people? Where do you move people to? [Think of] the Lower Ninth Ward after
Katrina: all the affordable housing cleared for market-rate housing. People are suspicious
when you mention managed retreat. That is why. It was a way to clear the poor.
Robert, also an architect, addressed the law and politics of managed retreat, pointing to
how, at some point, it may no longer be a matter of choice:
It’s going to present a new requirement for architects. Unless it’s a law that somebody’s
going to have to retreat, they don’t necessarily have to retreat. All they have to do is lift
their house up or make that kind of correction. You can’t force them to retreat.
A forced retreat would harken back to other tragic experiences in America: forced
relocations, such forcing Native Americans off of their land; urban renewal that bulldozed
so-called slums leaving working class and poor people without affordable housing (Gans, 1965).
Then as Robert went on to say, to not plan ahead in a realistic manner could bring a different
kind of destruction.
If we start waiting until it is too late, you are going to have a situation where it’s going to
be forced retreat, and that’s not good, or you are going to have destruction. It’s a tough
one to talk to housing clients specifically about and how to achieve what I would call, a
controlled retreat, a phased retreat, as opposed to a panicked retreat. (Robert, architect)
And Brianna (architect) spoke of the analytical challenges her profession faced in
developing a “model” for decisions around managed retreat:
The thing is, Red Hook itself, is like in the middle of the city. It’s not like we’re some
outer banks kind of location. We need to start figuring this stuff out now . . . and partly
because retreat itself can take 20 or 30 years.
Brianna is both an architect and an educator. She spoke about programs such as RAMP
and studio courses at the Pratt Institute that have become incubators for ideas and
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experimentation. They also were places where communities could work with design/planning
professionals to vet ideas and co-create future alternatives in a non-politicized environment. I
asked Brianna how a design/planning professional can deal with the issue of managed retreat and
not rebuilding. She answered,
It’s our responsibility to always [have] an upfront conversation and then figure out how
to move forward through that. Another model that they [residents in high risk areas]
could do, they could sell their property and they could build a floating house . . . It’s
important, for the city to start having those conversations. Nobody wants to talk about it.
(Brianna, architect)
When I spoke to Thomas, a landscape architect who lives in Red Hook (and also was
very engaged with Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria), we talked a lot about The Rockaways,
where he has worked and sailed from.
Should we retreat? We’re living in these vulnerable areas, or do our lives depend on these
vulnerable areas? For people that are fishermen, surfers, and sailors, they want to be in
the ocean zone. They need it for their happiness, they have to see the horizon line of the
ocean. So, for folks like that, it’s worth the risk of it. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban
designer)
For architect Roberta, such questioning needs to be moderated with at least some
optimism if professionals are to have any chance of gradually opening up the option of
relocation.
You have to stay positive about what can be done, and we know a lot of what can be
done. We may not have the money to do it all, but we also have some tough decisions
about where it doesn’t make sense to invest. I don’t think that the question of managed
retreat has been warmly landed yet because it’s such a political nightmare. (Roberta,
architect)
Finally, on the issue of managed retreat, Melissa (architect) ended on a less optimistic
note recognizing not only the natural reluctance of individuals but the massive challenge of
relocating the large numbers of people living in massive public housing developments.
The idea that at some point your house will be dry but you’ll get there by boat because
that’s actually where the coastline would be, is grounds for considering managed retreat.
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People don’t get it… that’s a lot of the problem. The other . . . is the places where you
have large concentrations of poor people, in NYCHA housing. The idea of moving them
out of harms’ way, is too expensive, where are you going to put them? (Melissa,
architect)
Summary—Pillar 3, Societal, Theme 3.4: Managed retreat. At what point does rebuilding
in an area impacted by a climate impactful event make sense and at what juncture does one no
longer adapt and retreat from the site? The answer to these questions are further complicated for
communities that are more economically vulnerable. How does one even begin to approach the
difficult and sensitive questions of relocation which would be very different for someone living
in Southampton, Long Island, compared to residents of NYCHA public housing in The
Rockaways. We discussed how the terms “transformational adaptation” or “resilient relocation”
has been used instead of managed retreat. These are attempts to find wording that is less loaded
than “retreat” with its strong connotation of giving up and conceding defeat. Managed retreat is
going to present new challenges for design/planning professionals. A forced retreat would harken
back to forced relocations—moving Native Americans off of their land—or urban renewal—
leaving working class and poor people without affordable housing. Yet to not plan ahead in a
realistic manner could bring a different kind of destruction. What is needed is to adopt a
philosophy based on legacy, tied to altruistic pragmatism—an intergenerational form of
leadership.
Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.5: International connections and lessons. It is fitting,
given the global scale of climate change, that lessons on how to deal with disasters get shared
between experts and professionals from many nations. After Sandy, much was learned and
developed as HUD worked with Dutch water expert Henk Ovink, who played a leading role in
formulating and implementing the Rebuild by Design initiative. In the interviews the
significance of such cross-fertilization internationally came up a number of times. For example,

255
Jeanine (landscape architect) spoke about learning from another of the study participants such as
Eli (architect) because of his international experience.
It was interesting to me when Eli was talking about this trip to Japan to the area of the
tsunami and how there, they relocated people together. So, whoever your next-door
neighbor was, you took your next-door neighbor wherever you were going. So, they kept
the community together and also had some people say to them, “Yeah, well I might not
want to live with my old neighbors.” (Jeanine, landscape architect)
Grace brought up the impacts of and professional work that took place in the aftermath of
earthquakes in New Zealand:
[Regarding] New Zealand and the earthquake of 2010, we did have a larger, more
impactful event in February 2011, and we hadn’t yet fully finished examining all the
properties before that. That was a big learning experience. To apportion the damage
between events when you haven’t actually looked at the property in-between time is
really very challenging. (Grace, engineer)
When the time between catastrophic events is short, assessing the damage, let alone
readying the infrastructure and communities for the next catastrophe can be very daunting. This
is an important lesson to be learned as the frequency as well as the intensity of major climate
change-induced events increases in the United States and the Northeast. Having two “Sandys” in
close succession could overtax not only short term but longer-term response planning. Liz also
drew on lessons from New Zealand’s handling of earthquakes:
[During the] Christchurch earthquakes 2010 and 2011, the ground became liquified
. . . and the real estate changed, and you were in a flood zone and before you were not.
People then had to have flood insurance and earthquake insurance on the real estate. (Liz,
engineer)
The issue of insurance is a big one in the aftermath of disasters. Though this was not a
point of focus for this study, it is important to put what Liz was describing into the context of
Sandy. After Sandy, many insurance policy holders learned that their insurance may not cover
damage done before the storm. Most of the damage was not caused by hurricane winds but by
severe flooding from storm surge. And most traditional homeowner policies do not cover floods.
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Flood insurance is something bought separately through the government (FEMA). Referring to
New Zealand’s disasters, Liz went on to explain,
To get back the damages the earthquake insurance said you are not in a flood zone so you
should go to the flood insurance. The flood insurance [companies] told them, “Well, the
flood was created by the shaking of the earth therefore you have to go back to the
earthquake insurance.” The building code looks at shaking but not at the earth liquifying.
(Liz, engineer)
This international example states it so clearly through the phrase, “the real estate
changed.” This not only pertains to the insurance an individual may hold. Design and
construction continue locally in some areas after Sandy, including Red Hook, the Gowanus
Canal, and The Rockaways, all hit heavily during the storm surges and resulting floods. While
design standards and codes may be changing, so is the geology of the earth that these
developments are being built upon.
Liz also touched on her work after a major quake in South America:
I [led] the team after the 2016 earthquake 7.9 devastating the whole shoreline of Ecuador.
I collect newspapers after earthquakes. People [demand] water, safety, milk for their
children, going back to their houses, not live in tents. I thought I would see that; what I
saw was images of devastation and the word resilience in Spanish. I was like in shock.
This word made it all the way there because this was the demand of the people.
What stood out in Liz’s international experience is how much the design nomenclature,
such as resiliency, has become part of the public narrative. This harkens back to the disaster of
9/11, when phrases like “progressive collapse,” “design charrettes,” and “Jersey barriers,”
became part of the public narrative and nomenclature in the New York region.
For Claire, the devastating earthquake in Haiti was replete with very painful lessons, not
least because that is where she was originally from.
I lost a lot of family in the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Haiti ended up with 80,000 people
with some level of amputation because of hard cinderblocks from buildings falling on
them. My response was not just the resiliency of construction techniques, but architecture
rebuilt different than before. Architecture with accessibility. (Claire, architect)
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Claire saw firsthand how inappropriate planning or design responses can be when they
are fashioned by outsiders with minimal or no guidance from the affected communities. Similar
to what happened in New Orleans during Katrina, there was a lot of push back with people
coming in from outside to rebuild who had no understanding of the local culture.
Some of the competition results in Haiti looked like log cabins, Spanish Style houses,
none of this was a cultural alignment with Haiti. And all of the financial resources that
could have gone back into the Haitian economy was going to people from the outside
coming in. (Claire, architect)
As a Haitian American, Claire wanted to go back and offer her assessment after the
hurricane. She volunteered to go down and assess and evaluate buildings for structural integrity,
but because she was only two years out of school, even though she was working as a practicing
architect, the Haitian government told her she was too inexperienced to make those assessments
and evaluations. Claire did get her hands on a manual for construction from Habitat for
Humanity that was written in both English and Creole and went to work with the contractors.
I worked with the construction workers sharing other techniques that could make
buildings safer, like tying the rebar accurately, etc. I shared what I called the tricks of
trade, gave them the printouts from Habitat, and talked to them about the power they had
to make the environment safer. That they had the power to come in and make it safe.
(Claire, architect)
Claire explained that in Haiti if you say you are an architect, they refer to you as an
engineer.
Those who call themselves engineers are really contractors. So, there was no one there
checking foundation depth, water tables, soil stability, etc. There were rebars sticking up
from the roofs that detach the metal from the concrete. So, when the earthquake happened
it was catastrophic. Roofs were made heavy to resist the next hurricane which further
exacerbated the collapse of anything more than a single story tall. There is technically a
building code, but it is not reinforced, and no one is liable. (Claire, architect)
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Samuel (architect) drew attention to the special challenges of Kuwait which is both
highly vulnerable to climate change and a major source of fossil fuels whose usage is a major
driver of global warming:
In Kuwait, obviously there’s huge issues that have to do with climate change; it’s
arguably the hottest inhabited place on the planet and it's primarily organized around
fossil fuels. China is built out so completely and so inappropriately, that it’s going to be
dealing with issues for at least 100 years. What’s really disturbing is that now the Chinese
are moving into Africa.
Of particular note from Samuel’s perspective is how developed countries like the
Republic of Kuwait—which according to the World Bank Group (n.d.) has 98% of its population
living in cities—face a scarcity of water and, yet, an economy built upon a major contributing
factor to climate change. Of note, in light of Samuel’s concern, it is to be noted that after the
United States under President Trump pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement, China began to
champion what it called “Ecological civilization . . . achieving harmony between people and
nature” (Pennington & Kastner, 2018, para. 3).
Roberta turned to Thailand in search of changing paradigms of professional work in
regard to engaging communities that are both vulnerable to disaster and marginalized
socioeconomically. She observed,
There is a group of architects in Thailand doing something called CODI. Community
Organization Development Institute . . . co-creative efforts with community members, for
community members, if you need to do work in a community that has nominally
significant needs you have to figure out a way to work with and support the community. I
heard this similarly, from [African] representatives who said, “Nothing for us without
us.” (Roberta, architect)
Roberta worked with the CODI team in Bangkok and spoke at length about the Baan
Mankong Collective Housing and how people moved from rickety shanties to owning solid
upgraded homes. While the primary motivation for this program was not imminent effects of
climate change, the program is one we can learn from in the developed world. Upgrading and
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storm proofing the dwellings of those who live in disaster-prone areas of New York, and doing
so in a way that enhances community capacity, certainly describes challenges that I heard of
repeatedly from professionals who worked in rebuilding post-Sandy. Roberta further discussed
how this tied into creating income generation and the local issues in the context of the greater
regional challenges. This goes to a point raised throughout my research in direct response to
Sandy: The need for “a new story of unified effort to heal [rebuild] communities harmed by
racial [economic] injustice so that they can participate in repairing our damaged ecosystems and
social networks” (Anthony, 2017, p. 8).
Finally, in terms of the theme of international lessons and comparisons, Penelope
(architect) brought up the Caribbean island jurisdictions, some of which have started reducing
climate change impact through use of renewable energy sources:
The Governor [of Puerto Rico] signed a bill, on 100% renewable energy, by 2050.
Dominica signed on to be a 100% resilient nation, in the rebuilding. There is a lot of
opportunity that is happening there in regard to case studies and new projects. They have
different governmental structures than what we do, which creates different hurdles.
There were many architects interviewed in this study with close affiliations to Puerto
Rico and to other Caribbean islands. Of particular interest in terms of lessons learned
internationally was how areas with different governmental structures than in the United States,
and having a wholly distinct set of economic, social, and political hurdles, are making great
strides in committing to policies that many cities in the United States have yet to adopt.
Summary—Pillar 3 (Societal) Theme 3.5: International connections. After Sandy,
much was learned and developed as HUD worked with Dutch water expert Henk Ovink who
played a leading role in formulating and implementing the Rebuild by Design initiative. The
significance of such cross-fertilization internationally came up a number of times in the study.
As noted, one participant referred to how, in New Zealand after two earthquakes struck in quick
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succession, “the real estate changed.” While design standards and codes may be changing, so is
the geology of the earth that these developments are being built upon. It was also shown by way
of international examples how inappropriate design/planning responses can be when they are
fashioned by outsiders with minimal or no guidance from the affected communities. Similar to
what happened in New Orleans during Katrina, there was a lot of resentment about non-local
people, including professionals, who had no understanding of the local culture yet came in from
outside to rebuild after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010. Of particular interest in terms of lessons
learned internationally was how areas with different governmental structures than in the United
States, while having a whole different set of hurdles, are making great strides in enacting policies
that many cities in the United States have yet to commit to.
Pillar 3 (Societal), Theme 3.6: Leadership. Despite widespread constructive critiques
of conventional ideas about what it is to lead (e.g., Heifetz, 1994; Vaill, 1996), even the most
progressive professionals still often instinctively feel pressured to have “all the answers” for
dealing with climate change disasters. Yet realizing, through experience with climate-change
induced disasters, they also aspire to alternative models of leadership. This dilemma was a
recurrent theme in the interviews for this dissertation
When asked about the qualities of leadership needed for dealing effectively with the
climate change crises, most participants suggested that it is no longer possible or desirable to
lead from the top down. Others simply acknowledged that leadership is desperately needed in the
aftermath of events like Sandy but did not know where it would come from or what it would
even look like. Talib (architect) cautioned,
Don’t construct a whole reality for them [communities] through your own eyes. And this
is why it’s so important for designers to understand [impacts] of what we do. We
interpret peoples wants and desires into physical space. We need to begin to change the
paradigm to, “I’m not going to stand up for you, I’m going to stand with you.”
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Susan spoke of the dangers for professionals in overestimating the decisiveness of their
expert knowledge in contexts where, in fact, no one person really has “the truth”:
Let me give you something completely on the other side of leadership which is the guru
effect. People come into these situations and because communities are desperate and
confused, we are all susceptible to somebody coming in with all the answers. As I think
about it, they are almost always men. They come in with big grand sweeping initiatives
that they are going to solve it all. (Susan, urban strategist)
The term, “guru effect” was coined by Sperber (2010) in reference to how a
jargon-rich authority’s perspective is often over-valued, what Schön (1983) earlier called the
strategy of mastery through mystery (p. 126). Susan’s point was that in the midst of a confusing,
uncertain, and even dangerous situation as was the aftermath of Sandy, professionals may fall
back on technical prowess when the challenge is beyond the grasp of current expert knowledge.
Susan (urban strategist) summed up the guru effect with this impact: “In New Orleans
they used to say that New Orleans had two storms. One was Katrina, the actual storm, and the
second one [was] the attack of the experts and a kind of dogma that is disrespectful and
destructive.” It appears that one of the greatest barriers to environmental and social justice in the
aftermath of climate change-related catastrophes is the expert or group of experts that come in to
“save the day.” Most of the time they are coming from the place of privilege rather than
inclusivity. They use their privilege not to engage but rather to control and have power over. It
goes back to something architect Talib (architect) mentioned earlier. It’s the difference between
standing with rather than for. It’s a form of bias that comes from feeling like the anointed one
while the local and neighborhood community have less credibility. It also runs against the kind
of global perspective Roberta discussed from the ever more valued perspective of communities
in relation to design/planning professionals in Africa: “Nothing for us without us.” Liz (engineer)
expanded on this:
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From a preparedness, planning aspect and leadership perspective, professionals need to
explain details of what they do from the top down and the bottom up. It should start from
a very early age from a school level and if the parents are more aware then they can have
a productive conversation with the technical and the political.
Along the same lines, Brianna (architect) concluded, “You can’t force people to
understand it. And we have to be sensitive in that there are lots of people who have just
hardships around keeping a job, or making enough money, or feeding their kids.”
When discussing the issues of climate change, particularly in marginalized or
economically challenged communities, the reality of priorities comes into play, as Brianna noted.
This perspective further substantiates what Liz stated on the importance of educating children so
they in turn can educate their parents in a way that is conversational, accessible, and not a
burden. Considering the gradual and educative leadership role that design/planning professionals
need to take, Paul used a metaphor of descending a staircase:
When you walk down one step as a time. you might not get down 15 stairs, but you might
get down five or six or seven. As a leader it’s important to let people know that you’re
still on the staircase. You’ve got eight stairs to go, but at least you don’t have 15. And
then people can make decisions about how much farther they want to go. In a postdisaster scenario that translates to where they want to live and the amount of risk that
they want to take. (Paul, engineer)
What has been thematic in this research is the overlap between the professional and
personal. Many professionals whom I interviewed used their professional knowledge but
personally within their own communities. This is a form of servant leadership (Greenleaf, 1977),
wherein the desire to make a positive difference in others’ lives is modulated by using one’s
knowledge in a way that makes room for everyday wisdom to develop in the client group.
Samuel reflected,
I’m very much an optimist; I think you have to be an optimist if you’re in our profession,
but I’m not super optimistic about what’s going to happen in the next 20 years. I find it
hard to believe that we’re going to make any kind of tough choices in the next 15 to 20
years unless something ultra-catastrophic happens. (Samuel, architect)
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Inclusive leadership is intrinsic in Samuel’s response: The best way to deal with tough
times and choices ahead is to engage all in a shared vision.
Look at what happened with New York. It completely flooded the southern part of the
island. What’s been done since then? I would just say that our goal is to give people
information so that they can make informed decisions and somehow do that in a way
that’s compelling [emphasis added]. (Samuel, architect)
There is a sense of shared purpose. Leaders create an environment that is participatory
and transparent. This type of approach in leadership could not only counter the guru effect but
also, as Eli had noted, help with the dilemma professionals have assisting people to make
informed decisions in the middle of a crisis.
A somewhat opposite take on the kind of leadership needed for tackling the
unprecedented design/planning problems after Sandy was advanced by Muriel who said,
We need another Moses,19 a czar, someone tough enough to say, “No, we are not building
here.” The water will rise—and the land will not be there. The big question is how this
will happen? Who has the authority to do this—crack the whip and do this and where
does the money come from? How are we going to deal with this? (Muriel,
communications specialist)
Muriel seemed to be implying this is a leader who is more charismatic in approach, quite
different from other participant perspectives that described an adaptive and inclusive leadership
process for the long-term. However, when one looks at the most famous 20th century leaders
who brought their nations or communities through crises—Roosevelt, Churchill, King, and
Gandhi, for example—charisma paid a huge part in galvanizing people and keeping them
focused on intention during stressful times (House, 1976; Northouse, 2007). While this may be

19

Here, Muriel was referring to Robert Moses, the legendary public official in New York City who in the
mid-20th century was a dominant force in shaping the public infrastructure. His life and work is described
in Caro (1974).
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justified in light of the even more global crisis of climate change, however, the world has many
charismatic leaders who do not necessarily fall on the side of making the climate great again.
I asked Muriel specifically why she feels the design/planning community has not had
better leadership. She responded,
Why isn’t it moving faster? There are too many people employed in this within their
various silos and their own small power base and are more committed to their silos then
to the challenges of the issues . . . We have fires, flooding across the country. Do we just
have a nation of zombies who just can’t move? (Muriel, communications specialist)
I was curious if design/planning professionals viewed the most effective form of
leadership during and after Sandy as leading from the bottom up, top down, or “from the
middle.” Thomas (landscape architect/urban designer) described the most effective form of
leadership being where the horizontal and the vertical come together. He calls it the “middle
out,” where the leader is ever toggling between the horizontal resources of community and the
vertical resources of governments.
Thomas linked the potentially delicate balancing act of leading from the middle to the
need for professional self-awareness. He said this approach depended on,
not being afraid to engage leadership at all levels, and play inside ball, but also play
outside ball and organize with all the non-profits on the ground for those who do not have
access to those resources and just being a connector of resources and a conveyer of
power, in a way, and not a concentrator of power. (Thomas, landscape architect/urban
designer)
Thomas’s description of power and its use is a good example of the positivity of leading from the
middle: the leader as connector of resources, a conveyer, not concentrator of power. Joseph
supported the need for leadership that transcends command versus consensus models. He said,
There is this hierarchical thinking . . . top down notions that the expert will be able to
solve all the problems. We need solutions that not only address complex problems but
complex systems. The hierarchical thinking approaches are not as complex as the scale of
our problems. And while I think it is leading from the middle, I think the bottoms and the
tops have to come together. (Joseph, social activist)
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Roberta’s remarks in response to my asking about leadership went straight to achieving a
more collaborative leadership approach:
I think that we have to put collaboration at the forefront. Sometimes you need to play
rhythm guitar, you don’t always need to be the lead guitar. How do you create this desire
for collaboration as a new trend? [How do we] change our motivation and incentives for
celebrating success? Are we able to say we’re not going to give anymore design awards
for individual contributors? Everything has to be a collaboration. Are we bold enough for
that? (Roberta, architect)
The impacts of Sandy and other climate-impactful events are having consequences on the
societal role designers/planners play. Will this lead to some fundamental changes that may in
fact include, as Roberta notes, “knowing when to play rhythm guitar and when to play the lead.”
One of the puzzles that many of the design/planning professionals spoke of in one way or
another was basically, why isn’t it moving faster; who is in charge here? The participants
acknowledged that designers/planners will need to find their place as leaders of a movement that
is both reflective and proactive. A leadership model that addresses our environmental challenges
may be hard to achieve but, from what the participants observed, greatly needed. These ideas
will be further discussed in Chapter V.
Focus Group Reflections
Ironically, on the day of our focus group call, Hurricane Barry struck the Gulf Coast
causing flooding from Louisiana into Arkansas. I convened the focus group as a means to
triangulate and/or challenge my research data. Zac (architect/planner) was in attendance with
Adam (architect) and Therese (landscape architect/architect). All three of the participants were
recruited through the efforts of Ross, another architect in the study. Adam committed his career
to housing, most specifically affordable housing and community-based design in underserved
communities. Therese is a multi-disciplinary professional whose work integrates ecologically
and socially progressive design and is a leader in resilient urban design. Zac is the founder of a
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planning and architectural firm in which collaboration and community engagement is central to
his work. He is also the only person in the study who was engaged in relocating a community
from a climate-vulnerable location to higher ground (i.e., managed retreat). I provided all the
participants with a series of five questions. One participant, Adam, answered all of the questions
and sent the answers back to me in writing. In providing the questions in advance, I discovered
that the three pillars used in the interview analyses did not align with the more integrated themes
that emerged from the focus group.
Zac, like the interview participants, landscape architect Beryl, architect Eli, planner
Kaasar, urban strategist Mary, and engineer Paul (along with many others in the study)
emphasized the importance of community engagement. Zac referenced a particular project in
Louisiana with extensive community involvement.
People don’t know what they don’t know. We went through an extensive project in South
Louisiana called LA Safe that involves 3,000 people. We had 70 community meetings and
we were able to present to people what the options were, what their future conditions
might look like. It was an enormously complicated, costly exercise but a lot of people’s
awareness was raised. (Zac, architect/planner)
There was then further discussion about being able to be sensitive in how those options
are presented.
Even as simple as what the options are—either you stay here, and this is what your future
is going to look like, or you can move, and your future can be different—you won’t have
the same culture because everyone might not end up in the same place, but these are the
choices based on the facts about sea level rise and that your community is going to be
under water 30 years from now. (Zac, architect/planner)
Therese commented on this from the perspective of how difficult it is to hear the options
when you are feeling so vulnerable. That vulnerability, as further noted in the study extends to
both the community and the designers/planners that are the ones delivering the information.
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I think a lot of people may just feel helpless because they can’t engage with the issue and
giving people an idea of how they can actually do something or help or make their
participation meaningful; it is really important. (Therese, landscape architect/architect)
Therese further expanded upon one of the themes that emerged during interviews on how
designers/planners are making decisions and developing new standards for the purpose of
adaptation but that incentives may not always make the most sense from a personal or financial
perspective.
We are working in Miami Beach developing new standards for how private homeowners
can raise their buildings, adapt their landscape for climate change, and sea level rise of
five feet. The presumption is the city is raising the street by five feet because the
emergency vehicles will have to get to the homes so you as a private homeowner have to
adapt. How do you make this make economic sense? (Therese, landscape
architect/architect)
Therese described that what she has been trying to work through is not only the financial
mechanisms driving decisions on redevelopment of infrastructure in coastal areas but also the
belief that people must have power over nature rather than living with her.
Holly Whyte—The Last Landscape—it was as if it was written yesterday.20 I kind of
couldn’t believe . . . I guess I am surprised we haven’t been able to make more change.
It has to be more than education. Because I feel like people know they just haven’t given
up on the post-War idea that we as humans can control nature and that I don’t know why
we haven’t figured that out. (Therese, landscape architect/architect)
The discussion of managed retreat added another dimension of gravitas to the
conversation because Zac had actually planned and participated in such a move. He also had
more hands-on experience with people in Louisiana in this context than many who worked solo
in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. His insights were invaluable.
People don’t want to move. That’s human nature and no matter how logical we can think
of it being logical. People don’t do logical things all the time Like in Plaquemines Parish
in Louisiana when you have to pay $30,000 a year for insurance then it finally hits you
that it is time to move. And they won’t go no matter what. Those are the things as a
professional that I feel I need to be able to listen to. (Zac, architect/planner)
20

The Last Landscape was written in 1968 by William H. “Holly” Whyte about the urgent need for land
conservation including the concept of protecting open (undeveloped) spaces.
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Therese commented plainly on managed retreat, saying, “A lot of people don’t want to
leave these places because they are home. And that’s what’s makes us human. The humanity of it
is not something to be taken lightly.” Looking at larger global issues like climate change and
migration we also have to foresee the next 2.5 billion people that are going to move into cities
worldwide. This scenario has made professionals like Therese more conscious of the crucial
nature of the role of design.
It has made me more aware of the role of design because that is often neglected and
environmental planning policy not only in anticipation of events like Katrina or Sandy
but I also am concerned about the planned integration of renewable energy systems such
as wind turbines, solar farms, and transmission lines with minimal disruption to the
existing urban and rural fabric. (Therese, landscape architect/architect)
Adam looked at this from the perspective of policy: “I think the country needs a larger
environmental planning policy that looks at all these issues and tries to think proactively and get
mayors and governors to sit and think about this” (Adam, architect).
The focus groups attention then moved to another polarizing theme within the
study—resiliency. Of the three participants in the focus group, Adam was the one who had
worked the most within marginalized neighborhoods. He has been working with NYCHA
housing in Coney Island post-Sandy and that is to continue into 2020. When I raised the question
about resiliency in the context of marginalization, Adam responded, “I can say in New York
resiliency has worked in concert with marginalized communities, in Coney Island where I have
worked since Sandy. I don’t see where it hasn’t. Don’t know what context you found in other
people.”
While Therese did not engage in this part of the discussion, she punted the question to
Zac who acknowledged that it is a very sensitive topic. In the course of the study, this was not
unusual. There were different degrees of comfort level responding to the question. Some had
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little prior awareness of the challenges of resiliency in marginalized communities while for
others the issue was so in the forefront of experience that it brought them to a place of outrage
and sometimes rage.
This is a really touchy subject. Some of you might know about the Green Dot plan for
New Orleans. It was dead on arrival. People were put in harm’s way because they were
placed in low-lying areas and they were told that is where they could live. They were
Black. And it was red lining. And red lining produced low-lying African Americans areas
who communities that were conflicted between resiliency and social justice. (Zac,
architect/planner)
Zac went onto explain that ironically people in those areas, even knowing all this didn’t want to
leave. There were five generations of families there and those homes were their major financial
asset.
It was the only wealth that they were allowed to build so who was going to take that away
from them. It was a very complex [issue] and also confusing. I feel like that are a lot of
places where you can make this kind of comparison. Resiliency is great for people who
can afford to move to higher ground. But it doesn’t work so well for people who can’t.
. . . It doesn’t mean it’s wrong. Maybe the word resiliency has taken on almost an elitist
perspective. I can’t tell you how many people have said they don’t want to use the word
resiliency anymore. (Zac, architect/planner)
Adam wondered what other words were beginning to be used. They were the same ones
brought up earlier in the research: transformation and adaptation. The conversation then returned
to NYCHA/affordable housing and the false sense of safety.
You all bring up the issue of public housing, but in places like Red Hook, transformation
is happening that is changing the nature of that whole community. It is not adapting or
fixing the public housing in ways that are meaningful, but it is suggesting a berm around
an area in a low-lying zone, so you are keeping people in harm’s way and giving them a
false sense of security. (Therese, landscape architect/architect)
Another point raised by Therese is that the landscape is being created by speculative real
estate people: how will they be able to assure people that it is safe. This was a point brought up
earlier by other participants in the study, most specifically Beryl, Brianna, and Jeanine.
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It is problematic and not okay. I don’t think it makes sense to pour public resources into
landscapes that are potentially vulnerable when we could be pouring resources into other
neighborhoods that could be rebuilt better that are already on high ground. (Therese,
landscape architect/architect)
Adam, Zac, and Therese all concurred that no matter the event, what we were all talking
about was people’s feeling about nature, human nature.
We can talk about the environment, we can talk about floods, we can talk about tornadoes
we can talk about fires, we can talk about everything but the real challenge is how we
understand how human nature works—how psychologists spend their lives trying to
figure this stuff out. (Zac, architect/planner)
Zac’s hindsight in the aftermath of Katrina gives a different perspective into what was
previously discussed in the research.
I would say we are beginning the recovery process [2019]. It has taken this long to think
and feel that there are moves we can personally make. All the planning and policies that
people can propose—until we get to the point where people can feel it and touch it, and
have agency about it—then I don’t think we are making much progress. (Zac,
architect/planner)
Especially when they are telling you that you have to leave your family and friends. It is
not going to happen. So, you have to have a lot of agency to make that decision to leave
your family and friends. (Adam, architect)
“And it all costs money. It all costs money” (Therese, landscape architect/architect). At
this point, the conversation evolved into one about wisdom. Zac, along with another participant
in this study, Eli, had spent time with the chief of the Kalinago Indians in Dominica. The chief
explained that his people had lived on their land for 3,000 years and the reason they didn’t lose a
single life during Hurricane Maria was they never built a house near the water. From memory,
Zac paraphrased the Chief’s words on this as follows:
[He had said]: The reason why on our 37,000 acres of tribal land we didn’t lose a single
life is we don’t build our houses near the streams even if it is prettier. We learn from
ancestors. So, there is something about that or, as someone mentioned, we are so built
around technology and that is the new normal to be thinking of not to live with nature but
to live against nature. I think that is real wisdom. Learning to live, plan, and live in
harmony with nature.
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It is problematic and not okay. I don’t think it makes sense to pour public resources into
landscapes that are potentially vulnerable when we could be pouring resources into other
neighborhoods that could be rebuilt better that are already on high ground. (Therese,
landscape architect/architect)
Adam, Zac, and Therese all concurred that no matter the event, what we were all talking
about was people’s feeling about nature, human nature.
We can talk about the environment, we can talk about floods, we can talk about tornadoes
we can talk about fires, we can talk about everything but the real challenge is how we
understand how human nature works—how psychologists spend their lives trying to
figure this stuff out. (Zac, architect/planner)
Zac’s hindsight in the aftermath of Katrina gives a different perspective into what was
previously discussed in the research.
I would say we are beginning the recovery process [2019]. It has taken this long to think
and feel that there are moves we can personally make. All the planning and policies that
people can propose—until we get to the point where people can feel it and touch it, and
have agency about it—then I don’t think we are making much progress. (Zac,
architect/planner)
Especially when they are telling you that you have to leave your family and friends. It is
not going to happen. So, you have to have a lot of agency to make that decision to leave
your family and friends. (Adam, architect)
“And it all costs money. It all costs money” (Therese, landscape architect/architect). At
this point, the conversation evolved into one about wisdom. Zac, along with another participant
in this study, Eli, had spent time with the chief of the Kalinago Indians in Dominica. The chief
explained that his people had lived on their land for 3,000 years and the reason they didn’t lose a
single life during Hurricane Maria was they never built a house near the water. From memory,
Zac paraphrased the Chief’s words on this as follows:
[He had said]: The reason why on our 37,000 acres of tribal land we didn’t lose a single
life is we don’t build our houses near the streams even if it is prettier. We learn from
ancestors. So, there is something about that or, as someone mentioned, we are so built
around technology and that is the new normal to be thinking of not to live with nature but
to live against nature. I think that is real wisdom. Learning to live, plan, and live in
harmony with nature.
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“Addressing these issues more with wisdom than through knowledge,” Zac remarked.
All of the focus group participants agreed that designers/planners had to continue to break down
silos.
We have to engage as many people as we can and break down the silos and bring as
many people in and work towards formulate ideas in a way that people across the country
can begin to buy into what needs to be done and do it. It’s not someone else telling them
what has to be done will be a future. (Adam, architect)
What is implied here is the need for a resurgent wave of action initiated by
designers/planners that spreads within the communities of people across the country (including
their own). The following snippet quotes from the focus group discussion illustrate this point.


“It has to be a movement. We have to think about planning a movement. All we are
doing is putting band aids and twittering around the edges” (Zac, architect/planner).



“There have been a lot of successful movements in this country. Maybe it’s time for a
new one” (Adam, architect).



“That’s where we need to learn those lessons. We can’t tweak our way to get there”
(Zac).



“And we can’t do it through building codes alone” (Adam).



“That’s right. It has to be all of the above” (Therese, landscape architect/architect).



“How do you build a movement?” (Zac)

The whole concept of breaking down silos that could lead to a movement initiated by
designers/planners was something new that had not appeared earlier in the research. What Zac,
Adam, and Therese are suggesting through these words is that tackling the most challenging
issues of climate-impactful events requires a wisdom-based movement. I interpret that as a
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non-siloed approach within which designers/planners work towards a practice which is inclusive
for both people and nature.
Chapter Summary
My effort in presenting these extensive and multilayered discussions has been to ensure
that the rich and thoughtful ideas that the diverse participants voiced, are documented. To do so
has relied on the metaphor of the three pillars subdivided into a total of 16 themes. Chapter V
integrates these themes, considers these findings in light of the extant literature, and proposes
how design/planning professionals affect and have been affected by the climacteric21 now
unfolding, and which is now going to be with us, probably forever.
Designers/planners acknowledge that leadership is desperately needed in the aftermath of
events like Sandy but most did not know where it would come from or, really, what it would
even look like. For leadership in dealing with the climate crisis participants overwhelmingly
believe it is no longer possible or desirable to lead from the top down. What has been thematic in
this research is the overlap between the professional and personal. There is a sense of shared
purpose—and purposes that need to be more widely shared. Leaders, my participants all stated in
one way, must create an environment that is participatory and transparent.
It will take a reshaping of our global system to reclaim the core values of human dignity
and ecological sustainability (Capra & Luisi, 2014). As Talib (architect) argued, “If one creates
their own reality and empowers others to do the same, you are creating a unifying element
between the individual and the larger community.” This connects to designer/planners in

21

Lord Eric Ashby (1978) spoke of the complex transitional time humans are going through as a
“climacteric” (p. 3) more than 40 years ago, rejecting referring to environmental problems as a “crisis.”
He suggested that a crisis is something we get through, albeit often slowly and painfully. A climacteric is
something, Ashby argued, that humanity will have to live with “for the rest of man’s (sic) history on
earth” (p. 3)
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requiring the profession to continually challenge the status quo through design, ecological
balance, and social equity. The practice of designers/planners is not based upon a natural law but
rather a human one. Therefore, it can be challenged and reshaped.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
The focus of this study arose from my research question: “In what ways did experiences
after Hurricane Sandy impact the design/planning professionals’ approach to future
climate-related events personally, professionally, and societally?” This is about how working
within highly charged post-disaster or pre-disaster climate-vulnerable communities, specifically
Hurricane Sandy, broadly impacts design/planning professionals (architects, planners, landscape
architects, and engineers). Within the methodology of an embedded case study with narrative
inquiry, professionals’ individual stories were the lynchpin of the research and served as the best
way to hold and convey the depth of experience and information. It is through these stories that
solutions to address the effects of future hurricanes (superstorms) can be found. This chapter will
discuss the key findings, limitations, and implications for leadership and change that emerged
from this research. Finally, I will conclude with how this research has impacted me personally.
Key Findings
The findings of the study were derived from two stages. In the first stage, interviews were
conducted with architects, planners, landscape architects, and engineers, along with several
tangential but interconnected post-Sandy professionals. This was followed by a second
data-gathering stage, a focus group (consisting of one architect, one architect/planner, and one
landscape architect/architect) which triangulated the data from the study’s interview stage.
All data was gathered using biographical narrative interviewing during which I relied on
minimal questioning or prompts, giving participants wide latitude in structuring their “stories of
Sandy” in their own way. The focus of this research was on the post-Sandy experience and its
ramifications on the design/planning professional. However, many participants also discussed
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other climate-impactful events they experienced before or after Sandy as a means of expanding
upon their responses.
The data were then classified into three pillars: Personal (self/individual, psycho-social
challenges, empathy/stress), Professional (impact to professional practice, reflection on strategies
post-Sandy, impact on future events), and Societal (local and global impacts, leadership). It is
important to note that the research results analysis in Chapter IV included post-Sandy and other
disasters that design/planning professionals worked on before or after Sandy. This chapter
emphasizes the impacts of Hurricane Sandy and its aftermath.
General reflections on Pillar 1 (Personal). This pillar comprises issues that pertain
either to the research participants themselves or to issues that other professionals have faced on
the individual level. This includes topics from psycho-social challenges to emotional and
spiritual well-being. Matters pertaining to depression and stress and the need for empathy and
compassion are also of relevance. Given the rich volume of data discussed in Chapter IV, only
the most prominent themes will be highlighted: permanence/impermanence, grief/empathy/PTSD,
and dignity.
Throughout the interviews, there was a prevailing opinion among design/planning
professionals that their actions carried intergenerational consequences: Design needs to be
considered not merely as a structure that will withstand the test of time, but also serve as a
structure built within the context of the time. Because of that pervasive insight, there was an
existential question emerging that many had not entertained before—impermanence.
Permanence/impermanence. After Hurricane Sandy, a number of the designers/planners
experienced what can only be described as the reality of an unreality; what was once considered
permanent was no longer. How do you reconcile impermanence in the context of a profession,
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specifically architecture, based upon the permanence of structure? This is what Kan and Parry
(2004) referred to as “paradoxical discourse” (p. 482). This occurred, they said,
most often when respondents discussed change efforts that had caused conflict and
misunderstanding for them and others. More specifically, the conditions under which
paradoxical discourse most often took place were when respondents described change
incidents or relationships that involved others with divergent realities. (Kan & Parry,
2004, p. 483)
The motif of impermanence arose not only from a personal or emotional perspective but
as a refocusing of a professional quest for a physical solutions-based perspective. Yet what
makes this particularly paradoxical is that designers/planners are expected to guide solutions that
are going to protect the community in the future, which, conventionally, implies permanence.
When they are designing for storm protection no client wants to hear that structures will not and,
indeed, cannot be built to last. A surprising lesson for me was the different perspective
impermanence played after Sandy for professionals within the different practitioner fields.
One architect reflected that as an immigrant and first generation American, permanence
and legacy were part of the motivator for becoming an architect. However, since Sandy his
perspective has changed with the realization that what he had always thought of as perpetual was
actually so vulnerable. Another participant, Ross (architect), commented further on this:
It was the experience with Sandy of the impermanence of everything that underscored
the paradox that as an architect, you believe that what you build, will last forever. And it
makes me think also about what just happened yesterday with Notre Dame de Paris.22 It
has an intergenerational history; it’s been around longer than you have been alive, and
everything looks so solid—and then you realize it’s not.”
For the landscape architects who participated in this study, the focus is on ecology, not
the built structure. When a landscape architect begins the design process, the focus is on how it

22

Our interview took place just after the revered Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris was severely damaged by
fire in April, 2019.
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will grow and change. They are not dealing with finite objects. One of the landscape architects
described impermanence in the context of the shoreline itself:
When you are dealing with something like Sandy, impermanence becomes your reality. I
feel like the past several hundred years have been about humans moving out into the sea.
Now the next hundred, several hundred years is going to be about the sea moving back
into the land, reclaiming what had once been nature’s own boundaries of permanence.
(Beryl, landscape architect)
Equally, design/planning professionals were deeply impacted, helping people who
sustained severe loss during Sandy and had to help them navigate loss and impermanence.
[They say] “I want it back. I want it back.” It’s not a response of wanting their house
back, it’s a response of, I want it back, I want my life back. They are looking at a global
context that you can’t imagine unless you went through it. That’s a great profound
question and a huge hurdle for the design profession to take in. (Eli, architect)
Perhaps in order to get there, professionals will need to step outside of their usual patterns
of behavior and “… explore the uncharted waters of the art and soul of social change” (Lederach,
2005, p. 63). What he said in reference to peacebuilders could just as easily apply to
designers/planners and their post-Sandy reality, for climate change can become an impetus for
social change.
Grief, empathy, and PTSD. At first glance, empathy and stress seem to have a limited
correlation. In the context of the disaster, one expects victims to be stressed and those who
respond, whether in short or long term, to have empathy as they help. Marking one year after
Sandy, Redlener and Abramson (n.d.) reported on a mental health conference organized by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation which concluded that there were “clear and compelling links
between exposure to natural disasters and increased levels of anxiety, depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and strained marriages and family relations” (para. 16). However, what if
professionals from whom empathy is required are devastated by this same suffering? How are we
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to take care of those who are supposed to be, through their short- and long-term application of
technical planning and related skills taking care of society?
Design/planning professionals are also impacted personally in varying degrees of
magnitude of empathy and resulting stress. While everyone in this study responded with empathy
to the distress of others, it was difficult for most to acknowledge that response or` to recognize
when they needed empathy from others.
Additionally, in 2014, two years after Sandy, the Associated Press–NORC Center for
Public Affairs Research (2014) surveyed 1,009 residents of 12 neighborhoods that were highly
impacted by the hurricane. Keeping in mind that “fear is the key emotion . . . motivating survival
via defensive behaviours” (Cantor, 2009, p. 1038), Leah (architect/planner) said that she doesn’t
talk to anyone about her disaster experience. After seeing the world turned upside down during
Katrina, she developed a lot of “hurricane fear.” Once she knew Sandy was approaching, she left
and returned after the storm to help with the recovery. Commenting on what it has been like
living through this trauma in two completely different cities, and yet how much of it was actually
the same, she said,
It is the sense of a place being turned inside out and how upsetting that is to see. That’s
even more [traumatizing] than seeing a house demolished or in the middle of the street
and to see a family’s contents on the curb. (Leah, architect/planner)
While much has been written on how individuals within a community are impacted in the
context of recovery efforts, it is unusual for a study to focus on the impact of grief, empathy, and
PTSD on design/planning professionals. Focusing on shared trauma of mental health
professionals and their patients in the context of post-Hurricane Katrina, Boulanger (2013)
commented, “Neither clinicians nor their patients in New Orleans had anticipated the long
psychological reach of adult onset trauma; [there are] catastrophic and sometimes chronic
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disruption of fundamental aspects of self-experience that survivors of life-threatening disasters
may face” (p. 32).
When asked if they felt Sandy had impacted them in a way suggestive of PTSD, research
participants seemed to show a general feeling of discomfort, either because the idea had never
occurred to them, did not apply to all of them, or the very association made them uneasy. There
were, however, three interviewees who had a personal association with the term. They felt their
knowledge was both a blessing and a curse. They knew “too much” about how climate affects
city infrastructure and coastlines. Robert (architect) commented that while talking to
homeowners in The Rockaways, he was trying to process this tragedy while simultaneously
providing guidance, and felt like he was experiencing PTSD.
Even if members of the study did not directly identify with experiencing PTSD, they did
acknowledge the considerable difficulty design professionals face in their emotional response in
the midst of major and traumatic disasters.
Dignity. While I have chosen to categorize the concept of dignity as part of the personal
pillar, it was referenced in all three pillars from a variety of perspectives. Anthony (2017), an
African American architect, regional planner, and social justice activist, wrote: “We must forge a
new path illuminated by justice, respect for the dignity of each and every human being, and
determination to maintain and restore the web of life as the foundation for health and
sustainability” (p.168).
With the fostering of greater understanding into human nature, comes the question of
dignity, its loss or maintenance. From my perspective, dignity within this context extends not
just to human dignity but the dignity of nature herself. Hicks (2011), an associate at the
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Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, is in the field of international conflict resolution,
stated, “Dignity is at the heart of our soul. It’s part of the shared human condition” (p. 1).
One of the planners who participated in this study talked about the importance of helping
people maintain their dignity with small, simple acts: a warm blanket, bottled water, or a place to
charge a phone. A social activist/storyteller spoke about the importance of witnessing someone
else’s story in the context of dignity. “It is about honoring the dignity of the person [in the
community] telling the story. You know there is some value to being both a storyteller and being
a witness to someone else’s story” (Esther, activist/storyteller). Talib (architect) pointed out that
there is also a kind of dignity in understanding how people live after a disaster that needs to be
part of the narrative. He said, “Dignity doesn’t only have to do with shelter, and food, and
hygiene; people still need to form community.”
Ultimately, it will take a reshaping of the global system of wealth and poverty to reclaim
what are the core values of human dignity and ecological sustainability (Capra & Luisi, 2014).
This may depend on rediscovering and applying longstanding visions from an Indigenous
perspective that sees and lives unity between people and the environment (Deloria, 1997; L.
Smith, 2013). To creates one’s own reality and empower others to do the same, serves as a
unifying element between the individual and the larger community. That is probably the richest
and most lasting form of dignity applicable to the setting of post-disaster professional work with
vulnerable and marginalized populations
General reflections on Pillar 2 (Professional). This pillar is about the impacts on the
work of planners and designers involved in in the aftermath of Sandy. The underlying issue was
how, if at all, the nature of what they do, especially their underlying “theory in practice” (Argyris
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& Schön, 1980), was affected by the often unprecedented challenges in their professional work
required in the days, months, and even years after the storm.
Sandy had left the professionals in this study within terms of defining and refining their
practices. Varied as the responses appeared to be on the surface, what was most striking was the
heightened importance of reflective and reflexive practice. Donald Schön (1983) wrote about the
underlying process of reflection-in-action with professional practitioners (including two chapters
on each of design and planning). He concluded that
[Different] professions draw on very different bodies of professional knowledge. But
. . . there are also similarities. In both . . . the practitioner approaches the practice problem
as a unique case. He does not act as though he has no relevant prior experiences; on the
contrary. But he attends to the peculiarities of the situation at hand. In neither example is
the problem given …The situation is complex and uncertain . . . These points of
similarity create the conditions for reflection-in-action. (Schön, 1983, pp. 128–129)
Schön’s comment unquestionably described what a number of the participants were
saying in various ways. They stepped into the post-Sandy context and tried to apply their
“relevant prior experiences” but were often overwhelmed with the “peculiarities of the
situation.” Furthermore, rather than paralyzing them they reflected more deeply on the nature
and implications of the technical practices that they would typically employ. This reflection led
to new thoughts and, most important, to new questions that participants found distinct from their
past experiences.
Model for a more reflective design process. “Sandy made it clear that the way we were
building things was wrong. It was no longer going to work,” noted Eric Klinenberg (2018,
p. 101), who served as research director of Rebuild by Design. “There was an urgent need to
design things differently. We all wanted a different outcome and that meant we were all open to
a different process” (Ovink & Boeijenga, 2018, p. 101). The objective was for Rebuild by
Design to be a new model, more holistic in nature, in concert with each specific community and
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with sources of funding and leadership that involve non-profit organizations with a history of
community-based change locally and worldwide. This was an example, that was at the time, was
breaking new ground by broadening awareness and maximizing interdisciplinary involvement.
It also was about slowing down the design process so that there was time for reflection
with the professionals engaged with the community rather than rushing to solutions. Olshansky
et al. (2012) establishes the compression of time as one of the distinguishing factors between
post-disaster conditions and normal times. “Post-disaster recovery takes place in a different
world where the community does not function as it does in normal places (Johnson & Olshansky,
2016, p. 8). Therefore, strategic decisions that set up a structure for reflection and dialogue
becomes all the more critical.
One of the engineers, in pondering the importance of recovery and how to prevent the
same level of damages in the future, said the question had become, “How do you get back to
normal faster through the redundancy of systems in place? Preparedness was also a big part of
reducing loss of life in Sandy” (Paul).
Funding. Another point of reflection was about money. Design/planning professionals
who are accustomed to planning and implementing single projects generally can make a
reasonably accurate estimate on how much it will cost. In contrast, recovery planning for an
occurrence like Sandy is wrought with uncertainty given the staggering costs of restoration. The
political posturing and promises compound the financial challenge and its uncertainty in the
wake of disasters. Many of the recovery professionals interviewed commented that political
changeability added to the difficulty of securing municipal or federal funding.
Optimism. Were these professionals going to be able to keep pace with the environmental
changes and prepare adequately for the next Sandy-like events? The responses from the
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professionals in the story were varied but always tending toward optimistic. As Eli noted, “It
depends on what side of the bed you wake up on. You’re hopeful one day and the next day you
look at it and say, ‘We’re not going to make it, in terms of transformation and time.’”
Several participants felt that society as a whole, is not prepared to make tough choices in
the next 15 to 20 years unless something ultra-catastrophic happens. These include retreating
from the most vulnerable locations versus staying in place and facing unforeseeable but probably
disaster. Rebuilding may not be the wisest choice when there is no alternative place to either
move or stay. Yet, how does this get taken into account when people have a much-valued home
and/or community that they have lived in for generations? Eli (architect) concluded,
There is no silver bullet. We can go through all of those analogies that we are all really
well at saying. We can pledge to become the greenest and most resilient county on the
planet but then to get there it comes down to the common person [and] engaging them
with the profession [is very difficult].
The professionals in this study were aware of the extraordinary vulnerability for future
events that are certain to destroy property and take or ruin lives. “It’s 525 miles of shoreline in
the city, so just do the math” (Beryl, landscape architect).
General reflections on Pillar 3 (Societal). This pillar described the broader social issues
that emerged from the interviews. The participants had very different perspectives and
approaches to their work with neighborhoods, the city, and other regions. There were two
significant findings within this pillar: lack of justice and equal treatment for marginalized
communities and lack of diversity and inclusion within the design/planning profession.
Post-Disaster—Lack of justice and equal treatment for marginalized communities.
Hurricane Sandy did not discriminate: The storm wiped out homes of owners and renters,
wealthy, working class and the poor. However, aid to communities and the speed in which it
arrived vividly showed bias. I witnessed this personally while on the ground working in Coney
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Island. After hours of waiting for water and blankets, food relief organizations went first to
Seagate (a middle class community) but made no attempt to distribute aid to the NYCHA
(comprising the lower socio-economic class reliant on regular government social assistance )
community, which was located directly outside of the gates. Ultimately, several of the
participants from this study built support from within the NYCHA community. There were
residents who knew well what was needed and who began the distribution themselves. In sharing
this story Talib observed,
Don’t construct a whole reality for them through your own eyes. And this is why it’s so
important for designers to understand because of what we do. We interpret peoples’
wants and desires into physical space. We need to begin to change the paradigm to “I’m
not going to stand up for you, I’m going to stand with you.” (Talib, architect)
His comment was an awakening for me as I became aware of my unconscious
bias—acting on “standing up for others” rather than “standing up with others.”
Several participants particularly noted the influence of race on the ability to collaborate
and cooperate. Joseph (social activist) spoke of trying to get people to understand how to
problem solve better with people that don’t look like them. He paraphrased a strongly worded
view from the community:
“Just because you live five blocks away from where I live, doesn’t mean you know what
it’s like living here.” Those are the assumptions people make and most of the time those
assumptions fall down the line of race and class. (Joseph, social activist)
One of the key findings of this study is that while the role that race, gender, and
socioeconomic composition of the design/planning profession was significant within the
Personal Pillar, it is of equal, if not more importance that it be included in the discussion of the
lack of diversity within the profession itself.
The lack of diversity and inclusion within the design/planning profession. In 1968,
Whitney M. Young, Jr., civil rights activist and, at that time, Executive Director of the National

285
Urban League, gave the keynote address at the AIA National Convention. He stated, “You are
not a profession that has distinguished itself by your social and civic contributions to the cause of
civil rights . . . You are most distinguished by your thunderous silence” (American Institute of
Architects, 2019, para. 4). At the time, Young was critical of the high-rise housing projects that
were being built in some of the poorest and toughest neighborhoods. He questioned why there
wasn’t pushback from the profession. The AIA responded to his speech by launching a task force
focused on opening the profession to minority groups. An article in Curbed (2017) on race and
architecture made the following points:
Though African Americans made up 13 percent of the total U.S. population at the last
census, only 2 percent of licensed architects in the U.S. are African-American, according
to the National Association of Minority Architects (NOMA). In 2007, African American
women made up a scant two-tenths of a percent of licensed architects in the U.S., for a
total of just 196 practitioners. (The University of Cincinnati’s database of African
American architects reports an increase in that number, to 385, of a total 107,581 licensed
practitioners in the U.S.). (para. 5)
Talib reinforced how architecture as a profession distances marginalized groups from the
very nature of design:
The interface that most Black people in this country have with architecture is in spaces
that are given. So, it’s spaces that are designed and handed to them. Instead of spaces that
they’ve had agency in creating. You can connect it to any kind of communities, from the
Jewish ghettos in Europe to modern ghettos . . . spaces that are either left over—or we
design what the reality is for you instead of allowing you an individual agency. (Talib,
architect)
This professional indifference was noted by Whitney Young, Jr. and by critics of the
design of public housing/urban renewal half a century ago (Gans, 1965; Goodman, 1971;
J. Jacobs, 1961; Krumholz, 1982). “So, we need to be able to take a hold of the complexity,
recognizing the leadership of the very people who are directly impacted; leadership of women,
Indigenous people, folks of color . . . we absolutely have to do that” (Joseph/social activist).
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Joseph’s point goes directly to power dynamics and the kind of leadership that will be
needed in the times ahead and can provide the opportunity for a shift in the dynamics of design,
power, and social justice.
In June 2020, as I am finalizing this dissertation, the New York chapter of the AIA,
prompted by COVID-19, the death of George Floyd and resulting mass demonstrations locally,
nationally, and globally, issued a statement titled “Dismantling Injustice and Systemic Racism”
(AIA New York & Center for Architecture, 2020). Aiming to “amplify the voices of people of
color in our profession” (AIA New York & Center for Architecture, 2020, para. 6), this striking
and brief document links the tragic death of a Minneapolis man, George Floyd, through police
brutality, the COVID-19 pandemic with its disproportionate negative impacts on people of color,
as “glaring inequality [that] serves as a call to action” (AIA New York & Center for
Architecture, 2020, para. 3). This advocacy converges with the findings and implications of this
study and the urgency for a more racially, gender and economically diverse design/planning
community of professionals.
Resilience. While the term resilience is becoming more and more entrenched in the
recovery, planning, and design nomenclature, it has many definitions. It is derived from the Latin
word, resilio, meaning “to jump back” (Klein et al., 2003, p. 35). Probably one of the earliest
uses of resilience in environmental science was by Holling (1973) and his associates whose
primary interest was not in disasters but how disturbed natural populations ecosystems return to
prior functioning, if not identical equilibrium points, after major perturbations.
The 2013 final SIRR report (PlaNYC, 2013) referred to resiliency as “bouncing back.”
While expressed as something positive, in the context of marginalized communities, it would not
be experienced as necessarily positive if bouncing back meant returning communities to the
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status quo. Resilience has as much to do with shaping the challenges being faced as responding
to them. Similar to the distinctions between permanence and impermanence, resiliency is viewed
differently for landscape architects than it is for architects, planners, or engineers. Thomas
landscape architect/urban designer) described resiliency in nature as something that is not static
but relational. He called it a four- not three-dimensional mirroring of the cycle of nature. He
suggested, “Instead of a separation of people and nature, it assumes oneness, the inseparability of
people and nature.”
Participants noted that resiliency has become a brand and may be losing its clarity of
purpose by turning into a marketing gimmick for big business and big government. In this it is
not unlike sustainability, which steadily transmuted (Foster, 2012) in the years after being first
popularized in the Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future (World Commission on
Environment and Development, 1987). Samuel, one of the architects interviewed for this study,
said this:
I think one of the challenges we've seen globally is that everybody's trying to come up
with a kind of branded and graphically fascinating attempt to address resiliency. We care
less about that, about the brand of the thing, right, whatever that ultimate platform is. We
care more about getting the information out.
Some study participants spoke critically about people claiming expertise in the fields of
sustainability and resiliency but who lack the requisite knowledge and experience. Several of the
participants were against the concept of resiliency. They have seen it not only quickly becoming
a catch phrase but also as actually furthering a more colonialist and economically privileged
agenda. The concern is that those who are privileged always want the status quo to bounce back
no matter the nature of the disruption. This is articulated by Graham, Debucquoy, and
Anguelovski (2016) in the aftermath of Sandy:
As the concept of (urban) resilience continues to gain popularity and more municipalities
are engaging in urban resilience interventions and adaptation planning, further research is
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needed to assess how community-based organizations can be supported in resilience
efforts and how unintended consequences of resilience interventions might exacerbate or
create new socio-spatial inequities. (p. 121)
Also, Amundsen (2012) cautioned,
There is a risk that community resilience may be an illusion, leading to complacency
about the need for adaptation to multiple factors of change. Hence, the ability of
communities to actively engage in reflexive learning processes is of importance for both
adaption and future resilience. (Abstract)
Many of the designers/planners in this interview debated what comes after resiliency.
Many have begun using the word transformation instead of resiliency because the term resiliency
can have differing contexts and meanings (Zac, architect/planner; Eli, architect; Beryl, landscape
architect).
Managed retreat. Managed retreat was one of the most controversial issues raised by the
participants in this study. It is a professional dilemma as it forces decisions between what is
technically best and what communities want. Listen to the science, or listen to the people?
Koslov (2016) focused her research on Staten Island, the site of the most deaths in New York
City attributable to Sandy. Her findings ran contrary to the notion that those most affected will
“bravely” reject managed retreat, similar to Mayor Michael Bloomberg who adamantly stated,
“As New Yorkers, we cannot and will not abandon our waterfront. It’s one of our greatest assets.
We must protect it, not retreat from it” (as cited in Koslov, 2016, pp. 360–361). In the years
since that report, it has been acknowledged that buyout and managed retreat needs to be
considered as the science points to an increase in sea level rise and vulnerability to coastal
communities. Very much on the minds of participants in this study was how to begin a
conversation on managed retreat. “So, when you talk about retreat, are we providing solutions?
Retreat to what?” (Ross, architect). They claimed that the quality of the relationship that
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design/planning professionals established with affected local people would impact the manner in
which conversations were conducted and different choices were considered.
Managed retreat may have the most challenging effects on individuals and communities
without the financial solvency to relocate. However, fear and uncertainty of relocation knows no
economic boundaries. In the last five years, managed retreat has been referenced instead as a
form of adaptation (Beryl, landscape architect; Roberta, architect; Hannah, planner). Without
discussions about what retreat from certain areas would look like, or how to adaptively keep
people safely in place, the more crucial it is to examine how low-income communities are
disproportionately impacted.
Hino, Field, and Mach (2017) defined managed retreat as “the strategic relocation of
structures or abandonment of land to manage natural hazard risk” (p. 364). In considering
managed retreat and marginalized communities, the conversation with this study’s participants
more often than not circled back to the “experts” who make the assessments and conclude
whether it is best if people stay or go. In the context of lessons learned after Sandy for
designers/planners, one of the architects summed it up in the context of managed retreat in this
manner:
The first step is to assess risk from the standpoint of the community. What are the risk
factors now and how does that dovetail with future projections? I think we have to
understand that we seldom see risk from the eyes of those who live through it. If we don’t
we are simply mindless technocrats not practitioners. (Kaasar, planner)
Summary of key findings. While there are projections of what the future may hold, there
are no assurances. One of key findings was that from impermanence and uncertainty come
reflection about who design/planning professionals are after being impacted personally,
professionally, and societally. As many within the study expressed, it will become increasingly
harder to not address issues of social justice, diversity, and economic inequity as more urban
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populations are being impacted by Hurricane Sandy-like events. This extends not only to
communities within urban populations but within the profession itself. Further reflection on these
key findings bring to mind the following: In the context of both resiliency and managed retreat,
transparency and a willingness to be guided by the very people designers/planners are called
upon to serve remains an important part of the professional interpersonal dynamic. This
translates into, “We must support the strong. We must give courage to the timid. We must
remind the indifferent, and we must warn the opposed. Civil rights, which are God given and
constitutionally guaranteed, are not negotiable in 1963” (Whitney Young, Educational Radio
Network coverage of the 8/28/1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom). My challenge
to designers/planners in response to these key findings is this: What is not negotiable in 2020?
Limitations of the Research
There were three key limitations to this research. These limitations pertained to ethnic or
racial diversity, experience within the field, and professional diversity. First, there was an
underrepresentation of racial diversity within the study. To reiterate, problems faced by
marginalized populations is a significant theme in this study. This relates not only to those in
affected communities but also to the professionals within the field. The questions stands out:
Would first-hand experience growing up in a marginalized and disaster-affected community
influence professionals’ views of resilience, managed retreat, or how they proceed with
post-disaster recovery and planning? Late in this study I became aware of an initiative that are
promising in terms of a start at rectifying the design/planning professions’ underrepresentation of
long-time marginalized groups, the ones, as this study has shown, who ironically and tragically
are usually the ones most impacted by climate change-driven disasters. BlackSpace (2020)
comprises “Black urban planners, architects, artists, activists, and leaders working to protect and
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create Black spaces” (para. 1). Architect and educator Sekou Cooke (2020) has recently offered a
compelling perspective on “Blackness and Architecture in America” (para. 5). He pondered
openly, “Maybe there is a parallel to be drawn between the lack of Black perspectives within the
architectural ‘we’ and the inability of the architectural profession to find a suitable response to
the current state of social justice” (Cooke, 2020, para. 8). So clearly a study like the present one
that finds its own ways to be inclusive could contribute enormously to foreseeing how
designer/planners can work better with and for marginalized communities.
A second limitation to the research was not interviewing professionals with less than 10
years of experience. Over time, there has been more information about climate change in the
mainstream media. Would there be quite different results in a study if the sample was drawn
more from younger professionals who have grown up with climate change a more inescapable
truth now and for the future? It is frequently suggested that Millennials are more aware of
climate change (e.g., Meehan, 2019) and that it plays an important part in how they think about
the future. The current version of global climate movement, as invigorated by 17-year-old Greta
Thunberg (Leiserowitz et al., 2018; Meehan, 2019), is one such example. However, recent
applied research on climate-related risk and risk management options suggest that this is not
necessarily the case. In fact, in some cases, the younger generations are less concerned than older
generations and do substantially less to combat it (Costache & Sencovici, 2019; Gray, Raimi,
Wilson, & Árvai, 2019). No matter the overall trends, how younger generations of
designers/planners perceive climate change is of paramount importance to the way in which
these fields move forward.
Lastly among limitations, there were issues with the types of professionals I was able to
interview. I had hoped to have a greater cross-section of engineers as part of the study. But many
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engineers that I had invited to participate declined because I worked with a firm that was seen as
a competitor. Additionally, there were no participants engaged in the study who were climate
deniers. Perhaps this meant missing the perspectives of professionals with radically different
points of view on the approach to recovery and planning in the future.
Future Leadership for Designers/Planners
The natural environment is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the
responsibility of everyone. If we make something our own, it is only to administer it for
the good of all. If we do not, we burden our consciences with the weight of having denied
the existence of others. (Pope Francis, 2015, Article 95)
At some juncture, designers/planners will need to find their place as leaders of a
movement in which designers/planners take both a reflective and proactive stance to both climate
and social justice. A leadership model that addresses our environmental challenges may be hard
to achieve, but greatly needed. Based on the themes garnered from this study, to achieve
effective design/planning, professionals now working in the face of rapid climate change, would
need to do the following:
embrace shared community-based solutions rooted in dignity and inclusivity;
balance the present with the designing/planning for future generations;
witness other people’s stories and be aware of personal and cultural biases.
recognize the kinship between human nature and mother nature;
affirm that social, economic, and environmental justice are non-negotiable.
The following are four leadership theories that embody this ambitious agenda:
complex adaptive leadership,
servant leadership with inclusive leadership,
leadership in place, and
Indigenous leadership.
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Designers/planners within this study have exhibited both the capacity and desire to lead
change that might otherwise not be possible. This will require leadership such frameworks to
challenge status quo and reaches beyond personal ambition.
Complex adaptive leadership/Real-time strategic change. Addressing the multifarious
issues of Sandy’s aftermath requires the ability to work within a complex adaptive system, which
Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey (2008) defined as a framework where hierarchical structures
and the needs of individuals and groups of individuals overlap and must be addressed
interdependently. This can be particularly challenging when the needs of the individuals and these
hierarchal structures conflict and leadership within a relational context becomes increasingly
critical to generating system-wide solutions that are not dictatorial but interactive in approach.
The adaptive leadership model can be an effective tool in achieving these results because it
provides an overarching framework that provides for engagement and coordination among
administrative, adaptive, and enabling leadership, in particular between a complex adaptive
system and bureaucracy (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008, p. 199).
Thus, while leadership within a complex adaptive systems may provide the ability to
adapt swiftly and creatively to environmental changes (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008), immediately after
a disaster like Sandy, there is a period of shock followed by the gradual awareness that not only
is the situation catastrophic, it is even worse than anyone had initially expected. In the aftermath,
victims will look to first responders to make decisions and take action to deliver emergency
services. However, because damaged public infrastructure to impacted communities (roads,
electrical power grid, water, and sewage, etc.) makes entry inaccessible, actual on-the-ground
contact with people and professionals outside the community can be greatly delayed. This can
result in a form of disequilibrium described by Plowman and Duchon (2008) as “people and
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groups interacting, exchanging information, and taking adaptive actions without the intervention
of someone occupying the central controller . . . calling into question the purpose of leadership,
as it is traditionally viewed” (p. 134). This is the scenario that designers/planners as the second
wave of responders would probably experience.
In the case of Sandy, communication was cut off when the power went out and people
within these heavily impacted communities had to mobilize without any formal leadership
structure. With no central authority, leadership was exercised through interaction with your
neighbors or local grassroots assistance, a form of “enabling adaptive responses to challenges
through network-based problem solving” emerged (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008, p. 196). During Sandy,
this type of adaptive structure was critical to the survival of many individuals as well as
providing a structure into which design/planning professionals could begin the process of
reassessment, rebuilding, and planning.
Given the complexity of post-Sandy issues, real time strategic change (R. W. Jacobs,
1997) would augment the adaptive leadership approach. Real time strategic change deliberately
includes multiple stakeholders where aligned action is required and results need to be achieved in
radically reduced time frames. Consistent with the participants’ views, this approach advocates
for participants within a community to interact with their internal leaders, outside experts, and
each other forming a collective framework for analyses and strategy development.
It is, how you co-create this process in a way that works for the way that you live as a
community and build a mutual responsibility and hope that is key to leadership. You sit
down with someone and say, tell me how you see this place. (Roberta, architect)
The three phases of real time strategic change assist in the consideration of multiple
possibilities for moving forward post-disaster. This collective design complements the
uniqueness of a group’s culture, needs, and constraints, “ultimately allowing a community to
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develop their own road map which symbolizes the power and possibilities of the collective” (R.
W. Jacobs, 1997, p. 276).
Bringing alignment of purpose among core community leaders and designers/planners
will help build a solid foundation between strategies, actions, processes, systems, practices,
scope, scale, and plan. This becomes the basis of translating actions and ideas into something
tangible that can be implemented as short-term achievable victories and longer-term phased
implementation.
Servant and inclusive leadership. A leader within the design/planning community must
be both reflective and proactive. Their actions must be guided by a high level of self-awareness
combined with a commitment to be of service for the greater good. This description is aligned
with Greenleaf’s (1977) model of servant leadership. Servant leadership is based on a model of
service and has the capacity to produce outcomes in the context of vulnerable circumstances. This
is a model that is about human nature and making life better for others rather than doing things at
the expense of others. This does not imply that servant leaders are powerless. Power is a tool that
can serve the moment and be passed onto others. As Greenleaf said, “Servant-leaders differ from
other persons of goodwill because they act on what they believe. . . . and there is a sustaining
spirit when they venture and risk” (as cited in Keith, 2008, p. 71). Servant leaders are active
listeners, gather feedback, support the expression of others, and create living systems within
which everyone can participate. This approach aligns with one study participant’s comment that
“Leaders need be a bridge between the earth herself and the people living on the earth.” Leaders
would therefore need to be exercise wisdom and meaning that goes beyond their own personal
goals and ambitions.
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It is challenging for leaders to adopt this stance given the rapid change, human
vulnerability to injury and loss, and a highly emotionally-charged circumstances of a
post-disaster environment. “With its strong altruistic and ethical overtones,” writes Northouse
(2007), servant leadership “emphasizes that leaders should be attentive to the concerns of their
followers and empathize with them; they should take care of them and nurture them” (p. 348).
This is leadership of social responsibility, social justice, and equanimity. Would this idealistic
leadership model be able to stand up to the harsh realities of disaster-related events? Given the
views of the professionals canvassed in this study, a leadership theory that values everyone
within the community and fosters dignity, trust, and strength, is exactly what is needed after the
post-Sandy losses and recovery. In the context of post-disaster/climate change leadership, I
would position inclusive leadership as closely allied with servant leadership largely because of
its parallel emphasis on consensus. It is a good combination of the aspirational (servant
leadership) and the pragmatic (inclusive leadership).
Inclusive leadership is an approach within which members of the community and local
authority feel valued, respected, and engaged in a shared vision. Inclusive leaders, create and
support integrated groups that cross boundaries (geographic, professional, cultural, etc.) and are
valued both for who they are and for their ideas. Not all people engaged need to be leaders but
can still be made to feel like owners with an empowered stake in their own future. Diverse voices
can be heard and approaches can be more consistent with the common goal of achieving
consensus that serves many constituent groups. Inclusive leaders are authentic in their approach
and respect for others—they are committed to diversity. “Not being afraid to engage leadership
at all levels, and play inside ball, but also play outside ball,” was critical to leadership
post-Sandy world, from Thomas’s perspective. As a landscape architect/urban planner, he further
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noted the importance of “being a connector of resources and a conveyer of power, and not a
concentrator of power.”
Leadership in place. Leadership in place is another important potential leadership model
in the context of dealing with climate change. As described by Wergin (2004), it is,
A form of leadership that deliberately avoids any trappings of hierarchy and privilege, or
any form of formal authority at all. Instead, it’s a type of lateral leadership that promotes
collaboration and joint exploration of issues, with decisions that are built on solid,
evidence-based deliberation. (p. 2)
While Wergin posited this form of leadership in an academic environment, it has direct
applicability to cities and community-based adaptation given that it is based more on human
exchange than power and creates space for people outside of the traditional top-down
hierarchical model. In the case of climate-impacted cities and communities, formal authority,
while an integral part of the equation for implementation and change, is ineffective without
in-place leaders. Wergin (2004, 2007), drawing upon Heifetz’s (1994) adaptive learning and
Mezirow’s (1991) transformative learning, created a much-needed balance in leading and
learning, needs and process.
The inclusiveness within the leadership in place model and servant leadership does have
specific value when looking at leadership and fostering effective design responses within
post-disaster communities. Additionally, the key points that foster adaptive leadership and
transformative learning seemed like a made-to-order manual of the responsibilities leaders
should embrace in communities impacted by climate disaster: “Go deep . . . Be patient with
distress . . . Attend to needs . . . Monitor the process . . . Record progress” (Chapman & Randall,
2007, p. 60).
Advancing Mezirow’s model (1991) and looking through the lens of Sandy,
designers/planners along with a government agency or a local grassroots group would need to
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become co-learners and leaders so that people around them can determine what adaptation and
transformation looks like for them and mobilize to bring them into effect. These events are
personal but also contextual and situational. While there are shared solutions, they are also not
necessarily one-size-fits-all. Even at the most local scale this variability must be kept in mind.
Someone from the eastern end of The Rockaways would experience the storm and its aftermath
differently than someone from the western end.
The advantage of the leadership in place model in a post-Sandy environment is that at
different points in the process one person may be a leader and at a different time, a follower
depending on the events that are unfolding and how it is impacting the situational dynamic. The
model calls for and enables leadership as fluid as the context in which it must be exercised.
Indigenous leadership. What is missing from the leadership theories noted thus far is a
framework focused on both the human and natural worlds, as well as on storytelling. An
approach is needed to “promote partnerships that foster effective climate solutions from both
Western and Indigenous perspectives” (Cochran et al., 2013, p. 50). “What is also needed is an
approach that engages storytelling,” wrote Kenny (2012, p. 1 ), an Indigenous scholar of
leadership. She continued, “For thousands of years prior to colonization, leadership in
Indigenous communities was based upon the character of the land and the needs of the people in
their traditional territories” (p. 1). She explained the power and centrality of storytelling in
achieving such leadership: “Stories are a creative act of leadership through which we manifest
our solidarity and strengthen our people to take their next steps in encouraging good and healthy
lives” (Kenny, 2012, p. 1).
In the course of interviewing design/planning professionals for this study, my objective
has been to understand how these complex problems have impacted them personally,
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professionally, and societally. After completing the analysis of the research, it was clear that the
participants’ stories are necessary for a deeper understanding of the profession in the wider
context of humans as part, not at war with, nature. These personal experiences will contribute to
the profession as the built environment takes on changes that many leaders within the field have
not seen in their lifetime or are ill-prepared to even imagine. “Stories, especially in the oral
tradition,” wrote Kenny (2012), “provide powerful bridges that connect our histories, our
legends, our senses, our practices, our values, and, fundamentally, our sustainability as peoples”
(p. 4).
There is an intergenerational aspect to Indigenous leadership that looks at seventh
generational thinking within a multi-generational framework (Gutierrez, 2012, p. 97). This is
where lived experience integrates with shared knowledge. This is the place from which wisdom
is born. Given the complexity of climate impactful events, and the impacts on design/planning
professionals and the communities they serve, stories of reflection that connect us to our hearts,
the earth, and to each other, will grow increasingly important. One of the architects from the
study thought that one of the leader’s important qualities would be to “find the answer to how
you talk to one generation about the future of the next generation” (Samuel).
Future Research and Practice
This research served as an initial guidepost for a more holistic approach for
designers/planners to consider as they tackle the challenges of post-disaster adaption in the
future. There are a number of significant areas that lend themselves to future research using
mixed methods and action research methodologies.
What is the relationship between design, power, and social justice? A study exploring
this relationship would deepen what has already been discussed in this study. Ideally,
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the community would lead the design and the designers/planners would act as a
resource as facilitators and docents.
A study that focuses on the interrelationship between designers/planners and
peacekeepers. The study would look at the similarity and/or differences in the
challenges they each face; where their practices intersect and what the two
professions can learn from each other.
A study that focuses on designers/planners with less than 10 years of experience with
an emphasis on a diverse representation of participants. The broader sampling would
help to deepen understanding of intergenerational/intragenerational and racially and
ethnically diverse perspectives.
The findings from this study offer feedback to professional programs in architecture,
landscape architecture, planning and engineering. Future applied research could
address identifying and testing out new skill sets or interdisciplinary courses to enable
emerging professionals who will have to grapple with a rapidly changing earth
environment and vulnerable communities. For example, should there be courses
specific kinds of courses in trauma psychology, conflict resolution, Indigenous
philosophy and leadership, and storytelling as part of a core curriculum?
Create a six-month series of design charettes where Native American and a larger
cross-section of designers/planners of color work with a cross-section of participants
from this study to look at where local challenges can create global solutions. Possible
sites in the United States could include Rockaway or Red Hook; Isle de Charles/New
Orleans; Sonoma, California; Tangier Island (climate deniers); Anchorage or Barrow,
Alaska.
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Conduct a series of design charettes led by developers to re-imagine real estate in
NYC in the next 50 years.
In addition, an area of complementary future research could involve community members
in collaboratively assessing the work and accomplishments of architects, planners, landscape
architects, and engineers. Community-based participatory action research (Genat, 2009) could be
used to identify what was strong and supportive, and what was not, as professionals planned and
implemented post-Sandy projects and initiatives. In the end, improvement and/or fundamental
change to professional practice in the aftermath of major climate-change induced events, must be
significantly defined and evaluated by those most affected.
Significance of This Research
The designers/planners of this study have shared their insight, wisdom, an understanding
of the vulnerabilities, fears, and resilience of communities that have endured the fury of
Sandy. I intend that the personal narratives of this research will provide a point of reflection
for the designer/planners within the profession. This is foreshadowed so well in the words of
Isabel Lopez’s (2000) “Finding Wisdom and Purpose in Chaotic Times”:
Only through reflection do we find our purpose and the core of who we are. Reflection
enables us to become our own teachers, and we never finish––never finish taking our
own class, reading our own heart, and liberating our own spirit. Reflection forces us to
face our own lives and beliefs. . . . Perhaps the greatest gift of reflection is that we . . . can
find the place that is true for us, the place where passion and serenity meet, both
personally and professionally. (p. 85)
In the intersection between the personal, professional, and societal lies the understanding
of not only how these individuals responded to challenges on the ground but how they were
impacted by it. These shared experiences can support a dialogue between designers/planners that
might otherwise not be exchanged. Further, these narratives have insights that show the
importance of having a more racial, gender, and economically diverse community of
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professionals. This has implications for education within the profession. It also extends to the
intergenerational/intragenerational nature of their work that is not just about how the
communities respond to designers/planners but how these professionals respond to each other.
In the focus group, we discussed development of a consortium of design councils at
universities with mayors, to work collectively with designers/planners. By working collectively
on similar challenges, a foundation of a shared ethic and ethos could be developed and
implemented within a short timeframe. The significance would be development of a national
platform for tackling the more challenging issues. It could also help develop an approach that is
systems and wisdom-based, creating agency for both the built and natural worlds. This could
help to reinvigorate designers/planners as a profession with a mission and a calling—a
profession with societal impact that went beyond themselves. This was a way to take what is
altruistic and create a structure with tactical steps that could develop a new model of leadership
and change within a climate-vulnerable landscape. This led to further discussion on how the
significance of such actions bore the potential for a “movement” within the profession and that
the time was ripe for one.
Personal Reflections
I am a pool in a peaceful place,
I greet the great sky face to face,
I know the stars and the stately moon
And the wind that runs with rippling shoon
But why does it always bring to me
The far-off, beautiful sound of the sea?
The marsh-grass weaves me a wall of green,
But the wind comes whispering in between,
In the dead of night when the sky is deep
The wind comes waking me out of sleep
Why does it always bring to me
The far-off, terrible call of the sea?
—The Sea Wind by Sara Teasdale (1915)
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Arising. I remember speaking to a Sandy survivor in Coney Island in November 2012.
She did not speak English, so shared in Russian, how the water kept rising until it stopped right
below her nose. Not being able to swim, she stood there waiting for it to continue to rise and take
her life. She stood frozen and cold waiting for death. It began to recede. In her recalling, she
sobbed and shook with terror. So did I. I felt her story on a deep personal level. I could easily
imagine myself in that same scenario with a different ending. She was at least three inches taller
than me. I would have drowned. I too did not know how to swim. But as she said, her God and
her height saved her life.
So how do I conclude such a long and arduous doctoral journey on Hurricane Sandy,
rising sea levels, and all that goes with these without facing my own terror around water and
learning how to swim? It can’t be done. So, I did.
I don’t know why the Russian émigré woman never learned to swim but for me it was
because of an accident in a swimming pool. I am told I almost lost my life, had to be
resuscitated. I have no memory of what caused the accident, but my body does.
Learning how to swim and drowning is not the point of this recollection. What is are the
stories that connect us. The woman who spoke only Russian knew I understood every word of
what she said because I understood her experience.
Holding the research. While I had previously conducted narrative interviews for other
professional research projects and listened to historical oral histories, this experience was
different. It was far more intimate and more directly aligned to my own personal and
professional experiences. As a result, my heart and spirit felt a heavy weight during the analysis
of the material. As for my soul, it listened quietly as the witness, remembering.
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It seemed like the beginning of each chapter or rewrite in the past eight months was
accompanied by yet one more climate-related calamity—another flood, tornado, fire, heat wave,
drought. While these disasters underscored my sense of purpose, it did the same for my anxiety. I
struggled with stories that were intimate, revealing, and provocative. They became my lived
experience as I was writing and analyzing, which made me scrutinize everything I did. In cutting
the narratives down, I did not want to inadvertently transfigure the literature of fact into fiction.
Maintaining the dignity of the individuals within the community as well as their stories was, after
all, a strong theme in the research. Reconciling the push to complete the work and the pull to
honor all that I heard, created a dramatic tension within myself. I reconciled that by staying in
the role of the witness rather than the actor.
How does a mission become a movement? Earlier in the doctoral journey, during what
would later become known as my first dissertation topic, I was researching how a
personal/professional mission at the Lower East Side Tenement Museum became a movement.
Prior to delving into my interviews for this study, I reached out to Al Guskin, Professor Emeritus
at the Antioch Leadership and Change Doctoral program, as well as a co-founder of the Peace
Corps. My question to him was: How did a moment in time at the University of Michigan in
1960 became the groundswell of a societal movement of change? What had been the tipping
point? Al noted that it was a confluence of events that he described as serendipity. The students
were inspired by President Kennedy heralding a future that they could all imagine themselves as
agents of change; they were saying yes to more than an idea: it was a calling. It seemed that what
was going on environmentally required that same kind of collective action. The efforts from
within the design/planning community seemed to be more piecemeal and siloed than the kind of
collective action that was needed.
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Conclusion
During a time when we as a society are being collectively called to take a stand for the
equality, well-being, and future of the partnership between humanity and the earth,
designers/planners have a significant role to play. This will require not resting content with the
status quo. It will require an increased willingness to take risks.
Risk is mystery. It requires a journey. Risk means we take a step toward and into the
unknown. By definition, risk accepts vulnerability and lets go of the need to a priori
control the process or the outcome of human affairs. It is the journey of the great
explorers for it chooses, like the images of the maps of old, to live at the edge of
cartography. Risk means stepping into a place where you are not sure what will come or
what will happen.” (Lederach, 2005, p. 163)
This demands leadership with courage, leadership that reclaims the ecosystem of a built
environment standing on the foundation of the natural world. Everyone needs the courage and
wisdom to step boldly into this unknown; designers/planners are uniquely positioned to rising
to this call.
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Afterword
Since defending my dissertation on March 16, 2020, much transpired in New York City,
the nation, and the world. Within a few days, New York State (City) issues a Stay-at-Home order
in an effort to flatten the curve of the COVID-19 Pandemic. For close to three months all
non-essential businesses close. COVID-19 and Hurricane Sandy are not comparable in their
levels of devastation and destruction. However, the engagement of design/planning professionals
(architects, planners, engineers, landscape architects) is. Personally, professionally, and
societally, the challenges of how we live, work, and publicly congregate in the days, weeks, and
months ahead, will engage the very community of professionals at the center of this study.
While the COVID-19 “new normal” addresses the many and not the few, similar to
Sandy, some communities are affected far more than others. As of June 2020, more than 400,000
people die from this virus across the globe—more than 100,000 in the United States; a
disproportionate number of these deaths continue to be within communities of color (Vergano &
Goba, 2020).
Amidst this, George Floyd is killed May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis by police officers,
underscoring the widespread use of police force on Black lives for decades. Protests begin in
Minneapolis the following day. A local response turns into a national movement that goes global.
Rioting and looting run parallel but in opposition to peaceful protests.
As the history of systemic racism is further exposed and addressed within our
communities, we once again have the opportunity to extend the conversation of social justice and
civil rights to include not only design but the profession itself. This is not a new conversation.
Like systematic racism and economic disparity, it must be addressed with action taken in our
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workplace, our communities, our homes and how we interface with each other on our streets and
shared public spaces.
That said, my objective is not to make designers/planners the saviors. As architect Sekou
Cooke (2020) noted,
If we set ourselves up as the saviors of society, we separate ourselves from the
experiences of the people we design for. We must, instead, directly confront the realities
of the environments we seek to manipulate. If these spaces do not become painfully real
for us as designers, they will remain virtual play spaces in our minds, to be gutted and
destroyed at will. (para. 11)
The questions arising from the events over the past three months are further akin to and
resonant with some of the other findings that are the subject of this study. Climate-impactful
disasters create uncertainty and underscore the impermanence and fragility of life. So too do the
events of today. In both contexts, it will become harder to avoid addressing intergenerational
racial, gender, and economic inequities personally, professionally, and societally as more
populations are impacted. To accomplish this will require a new kind of leadership, where
leaders have the courage to stand for a future where all are equal and live in right alignment with
each other and the earth.
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